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Introduction 
The mystery which lies in the foundations of Western civilisation is that of logos. 
Logos is the only word which defines all epochs in the history o f humankind. The 
only word which can be compared with logos is the Chinese tao. The birthplace of 
the word logos is in the Greek mind. Logos had been used and preserved by the 
Hellenistic peoples wi th the consequence that this priceless heritage could be passed 
on to the peoples o f Europe when they were ready to receive it. The Christian 
civilisation inherited this precious gift , making it the cornerstone o f their beliefs. In 
the modern epoch it introduces structural thinking, which assumes that human 
reality is intelligible. Logos is an incipient logic and it degrades itself into logic. 
Nowadays our society is passing through a deep crisis - the loss o f the original 
concept o f logos. This has followed attacks on logocentric thinking. But i f Greeks 
invented and preserved logos in its many original forms, and then transmitted it to 
the Christian cultures, which adopted Logos in all its various meanings, in the 
process creating a valuable synthesis, what are the roots o f the logos crisis? We do 
not want to investigate the entire history o f humankind looking for the origins o f the 
deterioration o f logos. Whether logos lost its original meaning with Hegel's 
identification of being with non-being, or even earlier with Descartes' identification 
of being with the cogito, is not the focus of our discussion. 
Goethe gives the best account in his Faust, using prophetic language to show where 
the crises o f logos lie. Doctor Faustus, a physician returning f rom an Easter ramble, 
starts to translate the prologue o f St John's Gospel into German. ' I n the beginning 
was logos'. In the first clause he finds himself in diff icul ty as to how to translate 
logos. ' I n the beginning was the Word ' . No, such a complex meaning as contained 
by the word logos cannot be rendered by a single word. He tries to translate logos 
using 'reason', and then with 'power', but finally rejects both solutions. 'The spirit 
aids me, now suddenly I see my way, and write assuredly, in the beginning was the 
deed'. When doctor Faustus makes his final choice, Mephistopheles appears. The 
verses o f Goethe describe the misfortune which visits Dr Faustus as a result o f 
translating and interpreting logos. The main diff iculty is the exact nature of this 
Greek word. Does logos belong to philosophy which gives the primacy to the 
reason, or is its role as a medium in communication, or is logos something else? 
Different Christian traditions gave the different answers to question of the nature of 
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logos not just in the Prologue of St. John's Gospel, but in discerning the mystery of 
logos. The earliest Latin translation had not transmitted the f u l l meaning o f logos, 
but without losing the essence of its meaning. The early translators chose the Latin 
word conventus, the original meaning o f which was 'coming together', and which 
also covers the meaning 'word ' . The latter meaning can be seen in the Romanian 
word cuvint, which is equivalent for "word". Cuvint is used to translate logos in St. 
John's Prologue. A Latin word similar to conventus is cognisco (cum + gnosco), 
which means that something is known only 'w i th ' (cum) others. That indicates the 
interpersonal character o f knowledge. After a while, the Latin word verbum replaced 
conventus as a translation o f logos and the fullness o f the original meaning started 
to deteriorate. Nowadays those languages which derive from Latin usually adopt a 
translation o f logos equivalent to the Latin word verbum. Thus, in Italian logos is 
translated with la parola, in French with la parole, in Spanish wi th la palabra. In 
Luther's translation into German of the Fourth Gospel, as well as in all other places, 
logos is translated wi th das Wort. The English translator did the same, translating 
logos wi th the Word. Logos appears in the other Romance and Anglo-Saxon 
languages in much the same way. The things are different in the Slavonic tradition. 
Because they could receive the concept of Logos directly f rom Greeks, we might 
suppose that the logos of the Slavs retains the fullness of its original meaning. The 
legacy o f the Holy Brothers, St. Cyril and St. Methodius, was the translation of 
almost all Church services as well as the Gospels and the Apostolic writings into 
Slavonic. The original translation of logos by the Holy Brothers was slovo. Slovo 
has preserved all the aspects of logos - the common meaning o f 'word ' as well as 
that of 'reason' or 'mind ' . Slovo is still in use in most Slavonic tradition, but its 
meaning gradually moved to refer to a particular written character or letter. Today in 
languages which are derived f rom Slavonic, we find only traces o f logos as 'reason'. 
Words like slovesno, meaning both 'according to logos' and 'reasonable' indicate 
that meaning o f the Slavonic logos was once much wider. Another substitute for 
logos in the Slavonic tradition, is zbor or sabor. This word is nearer to the Latin 
word conventus. It covers the sphere o f language as well as referring to certain 
gatherings. The word sabor is the root o f sobornost or sabornost. This word is often 
applied to the Church, referring to its catholic character. It can also refer to the ways 
in which the Church has adopted some characteristics from Logos, such as her role 
in gathering the fai thful together. It is o f note that the translation o f St. John's logos 
in the Chinese tradition is tao, a word which is the cornerstone o f religious and 
philosophical thought in the Far East. 
We w i l l not go so far abroad, but w i l l focus our investigation o f logos f rom its early 
days until its mature use in identification wi th the God-man in Christianity. Logos is 
the most important word o f the Greek philosophical arsenal to have been introduced 
into Christianity. Its adoption caused Christians many problems, because their new 
vision o f the faith was explained by means o f older and current philosophy only with 
great diff icul ty. They were caught between a new vision o f their faith and existing 
philosophical language. Etienne Gilson remarks correctly: 'La pensee chretienne 
apportait du vin nouveau, mais les vieilles outres etaient encore bonnes' 1. The old 
skins were the Greek philosophy, limited in their ability to explain the new 
categories o f Christian faith. Thus, much time was to pass before the old terms 
attained new meanings. 
The aim here is to show the transformation of logos through history f r o m the Greek 
philosophical tradition to early Christian thought. The fulf i lment o f our task is 
intended to contribute to scholarship about early Christian thought in three ways. 
First, it w i l l distinguish between Greek and Christian ontology and argue that the 
theory according to which the development of Christianity implies the continuity of 
the Platonic way of thinking in Christian circles does not stand. Second, it w i l l argue 
that Greek philosophy is ontologically enclosed in a monistic pattern and that 
Christian belief based its ontology in God, who is in movement towards the world. 
Third, it argues that the essential characteristic of Greek thought is necessity, at a 
logical as well as an ontological level and that Christianity maintains the concept of 
a personal God who is absolutely free wi th regard to the world, and who allows 
absolute freedom in the world. 
In going about this task we w i l l make explicit the central structural themes present in 
first century Christian authors. To this end, the first chapter w i l l consist of an 
examination of logos concepts in the most prominent Greek philosophers. In this 
respect it w i l l consider the philosophies o f Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle 
and the Stoics. In some of these writers logos is the central pillar o f their thought, 
while in the others it plays an important role. The second chapter w i l l deal with two 
authors, Philo the Jew and St. John the Theologian. The first w i l l be considered in 
the light of his systematisation o f earlier Hellenistic and Jewish teachings, and the 
second as a forebear o f Christian logos. The third chapter w i l l consider the concept 
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of logos in Justin Martyr, Clement o f Alexandria and Origen, and their attempts to 
escape the moulds of Greek philosophy. The fourth chapter w i l l focus on the 
teaching o f Plotinus in the light o f the Christian search for meaning. The final 
chapter w i l l examine the teachings o f St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Irenaeus o f Lyon 
and St. Athanasius o f Alexandria. The first two are considered in their episcopal 
roles as defenders o f orthodoxy. Athanasius represents the crown o f our work as he 
unites the two traditions, one Alexandrian and the other derived f rom the above 
bishops. Athanasius' global conception o f understanding o f the incarnation o f logos 
effects a new version o f the relation between God and the world and provides a solid 
ground for Christian thought. 
1 Etienne Gilson, L'Esprit de la Philosophic Medievale, (Detixieme edition revue, Paris, 1944.) p. 82 
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I Ontological monism of Greek Thought 
1. The epic era and the primitive meaning of the Greek word logos: Homer 
The noun Aoyos is generated f rom the Greek verb Aeyeiv, which has many 
meanings. The oldest meaning of this verb is to collect, to bring together. Some 
philologists think that primitive usage of this verb is in the context of collecting 
wood or picking up wood. However, there is a lot of hesitation among experts in this 
particular area concerning the early meaning o f this verb when the noun logos was 
generated2. Later, the verb Aeyeiv acquired other meaning, which we can f ind in 
many classical and modern Greek texts. These meanings are to count or to be 
reckoned as the best known meaning o f this verb, which is still in use in the modern 
Greek language, is to speak, to talk or to say. 
From the latter meaning o f the verb Aeyeiv, logos acquired its late meaning of 
'speech' in the written and spoken language. 
The historical continuity o f the meaning o f the verb Aeyeiv, from 'to gather' or 'to 
collect' to 'to speak' or 'to say', gives significance to the fact that for the Greek 
mind, speaking was the collecting o f sounds and reading was the collecting of 
letters. 
Homer's epic poems employ the verb Aeyeiv in its late meaning and this generated 
the noun logos. 
The noun logos appeared only twice in Homer's epic poems; once in The Iliad and 
once in The Odyssey. In The Iliad Homer says: 
And Patroclus, so long as the Achaens and Trojans were fighting about the 
wall aloof from the swift ships, even so long sat in the hut o f kindly 
Eurypylus, and was making him glad with talk (A6yois). J 
Logos in Odyssey was mentioned in the following verses: 
Ever with soft and wheedling words 
(5E uaAcxKoioi K C U a imjAio io i Aoyoiai) she beguiles him that he may 
forget Ithaca.4 
It is interesting that in Homer's poems logos appears, as we have seen with the 
adjective ainuAos, which means apparent, deceptive, tricky. Syntagma 
2 E. Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik, ( v l ; Allgemeiner Tei l . Lautlehre. Wortbildung. Flexion ... 
4., unveranderte A u f l . , v l 1968.) 
3 Homer, The Iliad, (with a english translation by A .T . Murray, The loeb Classical Library, volume 11, 
Cambridge, Mass., London, 1963.) X V , 390-3 
4 Homer, The Odyssey, (Translated by A . T . Murray, The Loeb Classical Library, volume 1, 
Cambridge, Mass., London, 1974.) 1, 55. 
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aiuuAioioi Aoyoio i , which appeared in Homer's Odyssey, defined Homer's 
meanings that o f the term logos. Concerning this, we can conceive Homer used 
syntagma to describe trickiness, enchantment or something wheedling. The sense 
that is given to logos in such usage leads to the conclusion that logos had for Homer, 
the meaning of the thoughtful and persuasive word. 
Later, in the V I century, logos held its old meaning o f speaking, and started to be 
used not only as a spoken word but also as a written word. From that time, the usage 
of logos was closely tied up with larger meaningful entities and distinguished from 
the partial word ( E T T O S ) . 
Nevertheless, the question arises, against the background of ordinary, everyday 
usage, when did this Greek word, which determined equally ancient Greek as well 
as Christian thinking, get its philosophical wholeness? It seems that at that moment 
in history, attention was focused away from the mere conversation itself onto the 
matter which the conversation concerns. The matter is not only what we can see 
(XEyetv), but is also something that is in the base o f every indication and addressing 
the indicated itself (AEyouEvov). 
2. Logos as universal world of awakening; Heraclitus the Obscure 
One of the first pre-Socratic thinkers, who introduced the term logos in his 
philosophy, is Heraclitus from Ephesus. The logos in his teaching had a complex 
meaning, which was diff icul t also for his contemporaries to understand. 
For Heraclitus, the logos is 'the one and the common world ' for all people. Thus, he 
speaks: 
Not after listening to me, but after listening to the account, one does wisely 
in agreeing that all things are one 
( O U K Eiiou ccAAa T O U Aoyou ccKouaavTas onoAoysTv 0 0 9 0 V E O T I V E V TT 
dvra ) 5 . 
The logos, in this place probably expresses the law (uouos) o f existence, which is 
immanent in all things. This law of existence 'holds sway to the extent that it 
wishes, and suffices for all, and still left over' 6. The same logos directs people to 
think reasonably, because: 'thinking is common to all ( £ u v o v ) ' 7 . Although logos is 
the reason in virtue of which people have cognition of universal law, '[the greater 
5 Heraclitus, Fragments, (A text and translation with a commentary by T . M . Robinson, University o f 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987.) Fr. 50. 
6 Heraclitus, Fragments, 114 
7 Heraclitus, Fragments, 113 
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part o f things divine,] escape ascertainment because o f people's lack o f be l ief . The 
people lack confidence that they are capable of cognition o f that law, or they are 
stupid and 'become worked up over every statement (Aoycp) ' 9 . 
This universal principle of the law of existence or 'account, which holds forever, 
people forever prove uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when 
once they have heard it. For, although all things happen in accordance with this 
account, they are like people without experience when they experience words and 
deeds such as I set forth, distinguishing each thing according its real constitution, 
i.e., pointing out how it is. The rest o f mankind, however, fa i l to be aware o f what 
they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do while asleep' 1 0. 
The logos, such as it appears ( 9 p d £ c o v O K C O S E X E I ) , Heidegger puts in connection 
with a phenomenon of the truth as unconcealment (a-Ar)0Eia). In his commentary 
on this fragment", Heidegger's stance is that being in itself stays unknown 
(Accv9dvEi), or in concealment to unreasonable people. Being comes back to 
concealment for those people because they forget it (ETnAavGavovTou). Heidegger 
tries to use the logos of Heraclitus as a means for establishing his own teaching 
about the truth. According to Heidegger the truth belongs to the logos, i.e. truth only 
appears through the logos. This is only the case when we use the notion o f the truth 
in its pre-philosophical meaning. The following fragment is one in which people 
must take logos as a universal law. 
That is why one must fol low that which is common. Though the account is 
common, the many live, however, as they had private understanding. 1 2 
According to this, Heraclitus say that, ' for those who are awake there is a single, 
common (J;uv6<>") universe, whereas in sleep each person turns away into <his> own, 
private (universe). ' 
On this point, for Heraclitus sleepy people are those who have the illusion that they 
know anything. This kind of hermeneutic explanation supports Heidegger's thesis 
that the common world is the concealed (true) one whereas private worlds are just 
illusions. 
s Heraclitus, Fragments. 86 
9 Heraclitus, Fragments, 87 
1 0 Heraclitus, Fragments. 1 
" Heidegger, Martin, Being And Time, (Translated by J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Basil 
Blackwell , 1988.) h. 219, p. 262 
l 2Heraclitus, Fragments. 2. 
1 ' Heraclitus, Fragments, 89. 
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Apart f rom this logos, which is the law (vouos), understood by mind (<ppoveiv) and 
which we can called the logos of understanding, there are the other meanings of 
logos. 
The logos at the same time unites opposites. The logos is one which connects the 
opposites o f all beinghood. About this harmony and unity Heraclitus speaks in the 
fol lowing words: ' A l l things are one ( E V TrdvToc eTvai)' 1 4- This logos we can call 
the logos o f gathering because it arranges all things. 
However, this logos o f gathering as a principle o f unity stays hidden because 
'<things> real constitution has a tendency to conceal itself 
(cpuoig KpuTTTEoGai cpiXeT)'15. Heraclitus proceeds: ' A n unapparent connection is 
stronger than one which is obvious' 1 6 . 
According to M . Marcovich , Heraclitus takes nature not in its biological but in its 
mechanical sense. In this way, nature as a mechanical unity (cpuaig) shows a 
harmony (apiacour)), which in a mechanical way unites and holds together two 
opposite parts in every particular thing. 
We can add the fol lowing fragment: 
They do not understand how, while differing f rom (or being at variance), it is 
in agreement wi th itself. <There is> a back turning connection, like <that> o f a 
bow and lyre . 1 8 
By the internal relationship between bow and lyre, Heraclitus shows that in every 
nature exist two opposite parts, which establish wholeness and unity according to 
'strife' and opposition. Concerning this, i f someone wants to f ind out what is logos 
of gathering, he must separate the thing into its particular, opposite components 
according to its own nature (KCITCX cpuoiv Biccpeov). According to Heraclitus, the 
principle o f strife rules in the whole o f nature: 
[Heraclitus said] that what opposes unites [and that finest attunement stems 
from things bearing in opposite directions, and that all things come about 
s t r i fe] 1 9 
War and strife are not only principles o f the unity o f concrete thing but also have a 
cosmological character. 
1 4 Heraclitus, Fragments, 50. 
Heraclitus. Fragments, 123. 
1 6 Heraclitus, Fragments, 54. 
1 7 Miroslav Marcovich., Heraclitus. Greek text with a short commentary, (The Los Andes University 
Press, Merida, Venezuela, 1967.) pp. 33 
1 8 Heraclitus, Fragments, 51 . 
1 9 Heraclitus, Fragments, 8. 
One must realize that war is common, and justice strife, and that all things 
come to be through strife and are <so> tordainedt 2 0 
According to Heraclitus there is no logos without strife o f opposites, because: 
'things grasped together: things whole, things not whole; <something> being brought 
together, (something) being separated; (something) consonant; (something) 
dissonant. Out of all things (comes?) one thing, and out o f one thing all things 
( E K TrdvTcov E V K O U E § E V O S TrccvTa)' . Moreover, here in fragment 50: 'a l l things 
are one ( E V udvTcx E T V C U ) ' . However, first all (TrdvTa) probably indicates pairs of 
opposites, and one is their conjunction. In the second case, udvTcc is every concrete 
thing as a wholeness, which contains few opposite components and en is a universal 
principle o f unity o f every pair o f opposite notions. This universal principle is the 
all-gathering logos itself. 
Heraclitus guides us f rom existence, which exists in opposition, to opposition as the 
unity o f opposite components, and finally to the godhead as unity encompassing all 
opposites. 
In a few places, Heraclitus mentions a logos o f the soul: 'One would never discover 
the limits of soul, should one traverse every road - so deep a measure does it 
possess'22, and 'soul possesses a logos which increases i t s e l f 2 3 . This logos o f soul 
can be the human mind according to which man acts, and in that way participates in 
the logos as cosmic constitution. The logos o f soul is increasing in the measure in 
which man reveals and understands the great logos. The multiplicity o f knowledge 
does not reveal the real knowledge about things, about the whole world and about 
how to act according to logos. Rather, logos o f the soul, through which we arrive at 
the universal principle, reveals real knowledge. 
The following fragment suggests this: ' A l l people have a claim to self knowledge 
and sound th inking ' 2 4 . 
The above analysis o f the logos is conditional because presumably Heraclitus had 
thought comprehensively about logos. This analysis aims to define and systematise 
all meanings o f the word logos in Heraclitus' writings according to the context. Karl 
Jaspers gives one acceptable definition of the logos in Heraclitus: 
" Heraclitus, Fragments, 80. 
2 1 Heraclitus, Fragments, 10. 
3 2 Heraclitus. Fragments, 45. 
Heraclitus, Fragments, 115 
2 4 Heraclitus, Fragments, 116 
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In Heraclitus it is not defined, it carries all these meanings at once and is 
never limited to any one of them. The logos is encompassing, undefined and 
endlessly definable (like all the great and basic terms o f philosophy). 2 5 
In the other way, it is unbelievable that such a frequent and semantically polyvalent 
word has only one meaning in Heraclitus writings, as Edwald Kurtz claims in his 
26 
doctoral thesis . Many experts in this problematic have agreed that logos can have 
more than one meaning and that it can represent different things. Thus, for professor 
Kirk , logos is the formula of all things: 
From all things (i.e. the plural phenomenal world) one can understand a 
unifying connexion; f rom this connexion, the single formula or Logos o f all 
things, one is led to turn one's attention back to the many things which are so 
27 
connected. 
Although, elsewhere he identifies logos with fire: 'This logos, in material aspect, 
must be a kind o f fire' . 
It is very useful to mention Martin Heidegger's position about the meaning o f the 
logos in Heraclitus' writings . Heidegger tries to separate the meaning o f logos in 
Heraclitus f rom some later meanings, which this Greek word acquired in the 
Western European tradition f rom Plato until now. Heidegger characterised this 
period as the Onto-theological epoch of metaphysical oblivion (concealment) o f the 
primitive logos. For Heidegger, the logos has the meaning o f gatherings 
(Versammlung). In his attempt to describe metaphysically the meaning o f 
Heraclitus' logos, Heidegger often makes such phrases as: Laying that gather (die 
besende Lege) or Letting-lie-together-before (bei-sammen-vorliegen-Lassen). 
The logos of Heraclitus is still an inspiration and guiding star to many philosophers. 
Some of them abandoned the attempt to find out what the true logos really is and 
they interpreted the logos as something covered by a veil o f mystery. Moreover, 
they still participate in the mystery o f logos and whatever they know, they know 
according to the logos. The others did not unconsciously fol low the commandments 
of the logos, but they started to search for logos in their own opening toward 
communion. Only through the revealing of communion, do they have an experience 
2 5 K a r l Jaspers, The great philosophers; (Edited by Hannah Arendt. Translated by Ralph Manheim, 
London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1966.) p. 17. 
2 6 E. Kurtz, Interpretationen zu den Z.o£o^-Fragmenten Heraklits, (Spudasmata, Olms, 1971., pp. 63 
2 7 G.S. Kirk , . , The cosmic fragments; Heraclitus (edited with an introduction and commentary by G. 
S. Ki rk , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954.) p. 178. 
2 8 G.S. Kirk , The cosmic fragments; Heraclitus, p. 208. 
2 9 Martin Heidegger, Logos, in: Vortrage und Aufsaze 111, (Pfullingen, 1967; Heraclit, Der Anfang 
des abendlandischen Dankens. Logic, Heraklits Lehre vom Logos) Frankfurt, 1979. 
11 
of the true logos, and discover its power o f uniting. However, the history o f the 
philosophical logos started with Heraclitus. 
3. Why is there something and not nothing; Parmenides 
Heraclitus' teaching about logos was not the only one that appeared in pre-Socratic 
philosophy. A t the same time, the logos was revealed to another thinker, to 
Parmenides f rom Elea. Although logos is not so frequently mentioned in 
Parmenides' writings as in Heraclitus', it plays a very important, maybe the main 
role in his poem. 
Thus, Parmenides in the introduction to his poem 'On nature' writes that escorted by 
the Daughters of Sun, he has been driven to the Goddess. The goddess received him 
kindly and she was talking to him: 
Both the steadfast heart o f persuasive truth, 
And the beliefs o f mortals, in which there is no true trust ( T T I O T I S dAr)8ris). 3 0 
The goddess Dike put Parmenides in a dilemma; he has to decide between two 
paths; the way of truth and the way o f doxa. Parmenides introduces the logos as a 
means by which the decision can be made, and he says: 
For never shall prevail, that things that are not are; 
But do you restrain your thought from this route o f inquiry, 
Nor let habit force you, along this route o f much-experience, 
To ply an aimless eye and ringing ear 
And tongue; but judge by reasoning (KpTviv Aoycp) the very contentious 
disproof 
31 
That has been uttered by me. 
However, the decision made by the logos would be only one, because it is not 
determined by just one opportunity but the logos suspended the choice and directed 
us to only one solution. The solution is only one as very truth is only one also. 
Aristotle claims that Parmenides' concept o f Ananke contained an important idea o f 
the compelling force o f logical proof. Thus, Aristotle presented this conception as 
the centre o f the Parmenidean philosophy. Aristotle states that Parmenides 'saw the 
?32 
One under compulsion of the Logos' . 
Parmenides proceeds with the fol lowing fragment: ' A single story o f a route s t i l l ' 3 3 . 
3 0 Parmenides. Fragments, (a text and tr. with an introduction by D. Gallop, Toronto: Univ. o f 
Toronto pp., c 1984.) 1,29-30. 
"'' Parmenides, Fragments, 7. 
3 2 Aristotle, Metaphisica, 1, 5, 986b 
" Parmenides, Fragments, 7, 6 and 8, 1 
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On first sight, this seeming contradiction can be resolved by viewing the true nature 
of Greek thinking and its linguistic formation. Namely, to think and to speak in 
Greek is only possible in a situation where the object o f thinking and spoken 
articulation exists. The Greek verb 'to talk'(Aeyeiv), f rom which is generated the 
noun logos, indicates something existing. In this case, speech about nothing or non-
being (ur] 6v) is not possible. On the other hand, talking was distinguished f rom the 
mere pronunciation o f voices, because it is meaningful, whereas 'talking nothing' 
(ou5ev Aeyeiv) is meaningless. Parmenides says this in the fol lowing sentence: 
For you could not know what-is-not (for that is not feasible) 
Nor could you point it out (dvdoTov O U T E (ppccCjeTv).34 
Being is only one and unique object o f speaking and thinking or as Parmenides says 
in his poetic manner: 
It must be that what is there for speaking and thinking o f is; for (it) is there to 
be, 
Whereas nothing is not; that is what I bid you consider.. . 3 : > 
The well-known fragment o f Parmenides, where he says: '...because the same thing 
is for thinking and for being ( T O y d p auTo uoeTv eo"riv T E KCCI E T V C U ) ' indicates 
that the logos directs not only to true thinking and speaking, but also according to 
the logos men decide true being. Parmenides tries to assert that only being ( T O E O U ) 
is and only being can be the object o f thinking and speaking and 'thus it must either 
be completely or not at a l l ' 3 6 . False thinking is different f rom true thinking in that 
false thinking lacks substantiality and its conflict with reality becomes contradiction. 
Wi th his teaching, Parmenides has opened a new epoch in logical thinking. 
Distinguishing the phenomenal ( T C J S O K O U V T C T ) f rom the real world ( T d O V T C X ) , 
Parmenides gave the possibility for Platonic division into opinion ( 5 6 £ a ) , which is 
the product o f the senses ( T O a io8r |Td) and thinking (v6r | | ia ) about true reality, 
which is in the sphere o f mind ( i d v o n T d ) . Through Parmenides, the prior 
distinction of logos and myth became the opposition between logos on the one hand 
and on the other, myth and sense perception and opinion. Some scientists identify 
the logos in Parmenides' writings, with a ratio and try to establish that the logos 
lacks some of the gathering and synthesising elements. These elements lead to truth 
about wholeness in Greek language and thinking. Martin Heidegger is against this 
""' Parmenides, Fragments, 2, 8 
"° Parmenides, Fragments, 6, 1-2 
'"' Parmenides, Fragments, 8 , 1 1 . 
identification o f logos with ratio . His standpoint is that the genuine unity o f the 
logos and o f being becomes revealed in thinking as reassembling. Thinking as 
reassembling according to Heidegger is the possibility to understand being, which is 
gathered by logos in a true way. Thus, being becomes revealed. 
After all, in Parmenides' philosophy, people started to judge reality by means of 
logos. However, every time we talk about being and non-being, logic and 
metaphysics we stand in this Eleatic tradition o f logos. 
4. The logos of dialectics; Plato 
Heraclitus and Parmenides are not the only thinkers in the pre-Socratic period, in 
whose teachings the notion o f logos found a respectable place. The notion logos was 
in usage in the writings o f other philosophers in this epoch. However, the logos did 
not have significance as basic pillars o f their teaching such that can be investigated 
and we w i l l not give a lot attention to their writings. 
The decrease of interest in cosmology and an increase in searching for the authentic 
truth of being, which came with the Sophists, was projected onto the conception of 
logos. The subjectivism and relativism of the Sophists brought f lexibil i ty in 
conceiving o f logos. In the teaching o f sophistic thinkers, the logos has the meaning 
of proper reason (6p86s Aoyos). This reason is located in the realm of speech 
(Aoyois) and it served to be divided into elements and used for conclusions 
(Aoyoug). Thus, Diogenes Laertius says: 
Protagoras was the first to maintain that there are two sides in every 
question; opposed to each other, and he even argued in this fashion, being 
the first to do so. 3 8 
The proper reason of the Sophists was used for true conclusions or rational 
structures about which there is a conclusion or theory. Although usage of logos in 
that way was only in particular cases, such usage is remote f rom the possibility of 
the universal principle to arise 3 9. We w i l l not give here much attention to the 
3 7 Martin Heidegger, Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, (English, A n introduction to metaphysics / 
Martin Heidegger ; translated by Ralph Manheim, New Haven, London : Yale University Press, 
c 1959.) and Martin Heidegger, Was heisst Denken? (English, What is called thinking? / by a 
translation o f Was heisst Denken? [by J.Glenn Gray] ; introduction by J. Glenn Gray, New York : 
Harper & Row, 1968.) 
1 8 Diogenes Laertius, Lives o f Eminent Philosophers, (volume I I , wi th a translation by R.D. Hicks, 
The Loeb Classical Library, London, New York, 1925.) IX , 51 
y ) G.B. Kerferd,., logos in The Encyclopaedia o f Philosophy, (New York, London, 1967., vol 5) pp. 
83-84. 
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Sophist's usage o f logos, but we w i l l in some cases in the fol lowing text compare 
their understanding o f logos with Plato's. Logos acquired a very significant place in 
the philosophy of Plato. We cannot speak about the uniform conception o f logos in 
Plato's writings. The logos appears in many places and very often with different 
meanings. Plato's usage o f logos projects exactly the 'hybrid character' 4 0 o f his 
philosophy. Namely, the logos very often is taken in the meanings in which it 
appeared in the teachings o f Plato's great forebears. His teachings combined the 
universal logos o f Heraclitus with Parmenides' logos o f being, and the sophist's 
proper reason with Socrates' dialectics as the skill o f arguing. Plato emphasised the 
distinction between myth and logos. He also re-established the relationship between 
logos and nomos. Nevertheless, his thought brought something new. The new can be 
seen in Plato's dialectics, which was developed in Academia. The method of 
dialectics was based on logical divisions and the construction o f notions. 
For an easier investigation o f the usage of the term logos, we w i l l define different 
groups o f meaning in which the logos has the same or similar meaning. In the first 
group, we can distinguish these meanings of logos, in which those are contrasted to 
the myth or it is in relationship with myth. This problematic, which Plato revives, is 
one o f the oldest matters in the poetic as well in the philosophical tradition of the 
Greeks. From Homer and Hesiod, to Pindar and Thucydides the logos always abides 
close to myth, without the tendency to modify it. The standpoint on which myth as 
an experiencing o f reality was the given truth and logos as a thinking of reality was 
the searching truth, was brought into question. Plato supported this opposition and 
when he spoke about myth, he very often used the term mythical speeches 
(Aoyoi uuScbBeis). Thus, Plato through the mouth o f Protagoras asked: ' . . . but shall 
I , as an old man speaking to his juniors, put my demonstration in the form o f fable, 
or o f a regular exposition?' 4 1 Moreover, Protagoras finally decided to do this in the 
form o f myth. In another place, he said: 'On this point, Socrates, I shall give you 
argument instead o f fable ' 4 2 . To the mythical speeches were opposed true speeches 
(Aoyoi aAr)9ivo(), the former of which Plato demonstrates with the fol lowing 
4 0 F. Nietzsche, Die Philosophie im Tragischen Zeitater der Grichen, (in Nietzsche Werke, band I I , 
Verlag, Das Bargland - Buch, Salzburg/Stuttgart) p. 1098. 
4 1 Plato, Protagoras, (The Loeb Classical Library, volume I V , with translation by W . R . M . Lamb, 
London, New York, 1924.) 320c. 
4 2 Plato, Protagoras. 324d. 
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words: 'akin to these in the words o f tales that are fables and those that are more 
nearly true (6aoi (JA)0ti)8£i<; TCOV X6y(ov m i 6 C O I 6:Xr|9ivd)T;epoi f | a a v ) ' 4 3 . 
However, the result o f this hard confrontation between logos and myth is not the 
expulsion o f myth. Plato often uses a mythical form of explanation; showing by this 
that myth takes a part in conceiving reality structured by logos. Plato's myths stay in 
relationship wi th the logos. When the logos has to prove and establish that 
everything is not sufficient, it has to be substituted by myth, because myth is not 
under the demand of strict proof. The myth o f Plato is no longer used in the old 
sense; its use rather brings an acknowledgement o f the heights, which are 
inconceivable for logos. Moreover, the myth ennobled by the logos becomes capable 
to reveal powerfully. The logos in relationship with myth best demonstrates the 
nature of logos for Plato. While the myth was the authoritative and objective word 
and the widespread expression of the collective spirit, logos was subjectively 
defined and was the meaningful and persuasive word and the expression o f the one 
distinction o f the individual, his rationality. 
The popular and technical meaning o f logos as speaking is still in usage in Plato's 
writings, when he refers to some particular speeches 4 4 . 
Logos receives Plato's fu l l affirmation in the late dialogues. In Plato's gnoseology, 
logos assumes a very significant role. In taking an anti-sophistic position, Plato 
wants to overcome the opposition between relativistic opinion and true knowledge 
and to find the solution of this problem in logos. 
In his early dialogue 'Cratylus', Plato says that logos is 'that speech which says 
things as they are is t rue ' 4 3 . Plato defines logos in relationship to name (ovoncc) and 
things (TTpdyiactTa). Here logos explains the things to which it relates, as well as 
the meanings o f these things. Thus, logos is the definition of the meaning o f the 
names (6p0oTris T C O V O V O U & T C O V ) . This Plato exposes in his late dialogues, 
Theaetetus and Sophist, which clears a way to the true knowledge about something 
4 3 Plato, The Republic, (with translation by Paul Shorey, volume 11, The Loeb Classical Library, 
London, Cam., Mass., 1935), VII , 522a. 
4 4 Plato mentions 'old tradition' (6 TiaAaios Aoyos) in Laws, IV, 715e (Plato, Laws, volume II, with 
translation by R . G . Bury, London, New York, 1926) or when he refers to 'doctrine that is taught in 
secret about matter (EV aTroppr|"rois AeyonEvos UEpi O U T C O V Aoyos)' in Phaedo 62b (Plato, The 
Loeb Classical Library, volume I, with translation by H.N. Fowler, Cam., Mass., London, 1971.) 
4 5 Plato, Cratilus, 385b. 
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by dialectical logos. Plato in Theaetetus defines logos 'as the talk which the soul has 
with itself about any subject which it considers' 4 6. In the Sophist he says: 
Well , then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a 
silent inner conversation o f the soul with itself, has been given to the special 
name o f thought' 4 7 . 
In Theaetetus, we get some explicit explanation o f logos. Plato has started from the 
premise 'that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge' . Then he tries to 
define what explanation (logos) really is. The problem arises because the initial parts 
(elements), in which things are contained, could not be explained; i.e. we could 
neither have true knowledge about things because we need an explanation for these 
initial elements. Plato rejects the possibility that 'the combination o f names is the 
essence of reasoning' 4 9. Because, i f parts which are named did not have their logos, 
i.e. could not to be explained, how is it possible that conjunctions o f these elements 
could be conceived? In addition to this, i f somebody acquired true knowledge 
without logos, his soul possessed the truth, but it did not have true knowledge 
because it was not able to give an explanation (logos) about the knowledge that it 
possessed. 
Plato proceeds with giving the definitions o f logos. Plato gives three possible 
definitions o f logos. The first definition, which we can provisionally call the 
linguistic definition, is based on Plato's words: 
The first would be making one's own thought clear through speech by means 
of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through 
lips. As in a mirror or water. 3 0 
In this way, Plato proceeds to describe logos as 'the vocal image o f thought' 5 1 . In 
the Sophist also, Plato gives a similar explanation: 
But the stream that flows f rom the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth 
has the name o f speech. 5 2 
Thus, logos is understood as saying that something is and it depends on the vocal 
potentiality o f the speaker. The second definition o f the logos relates to enumerating 
the elements, which consisted in one wholeness. Plato defines the logos here 'by 
4 6 Plato, Theaetetus. (in Theaetetus, Sophist, with translation by H.N. Fowler, volume II, London, 
New York, 1921.), 190a. 
4 7 Plato, Sophist, 263e. 
4" Plato, Theaetetus. 202c. 
4 S' Plato, Theaetetus, 202b. 
5 0 Plato, Theaetetus, 206d. 
5 1 Plato. Theaetetus, 208c. 
5 2 Plato, Sophist. 263e. 
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describing the whole in terms of its elements' or 'the approach to the whole through 
the elements' 5 3. However, the problem o f such a definition o f logos is that counting 
the elements blindly or without any orders takes away f rom the understanding and 
explanation o f the character o f true knowledge. The third and last definition o f logos 
indicates some sign (ornieTov), by which one thing is distinguished f rom another. 
This, Plato expresses in the fol lowing: 'explanation was the interpretation o f your 
difference', or in another place: 'Then right opinion also would have to do with 
differences in the given instance' 5 4. However, the last definition is also 
unacceptable. We enter into a circular situation, because we try to establish our 
understanding on the basis o f difference, which we already know. Thus, Plato makes 
the conclusion that ' i t is utterly silly, when we are looking for definition o f 
knowledge, to say that is a right opinion with knowledge, whether o f difference or 
anything else whatsoever' 5 5. 
The investigation o f meaning o f logos developed in another o f Plato' s dialogues, 
The Sophist. Plato exposes the problem o f dialectics as the right method o f division 
and construction o f notions. In the dialogue The Sophist, discussion tends to acquire 
the nature o f the sophist; i.e. to give the specific definition (logos) o f what the 
sophist really means. However, the main theme o f this dialogue is the determination 
of notions of genera or classes. In the Theaetetus, we concluded that knowledge 
consisted in acquiring the notion of the species through genera and difference; i.e. 
through explanation of the logos. The main task of the dialogue The Sophist is to 
expose the integration of ei'8r) or yevr). 
The method of disintegration or separation that determined the notion 
(8iai'p£Oig, Staipeiv KCCT e\'5r|), which is included in the wider genera or species, is 
the method by which we can come to the definition. The process, which occurred 
previously, is the process of conjunction or synthesis 
(auvccyetv EIS ev, auvaycoyri ) . In the process of diaeresis, genera are classified 
into a consistent notion, whereas in the second process of synthesis the specific 
genera are made on the basis of a common distinction. The guidance through this 
investigation again belongs to the logos. About the synthesis, Plato says: 'there are 
some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can 
mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of 
" Plato, Theaetetus, 207d; 208c. 
5 4 Plato, Theaetetus, 209d. 
5 5 Plato, Theaetetus, 210a. 
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separation' . These elements or ideas can be mingled in communion (xoivcovia) or 
can participate ( U E T E X E I V ) in one another and they do not lose any o f their specific 
idea ( C C T O U O V E T S O S ) . According to Plato, the process o f 'the division o f things by 
classes and avoidance o f the belief that the same class is another, or another the 
en 
same, belongs to the science o f dialectic' . 
Dialectics presumes this communion o f genera. It also presumes the dieresis i f it is a 
communion established on unity, which is based on forms developed by division. 
The division enables the communion o f genera, which have an ontological 
possibility to be founded on themselves. The dialectical possibility o f synthesis and 
dieresis are established not only by the epitomising o f genera and species in 
opiouog as communion (KOIVCOVIOC) , but also by mutual relating o f these genera and 
species based on equality and difference. On the basis o f difference, which at the 
same time presents equality, the oneness of genera yields the last undivided form 
( C X T O H O V eT5og) of the species. These undivided forms are the cause ( C U T O V ) o f 
dieresis (StcnpEOis). The assembly of different ideas at the same time and in the 
same place is the condition for the existence o f dialectics. 
Plato in his Parmenides uses dialectical method to prove that the idea o f oneness 
does not refute the idea of plurality, but it establishes the latter. The purpose o f his 
dialectics is to show that ideas as singular forms do not need to be the oneness, but 
they can comprehend one plurality o f singular forms. Although Plato in Parmenides 
CO 
prefers dialectical practising to the Socratic op(^EOT0ai , this dialectics does not 
stay on the level of giving positive definition, but it founds the possibility o f the real 
defining of being by dialectical dieresis. Defining the oneness, which is not 
multiplicity, but diversity established in identity, happened in logos. In logos lies the 
possibility to understand multiplicity in oneness. Thus, this logos 
( O I K E T O S Xoyog ouoiag) has no purpose in itself, but it is the only way of thinking 
about something. 
According to this, non-being has not had its own logos, because it would be a 
delusion to think and to speak non-being. Plato says: ' for to think or say what is not, 
that is falsehood arising in mind or in words ' 5 9 . Logos is always 
5 & Plato, Sophist. 253c. 
3 7 Plato, Sophist. 253d. 
, ! i Plato, Pamienides, 153e. 
5 9 Plato, Sophist, 260c. 
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A6yo$ T O U O V T O S or Aoyog T I V O S , because it must be speech about something or 
it must be the reason for something concrete. The only way of talking about non-
being is to think non-being as something that is different to being, but not as 
something that is opposite to being. This Plato explains in the fol lowing words: 'that 
non-being was and is non-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes 
o f b e i n g ' 6 ' . 
Moreover, in Plato's Seventh Letter, logos has a significant place by way o f coming 
to true knowledge. Plato gives three elements, which mediate the process to 
knowledge, and the fourth element is knowledge itself. The first element is the name 
(ovouct), the second is the explanation or definition o f the notion (Aoyos), and the 
third is the image (e'(8oAov). These three elements stay on the way to the true 
knowledge, which is the fourth element in this process. Logos does not represent 
some accidental attitude, but the essential definition o f every thing, whose logical 
structure is established by dieresis. However, the problem arises as a result of 
entitling or naming, which does not consist o f something secure, because a bare 
definition is composed o f words, nouns and verbs. The instability o f knowledge 
comes f rom the weakness o f logos, not in a dialectical way but as a means o f verbal 
expression. In spite o f the imperfection of these four elements or levels, which are 
leading to the fifth element, or bare object of knowledge, cognition is possible on the 
base o f a proper mental disposition or just and noble tendency. 
Plato repeats in the other dialogues the idea o f the division o f the elements o f which 
things are composed. Thus, in The Laws, Plato says that three elements exist in 
every thing: 'One point is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one 
the name (Ev (iev xf]V otxriav, &v 5e xr\c, obaiaq xbv Xbyov, EV 5 E 6vouor) ' 6 2 . 
In Timaeus Plato conceives logos as the world o f ideas which serves as a pattern for 
the creation of the world. Plato's idea o f cosmos (Koouog) is shaped under the 
necessity o f ontological monism. The idea of cosmos was created on the basis of the 
unity o f three elements: the intelligible world (vor |Td) , mind (vous) and being 
(eTvai). Cosmos signifies beauty and harmony. The truth (ccAr)8£ia), which is 
identical with virtue (apETrj) and beauty ( T O KCXAOV ) , belongs to this world. The 
idea o f cosmos establishes a harmonious relationship between beings, and even God 
cannot avoid the influence of the ontological necessity of this Unity. This cosmos 
6 0 Plato, Sophist, 262e. 
6 1 Plato, Sophist, 258c. 
Plato. Law.v, X. 895d. 
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must have some arche. Plato states that ' i t is necessary that cosmos should be a copy 
of something' 6 3 . Cosmos is modelled according to something which is higher and 
better. The Maker o f the cosmos must have something according to which he w i l l 
create. 
For the Cosmos is the fairest o f all that has come into existence, and He the 
best o f all the Causes. So having in this wise come into existence, it is to be 
constructed after the pattern o f that which is apprehensible by reason and is 
self-identical. 
(b [LEV ydp KdXXiaxoc, xcov Y e Y o v o ' c c o v > 0 5' dpiaioc; TCOV auri.Gov. OTJTGO 
8fi Y£YevT||ifevoc; 7tpd<; t o X6yc$ K O U ^povf jaei nEp\Xr\nxov K O C I K a r a 
TOdrcd £%ov 8s8r)|iio<)pYT)i:ai). 6 4 
The Maker or Demiurge o f the cosmos produces the rational system of heavenly 
bodies, which reflect the world o f ideas. 
We must declare that this Cosmos has truly come into existence as a Living 
Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence o f God. 
( O - U T O X ; ovv 5f| K a r a A . 6YOV tov e t K b r a S E T XEJEIV ravSe xbv K6au.ov 
£opov £|i\ | /vxpv 'EVVOVV XE x f j dXr)0ei.a, 8 i d Tnv xox> QEOV YeveaGai 
7tp6voiav). 6 : > 
We can conclude that logos in the cosmology of Plato represents the place where the 
world o f ideas is settled, as well as the reasoning capacity endowed by God and 
inherited in souls. For centuries the ideas exposed in Timaeus w i l l have the central 
place in discussion o f the origins of the world among both Platonists and Christian 
philosophers. 
In respect o f Plato's conceiving of logos with his dialectical path, logos apart from 
its conventional meaning, acquires an onto-logical supposition. This is one of the 
biggest contributions of Plato to the notional-semantic history of logos and to the 
philosophy of logos, as well as to philosophy in general. 
5. The birth of logic; Aristotle 
Aristotle's conceiving of logos is polyvalent, as is in the case of Plato. Very often, 
the noun logos covers a variety of different notions. The main reason is that logos is 
not defined by some basic meaning. 
In the majority o f cases, Aristotle uses logos in the sphere o f language and 
linguistical determination. For him, logos is one of the elements o f linguistical 
6 3 Plato, Timaeus, 28b. 
6 4 Plato, Timaeus. 29a. 
Plato, Timaeus, 30b. 
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expression. Thus, every verbal expression has eight parts, and there are: letter, 
syllable, conjunction, joint , noun, verb, case and phrase (Aoyos) 6 6 . Aristotle 
explains what a phrase is by these words: ' A phrase is a composite sound with 
meaning, some parts of which mean something by themselves.' He continues: ' A 
'phrase' may be a unit in two ways; either it signifies one thing or it is combination 
of several 'phrases" 6 7. This explanation is Aristotle's definition o f logos as 
meaningful speech. In Aristotle's logic logos has the fol lowing meanings: notion, 
definition, statement, formula, argument, discourse, reason, judgement, sense and 
concept. One o f the most frequent meanings of logos is that of proposition. 
Nowadays, many scholars criticise the translation o f logos as proposition or 
judgement. Their main point is that the fundamental meaning o f logos is 
misapprehended in such translations. Undoubtedly, the most significant o f these 
critics is Martin Heidegger 6 8. 
Heidegger takes the position that logos does not mean judgement or proposition 
primarily in the sense o f making some connection or taking a standpoint. Logos 
indicates something conversant or something evident (BrjAoOv). Logos shows 
(a7TO9aivEO0ai) and makes something known. According to this, logos makes 
something conversant (aTTO<pavat$) to someone, through the discourse. 
Nevertheless, for Aristotle, not every logos is a true one. Every discourse, according 
to Aristotle signifies something (Aoyos orinavTiKOs), but at the same time every 
logos does not declare and proclaim something (Aoyos dTrocpavTiKOs). For 
Aristotle, logos, which makes something conversant can be true and false. He 
proceeds with this: 
We call proposition (logos) those only that have truth or falsity in them 
( E O T I 5E Aoyos QTras U E V or inavTiKoa, . . . aTKxpavTiKoCO 5E O U TTI'S, dAA 
' EVGO T O dAr)6EUEiv f) yEu8EO0ai U T T & P X E I ) . 6 9 
However, there are sentences, which are not true or false: 
A prayer is, for instance, a sentence but neither has truth nor has falsity 
( O U K EV ctTraoi 5E uTrdpxEi, oiov f) Euxn Aoyos U£v> dAA' O U T ' dAr)6f]s 
O U T E yEu5r]s)- 7 0 
6 6 Aristotle, The Poetics, (with translation by W.H. Fyfe, The Loeb Classical Library, Cam., Mass., 
London, 1982.) X X , 1456b 2. 
6 7 Aristotle, The Poetics, X X , 1457a 11-13. 
6 SMartin Heidegger, Aristotle's Metaphysics 9 1-3, (translated by W. Brogan & pp. Warnek, Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1995.) pp. 99-110, and Martin Heidegger, Being And 
Time, (Translated by J. Macquarrie & E . Robinson, Basil Blackwell, 1988.) h. 32-34, pp. 55-58. 
6' J Aristotle, On Interpretation, (in, The Organon, with translation by H.P. Cooke, The Loeb Classical 
Library, London, Cam., Mass., 1938.) IV, 17a 1-3. 
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Heidegger tries to connect Aristotle's logos with the possibility o f defining the 
notion o f truth. The truth is thought in the primitive meaning o f the word a-Ar)0Eict 
(which consists o f a - alpha privative and Ar)9r), which means forgetfulness or 
oblivion). Aristotle's standpoint is that logos is discourse, which can be true. 
Heidegger interprets this in the sense that logos makes known that o f which and 
about which the discourse is, and simply lets it be seen in itself. The expression 'to 
be true' (aXr]0EUEiv) in Greek means un-cover (ent-decken) something, in the sense 
to unfold (enthullen) something. The way to understand Heidegger's position is not 
as something which is uncovered for the first time or something that lets itself be 
seen, rather as the uncovering o f something, which then becomes covered again. The 
opposite notion, 'to be false' (vyEu5Ea0cu), does not indicate falsity, but expresses 
some deceiving (tauschen) or distorting (verstellen) something about which the 
discourse is. However, Heidegger translates this vyEuSEOTca wi th covering, because 
he tends to make this word the opposite to uncovering. 
Covering and uncovering are determined by logos, the essence o f which is to let be 
seen in itself. Thus, logos is airocpavTiKOS and its possibility to be spoken lies in its 
possibility to be seen in itself. The attribute ocTrc^avTiKOc; represents a verbal 
expression, in which a bare thing becomes accessible and maintained. Heidegger 
concludes that the proposition does not make the truth possible, but the opposite, 
namely, the proposition is possible only in the truth. 
According to the previous idea logos gives the possibility for something to be seen, 
and in that giving o f being becomes accessible. The logos shows something as itself. 
Logos indicates something in the basis o f every discourse, hypokeimenon 
( U T T O K E I U E V O V ) . According to this, logos itself is at the same time being and 
existence. Plato always conceived the logos as Aoyos T I V O S . Aristotle went a step 
further. His concept o f discourse declares something he determined as affirmation 
and negation 7 1. This logos is not the choice between two options or between positive 
and negative propositions, rather it indicates combination and separation and it is at 
the same time synthesis and dieresis. The combination (synthesis) does not manifest 
the combination of notions or propositions but it expresses something, which can be 
seen in its gathering. Concerning this Aristotle said in one place: 
Aristotle, On Interpretation, IV , 17a 4-6. 
7 1 Aristotle, On Interpretation, V, 17a 9-11 
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As for 'being' qua truth, and 'non-being' qua falsity, since they depend upon 
combination and separation, and taken together are concerned with 
arrangement o f the parts of contradiction (since the true has affirmation 
when the subject and predicate are combined, and negation where they are 
divided; but the false has the contrary arrangement. How it happens that we 
combine or separate in thought is another question. By 'combining or 
separating in thought' I mean thinking them not as a succession but as a 
unity); for 'falsity' and ' truth' are not in things - the good, for example, 
being true, and bad false - but in thought; and with regard to simple concepts 
and essences there is no truth or falsity even in thought; - what points we 
must study in connexion with being and non-being in this sense.72 
Aristotle defines the logos as definition or formula 7 3 i f it determines some thing. He 
very frequently uses logos with the meaning of argument 7 4. 
For Aristotle logos or 'a definition is a phrase signifying a thing's essence'7 5 and ' i n 
definition words ought to be rendered by account, i f possible in every case, or i f not, 
in major i ty ' 7 6 . 
In Aristotle's Analytics logos has the meaning o f conclusion, which is acquired from 
notions placed in the syllogistic relationship (ouAAoyiouos). The logos of 
Aristotle's logic is the basis of being, which unites all things. His logos consists of 
the essential origin of the whole language and it determines the way of discourse as 
a logical discourse. 
We can also spread the logical foundation o f logos on an ontological plan. 
According to his usage of logos in the ontological sense, we can understand 
Aristotle's definition o f the soul as human logos77. The possibility o f perceiving the 
world is equivalent to the possibility o f logically relating to the world. The soul is 
divided into two parts according to logos. One part is rational (Aoyov) and the other 
is irrational (aAoyov) . Aristotle proceeds with his classification in the following: 
Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as whole, is double. 
One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; 
the other, the seat o f the appetites and o f desire in general, does in a sense 
participate in the principle, as being amenable and obedient to i t . 7 8 
7 2 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, (with translation by H. Tredennick, The Loeb Classical Library, Cam., 
Mass., London, 1967), E , V I , 1027b 15-25. 
7 3 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 996b 5; 1013a 25; 1036a 30; and Aristotle. The Physics, in, (with 
translation by pp.H. Wicksteed & F.M. Cornford, The Loeb Classical Library, volume V, London, 
Cam., Mass., 1968.) 193a 31; 200a 15; 202b 12; 210a 20. 
7 4 Aristotle. The Metaphysics, 1002a 25; 1006a 10; 1010a 15; and Aristotle, The Physics, 185a 8. 
7 5 Aristotle, The Topics, 101b 38. 
7 6 Aristotle, The Topics, 149a 2. 
7 7 Aristotle, On soul, 414a 13 
7 8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (with translation by H.Rackham, The Loeb Classical Library, Cam., 
Mass., London, 1975.), I, XIII 1102a 18. 
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The rational part o f the soul, according Aristotle is divided into two faculties, the 
scientific (ETrioTnuoviKov), and the calculative (AoyioTiKOv). The former is 'one 
whereby we contemplate those things whose first principles are invariable, and [the] 
one whereby we contemplate those things which admit o f var iat ion ' 7 9 is the 
calculative one. 
Logos acquired its usage in Aristotle's ethical and political writings. Aristotle 
defines logos as speech which only man possesses: 
For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of 
the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain or 
pleasure, and therefore is possesses by other animals as well (for their nature 
has been developed so far as to have sensations o f what is painful and 
pleasant and to signify those sensations to one another), but speech is 
designed to indicate the advantageous and harmful, and therefore also the 
right and wrong; for it is the special property o f man in distinction f rom other 
animals that he alone has perception o f good and bad and right and wrong 
and the other moral qualities; and it is partnership in these things that makes 
O A 
a household and city-state. 
We can draw the conclusion that logos is the faculty o f recognition according to the 
fact that Aristotle puts logos in connection with prudence. In his usage o f logos in 
practical matters, Aristotle extends the meaning o f this notion f rom the syllogostical 
rules o f concluding into the sphere in which logos establishes the principal premises 
of practical concluding. 
6. The omnipresent logos: the Stoics 
In the system of Stoic thought, the term logos was widely used. Its usage was in 
logic, which was an autonomous discipline for the Stoics, as well as in their 
cosmology and ethics. They were very proud of the consistency and coherence of 
their system. 
Logic for Aristotle was the formal propaedeutic, (it is in this sense we find the term 
AoyiKog in his writings), whereas in the philosophy of the Stoics, logic occupies one 
of three main fields o f their philosophy. The Stoics divide logic and the object of 
logic into two parts. The first relates to discourse and its parts. This field was 
divided again into two disciplines. One is rhetoric and another is dialectics. The 
Stoics conceived rhetoric as the skill of arguing something through questions and 
answers. They define rhetoric as: 
7 9 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V I , I, 1139a 5-15. 
8 0 Aristotle, Politics, (with translation by H.Rackham, The Loeb Classical Library, London, Cam., 
Mass., 1967.), A2 1253a 10-18. 
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The science o f speaking well on matters set forth by plain narrative, and by 
question and answers, and by dialectics that o f correctly discussing subject 
by questions and answers; hence their alternative definition o f it as the 
science of statement, of statement true, false, and neither true nor false. 8 1 
The other part o f logical investigation concerns the faculty o f reason 
(Aoyoc, E V S I C X S E T O S ) . That is, the sum of conceptions and recognition, which 
incarnate a part of the universal, cosmic logos in human beings. The spoken word 
(Aoyoc. TrpocpopiKOs) is the opposite o f the faculty o f reason. 
Logos is the immanent principle o f law in the world and the Stoics identify it with 
God. It is the rational principle of the world and the source o f all activity in the 
world. The Stoics also identify logos, which is cosmic and pneumatic power in some 
cases, wi th creative fire, and in other cases with Fate (EtnapuEvn.) or Providence 
( T r p o v o i a ) 8 2 . 
God identified with logos is the active principle and governing force o f the universe. 
The second principle in the cosmos is matter, which is incapable o f any action o f its 
own . 8 3 The firs creative act, the separation of matter into four elements, is not taken 
by logos.84 
On the level o f the universe logos is identified wi th the creative fire 
(Trup T E X V I K O V ) 8 3 , which is the true nature o f the universe. Logos is material, as are 
the things which are the objects o f its activity. 
The nature of man is different f rom the nature o f the universe. Human nature is also 
characterised by logos. The duty of the logos in man is the development o f his 
rational part on the level o f knowledge of the logos o f the universe. The logos of 
man is the same logos which is the governing force o f the universe. Thus, the logos 
in man cannot complete his knowledge and f u l f i l l his duty until it comprises the 
universe and man's place in it. The logos in man develops as a distinctive principle 
as the child grows older. The knowledge o f the orthos logos o f universe is the 
common law, which is achieved in God 8 6 . I f we identify the orthos logos wi th God 
the result is that man w i l l reach the orthos logos when he conceives the right idea of 
God. The idea o f God and the f u l l possession o f orthos logos are interrelated. God is 
8 1 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, volume II, V I I , 42. 
8 2 H. von Arnim, . Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. [New ed], vl ; Zeno et Zenonis discipuli, v l . 1923, 
11,913. 
8'' Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, V I I , 34. 
8 4 Achilles, in H. von Arnim, , Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, I, 4, 9. 
8 5 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. V I I , 156; Cicero, De nature deorum II 57 
8 6 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.88. 
b v6uoq b K O I V O Q , bcmep koxlv b 6p96<; Xoyoc,, 5id ravraw epxbuevoc,, b a inbq cbv xcp Ai l , 
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the perfection o f logos or reason. Man cannot, like God, embrace all things and he 
thus arrives at a position in which he must choose. Put in position to choose, man 
must fo l low the common law (vo\ioq b KOtvbQ), which does not give much choice. 
Stoics accept this consternation by reason as a cause o f their goodness. The Stoic 
sage is free because he feels free, because he makes up his own mind about action in 
87 
accordance with orthos logos. 
The physis and logos are the key concepts of moral discourse, and for man they are 
interchangeable. The principle o f morality in the ethics of the Stoics was a life lived 
according to nature (6uoAoyou | iEvcos Tfj cpuoEi £fjv) . The ethical goal is to attain 
self-fulfilment by l iving consistently with reason, or as Chrisyppus stated ' l iv ing in 
QQ 
accordance with experience o f natural things' . According to Chrysippus 'universal 
nature' is only the starting point for moral philosophy, and the sole reason for 
studying physics is to establish the difference between right and wrong . Nature is 
the product o f Reason and at the same time, it is led by logos. In this regard we can 
conclude that the l ife according to nature is the same as the life according to logos. 
In the ethics of the Stoics, logos was the source o f law and morality, and the rule and 
the cause o f moral behaviour. According to the Stoics, lack o f moral behaviour is the 
result o f deviation f rom reason and is an exception in the cosmic order. There is no 
clear distinction between physics and ethics, between factual and moral statements. 
To be good is much more a physical disposition than a duty. Everything is based on 
acts according to reason, which is in turn based on empirical principles and 
grounded in human nature and physical law. The mind of God and the mind o f the 
sage are joined to some degree, because the life o f man is causally connected with 
cosmic events. Stoics draw together the categorical imperative and the orthos logos 
because thoughts and acts are causally linked. Epictetus states that reason in the case 
of the uneducated leads to errors both of judgement and moral choice. 9 0 Moral error 
can be avoided only by the proper use of logos for right purpose. Only the sage is a 
true logician 9 1 . 
8 7 Epictetus, Dissertationum Epictetearum sive ab Arriano sive ab aliis, IV, 7. 
8 8 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VI1 87f. 
8 9 Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1035 C-D 
9 0 Epictetus Dissertationum Epictetearum sive ab Arriano sive ab aliis, 1,21. 
9 1 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.83. Kod TOiomoi uev EV tovq 
AoyiKoIc, oi ZtcoiKoi, 'tvoc [idXiaxa Kpaxuvcoai 8taX.eKtiK6v ccel elvai t6v aotybv 
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Logos in its cosmic sense is interchangeable wi th Fate (Einapuevn) . The theory of 
'seminal reason' probably caused this identification. Logos as the active principle 
contains in itself active forms. Those active forms are more aspects o f Logos than 
individual entities. The material and divine forms are seeds (Xoyoi OTTEpiaocTiKof), 
through the activity o f which individual things come into being during the 
development o f the world. Harmony among people is the product o f the activity o f 
these seeds, which mediate between the people and the universal Logos. These seeds 
influence the reasonable action in base matter and so f u l f i l the plan o f God. 
Chalcidus claims that human decisions are completely pre-determined. 
We can conclude that Stoics abandon the duality o f transcendent and immanent 
realms. Their philosophical system characterises cosmological immanentism. But at 
the base of this immanentism lies a duality o f the active principle, logos and the 
passive principle, matter. Everything in the cosmos is constrained by Logos, 
including man, whose acts are pre-determined. 
9 2 Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis, 1050 C. 
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I I Greeks and Jews 
Logos appears in Christian writings from two sources. One was Philo f rom 
Alexandria, and another was St. John Theologian. The former was a well-educated 
Jew f rom Alexandria, who wanted to reconcile the biblical wisdom o f the Old 
Testament with Greek philosophy. The later was the apostle and favourite disciple 
o f Jesus Christ, who wanted nothing else than to reveal the salvation, which came to 
the world through the Logos o f God, Our Lord Jesus Christ. The former adopted the 
Greek ontology, which is established on the basis of the necessity o f the world of 
ideas, and the latter framed a new ontology, one which overcomes every kind of 
necessity and limitation. 
1. The forebear of the Christian logos: Philo from Alexandria 
The Greek, philosophical conception o f logos and the Christian conception o f this 
term, appear one to another for the first time in the thought o f Philo from 
Alexandria. In his writings, Philo used the term logos in 1306 places and in different 
senses. The whole thought of Philo is syncretistic and was influenced by the Bible, 
as well as the philosophical teachings, which were popular at that time in 
Alexandria. The translation o f Old Testament into Greek (Septuagint) enabled Philo 
to read Moses and Plato in the same language. Philo made the effort to translate the 
biblical language into the language of Greek philosophy. According to Philo, the 
thing common to the two traditions, one Greek and the other Jewish, is their source 
from the divine Reason, i.e. f rom Logos. The reason why the biblical tradition and 
the Greek philosophy are not opposite is their birth f rom logos. The former is born 
f rom logos, which is projected in the human mind and the world, and the latter is 
born f rom the divine Logos, which reveals itself directly to the prophets. 
According to Philo's writings, we can make a conditional classification o f the three 
groups, in which logos appears wi th the same or the similar meanings. In the first 
group are those meanings of logos, which came into Philo's writings f rom Greek 
philosophy. In the second group belong those meanings o f logos, which are inspired 
by the Bible and the usage of the term logos in the Pentateuch of Moses. In the third 
group we can classify the meanings o f logos which originate f rom Philo himself. 
Philo used logos with the meaning o f universal law, which is immanent in the world, 
maintaining order, harmony and beauty in the world. This usage of logos is identical 
to the usage of logos in the philosophy of the Stoics. Logos is universal Reason, 
which rules in the cosmos. According to the relationship between man and the world 
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as the relationship o f macrocosm and microcosm, one part o f universal logos 
belongs to human mind. Philo, like the Stoics, distinguishes two aspects o f logos. 
One is Aoyos ev5id0ETOs, and another is Aoyos upocpopiKOS. These two modes of 
logos, Philo in the Platonistic manner places into two worlds. The first finds its place 
in the immaterial world of ideas. The other one, Aoyos TrpocpopiKog is settled in 
the word o f visible things, in so far as they are images or copies o f immaterial ideas. 
The cosmic plan is projected onto the human being. Thus, Aoyos svSidGETOc; is 
placed in the sphere o f mind, and Aoyos upocpopiKos has the function o f the 
spoken word, which is generated f rom the faculty o f reason as a stream is f rom its 
source. Philo's use is distinct from the Stoic conception, which places logos in 
nature. Philo, as we can see places logos in the cosmos, as well as in human nature: 
There is a point, too, in the reason-seat being doubled, for the rational 
principle is twofold as well in the universe o f human nature. In the universe 
we f ind it in one form dealing with the incorporal and archetypal ideas f rom 
which the intelligible world is framed, and in another with the visible objects 
which are copies and likenesses o f those ideas and out o f which this sensible 
world was produced. 9 3 
Philo was strongly influenced by Platonism. We can see the same in Plato's 
Timaeus, in which God creates the world according to ideas or principles, which 
serve as the paradigms for creation. In Platonic spirit, Philo writes: 
For God, being God, assumed that beautiful copy would never be produced 
without beautiful pattern, and that no object of perception would be faultless 
which was not made in the likeness o f an original discerned only by intellect. 
So when He willed to create this visible world He first fu l ly formed the 
intelligible world, in order that He might have use of a pattern wholly God-
like and incorporeal in producing the material world, as a later creation, the 
very image o f an earlier, to embrace in itself objects o f perception of as 
many kinds as other contained objects o f intelligence. 9 4 
Philo claims that logos is the place ( T O T T O S ) , in which is settled the world o f ideas 
(6 EK T C O V I S E C O V Koaiios) 9 3 . A few verses latter, Philo proceeds: 
The universe that consisted of ideas would have no other location than the 
Divine Reason, which was the Author o f ordered frame. 9 6 
According to the former, K O O I J O S vor)Tos is logos o f God 'when he already engaged 
in the act of creation (cbSev dv &xepov etrtoi xbv vor\xov K6O"[IOV eivou f) Becu 
9 3 Philo, De Vita Mosis, II, 127. 
9 - 1 Philo, De Opificio mundi, 16. 
9" Philo, De Opificio mundi, 17. 
9 6 Philo, De Opificio mundi, 20. 
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Xbyov f\br\ Koa\xonoio\)Vxoq-) For Philo, logos is: 'the original principle behind 
all principles, after which God shaped or formed the universe, incorporeal, and 
discerned by intellect alone' . Logos is the image of material creation, which 
remains incorporeal. 
In many places, Philo's usage of logos was inspired by the bible. In Genesis, chapter 
one, the word o f God initiates the acts of creation: 'Then God said... ' . The essential 
role o f the word, which probably guides Philo, we can f ind in the fol lowing verses 
of Psalms: 'By the word o f the Lord the heavens were made 
(TOO Aoycp T O U Kupiou oi o u p a v o i EOTEpEcb8r)aav) ,99. 
According to Philo, the word or logos is the instrument by which God creates the 
world f rom non-being (EK \IT\ O V T C O V ) . Logos is similar to God because it shares 
with God the basic divine attribute - the faculty of creating. God through the 
meditation o f logos creates the world. The cause o f the world 'is God, by whom it 
has come into being, its material the four elements, f rom which it was compounded, 
its instrument the word of God, through which is framed, and the final cause of the 
building is the goodness of the architect ' 1 0 0 . The logos o f God 'is above all world, 
and is eldest and most all-embracing o f created things 
(npEafivxaxoc, K O U yeviKcbxaTOQ xcov 6aa ykyovE),m. Logos is the image of God 
without visible shape and it is the immaterial world o f ideas. 
Following the prophet Isaiah, to whom the Son of Man is representative of 
humankind before the throne o f God, Philo identifies Logos wi th the first-born Son 
of God. According to this, logos is 'the eldest son, whom the Father o f all raised up, 
and calls him His first-born, and indeed the Son thus begotten followed the ways of 
his Father, and shaped the different kinds, looking to the archetypal patterns which 
that Father supplied ' l 0 2 . In the same spirit, Philo proceeds: 'But i f there be any as yet 
unfit to be called a Son of God, let him press to take his place under God's Firs-
born, the Word; who holds the eldership among the angels, their ruler as it were ' 1 0 3 . 
Philo's identification of the logos of God with the Son of God does not imply that 
Philo, under the name Son of God, thinks of the historical Jesus. Jesus Christ was a 
contemporary o f Philo, but there is no strong evidence that Philo had heard of him. 
9 7 Philo, De Opificio mundi, 24. 
9 8 Philo, De Migratione Abrahami, 103. 
9 9 Psalms, 33. 
1 0 0 Philo. De Cherubim, 127. 
1 0 1 Philo, Legum Allegoriarum Libri, 111, 175. 
1 0 2 Philo, De Confusione lingiiarum, 63. 
I l b Philo, De Confusione lingiiarum, 146. 
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The conception of logos in Philo is similar to the conception of wisdom in the 
wisdom theology. Namely, wisdom has the same attributes as logos. Solomon 
describes wisdom in the following verses: 
Though she [wisdom] is but one, she can do all the things, and while 
remaining in herself, she renews all things; in every generation she passes 
into holy souls and makes them friends of God, and prophets.104 
Philo makes a clear identification between wisdom and logos: 'the wisdom of God, 
and this is the Reason of God (xfjc; xov QEOX> aotjnaQ- r\ 8£ kaxiv b Qeo\) 
In the light of the previous remarks we can conclude that logos or reason has three 
manifestations: divine, cosmic and human. According to Philo, men by participation 
in or through union with logos attain eternal life. 
But it is the lot of man, as we see, to occupy the place of excellence among 
living creatures because his stock is near akin to God, sprung from the same 
source in virtue of his participation in reason which gives him immortality, 
mortal though he seems to be. 0 6 
Logos organises the elements of nature in the cosmos, as well as in the individual 
soul. Logos brings instincts, passions and desires of the soul into rational order1 0 7. 
The identification of logos with the powers of God, by which God is known, is 
something quite new and it is undoubtedly an original contribution of Philo to the 
theory of logos. According to Philo's theory of powers, there are two senior powers, 
the creative and the kingly. He writes: ' 
The central place is held by the Father of the Universe, who in the sacred 
scriptures is called He that is as His proper name, while on either side of Him 
are senior powers, the nearest to Him, the creative and the kingly. 1 0 8 
Philo repeats the same thing in De Vita Mosis: 
I should myself say that they [cherubim] are allegorical representations of 
the two most august and highest potencies of Him that is, the creative and the 
kingly. His creative potency is called God, because through it He placed and 
made and ordered this universe, and the kingly is called Lord, being that with 
He governs what has come into being and rules it steadfastly with justice. 1 0 9 
Wisdom of Solomon, 7,27. 
Philo, Legum Allegoriarum Libri. I 65. 
Philo, De Specialibus Legibus, IV, 14. 
C . H . Dodd,., The Interpretation of the fourth Gospel, (University Press, Cambridge, 1955.) p. 57. 
Philo, De migratione Abrahami, 121. 
Philo, De Vita Mosis, II, 99. 
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Philo introduces logos as a means to unite these two powers, which becomes the 
medium of the creation of the world and the medium of its divine government. 
Logos is above those powers and closer to divine being as such. 
The voice told me that while God is indeed one, His highest and chiefest 
powers are two, even goodness and sovereignty. Through His goodness He 
beget all that is, through His sovereignty He rules what He has begotten. And 
in the midst between the two there is a third, which unites them, Reason, for 
it is through reason that God is both ruler and good. Of these two potencies 
sovereignty and goodness the Cherubim are symbols, as the fiery sword is 
the symbol of reason. For exceeding swift and of burning heat is reason and 
chiefly so the reason of the (Great) Cause, for alone preceded and outran all 
things, conceived before them all, manifest above them a l l . 1 1 0 
As we can see, logos is the instrument of God with the highest rank among other 
beings and it is a mediator between the transcendent God and the w o r l d 1 1 a s well as 
between God and man. 
The general conclusion is that Philo was not consistent in his teaching of logos. Yet, 
the question remains what is the true nature of logos. Is logos one power of God, 
which depends on God, or is it self-existing being, subordinate to God? Concerning 
powers, we are still in a dilemma: what are the powers? Are they the qualities 
similar to the ideas of God, or independent entities? Al l these questions influence 
our understanding of the Philonic conception of logos. The definition of Philo's 
logos remains somewhere between two conceptions. One conceives logos as a 
being, which is an aspect of God and whose powers are qualities of God. The other 
conceives logos as an independent, self-existent being, but subordinate to God, with 
powers as its aspects. 
However, Philo's teaching prepared the ground for the concept of unique 
personalised logos, who is free from the necessity as maintained by Greek ontology. 
2. The logos became flesh: St. John the Theologian 
The mediator between the Greek and the Jewish tradition was Philo of Alexandria. 
He introduced the word logos from the terminological apparatus of Greek 
philosophy into the exegesis of the Old Testament. Christians such as Clement of 
Alexandria and Origen, who were interested in appropriating the Jewish tradition, 
were influenced by Philo's doctrine of the Logos. Nevertheless, the concept of logos 
1 1 0 Philo, De Cherubim. 27-8. 
"' Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.) 
p. 27. 
was introduced into Christian scriptures by an author who probably knew nothing of 
the writings of either Philo or the apostle and evangelist St. John the Theologian. 
The Fourth Gospel was written at the end of the first century. The problem of the 
origin of the Fourth Gospel is much more complex than the question of whether it 
has a Hellenistic or a Jewish background. Professor Barrett points out that 'this 
Gospel contains Judaism, non-Judaism and anti-Judaism'112. The same can be said 
for the origins of the Johannine logos. The most prominent writers of the early 
Church, such as Clement of Alexandria and Hippolytus of Rome, claimed that the 
logos of the Fourth Gospel is in essence identical with the logos of Heraclitus' book 
On Nature. The reason for this identification lies in the fact that both of them give 
the main role to logos. There is no consensus among the scholars about the origins 
of logos in the Fourth Gospel, but the general standpoint adopted by them is that the 
Johannine logos is essentially non-Greek, and that the roots of this term have an 
oriental or Gnostic background. Eliminating any Hellenistic influence, Brown" 3 , 
Bultmann 1 1 4 and Dodd 1 1 5 claim that the pre-existent logos had its roots in Near-
Eastern religion, and more particularly in Jewish mysticism which had penetrated 
Christian thought. We can distinguish four main categories for the use of the term 
logos. Especially when used in the plural, logos has the same sense as 
prjuaxa, meaning "that which is said or spoken", words spoken by Jesus or others. 
When logos is used in the singular the meaning is "saying", "statement" or 
"discourse". Normally, a discourse is composed of logoi, used in the sense of 
prjuaTa . A third meaning of the singular logos refers to what Jesus said to his 
disciples and to the world. In this case, logos is Jesus' message conceived both as 
revelation and as a command that must be obeyed. Jesus himself makes an important 
distinction between Aoyoc, and AaAia, where logos does not simply mean to hear 
the words, but to understand the meaning conveyed by those words, (Jn, v i i i , 43). 
Finally the most important meaning, the one that is relevant for our investigation, is 
logos used as "the Word of God". Christians saw the Word of God embodied in the 
Old Testament. Unlike men God does not have a cpcovri but he does have a logos, 
which can be recognised in the Scriptures. But the most important sense of logos as 
the Word of God refers to Christ. Christ is the logos of God, identified with the 
1 1 2 C.K.. Barrett, The Gospel of John and Judaism. (London, 1975.) 
1 1 3 Raymond E . Brown,, (Doubladay & Company, Inc, New York, 1966) 
1 1 4 Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel according to John, (translated by G.R. Beasley-Murray, R.W.N. 
Hoare and J .K. Riches, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971.) 
1 1 5 C . H . Dodd. The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, (University Press, Cambridge, 1955.) p. 247. 
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eternal truth. aAr)0£ia (Jn, xiv, 6), the ultimate reality revealed"6. The final, and for 
us the most important, meaning of logos is where logos is used as pre-existent logos. 
The Prologue of the Fourth Gospel gives a new and different concept of this term. 
The possible sources from which the concept of logos came into Johannine writings 
are: the To rah, the Tar gams and Wisdom theology. Some experts think that the 
Christian background of logos is as important as the Jewish background. However, 
the Prologue was moulded by the many different ideas with which St. John worked. 
It would be unwise to take into consideration only one source for the extremely 
complex doctrine of logos. 
In the Greek translation of the Old Testament (Septuagint), the word logos appears 
many times with similar meanings to those we find in Johannine writings. As 
mentioned above, the logos of God has a creative role in Psalm 33.6 and in Genesis 
1.3,6,9. In addition, we find logos used in the books of the Prophets to denote the 
means used to bring the message of God to the prophets. 'The word of the Lord 
came to.. . ' is to be found in Jer. 1.4, and Ezek. 1.3, or 'Hear the word that the Lord 
has spoken against you', in Amos 3.1. The commentaries show that the Old 
Testament dabar, understood in the light of speculation on Wisdom, can account for 
St. John's thought. The Hebrew word "QTT (dabar), which is equivalent to logos, 
has two meanings. Its primary meaning is an "articulate and intelligible utterance". 
The second meaning of dabar is "matter" or "thing". This meaning is derived from 
the first, as some thing about which one speaks"7. The influence of Wisdom 
theology on St. John is evident. Thus, the Johannine logos has a role parallel to the 
figure of Wisdom. 
Another non-Hellenistic background is constituted by Aramaic paraphrases, known 
as Targums. Some earlier New Testament scholars traced a Targumic influence on 
the Prologue, especially the Aramaic word memra (NUTD). After a while the 
influence of memra on St. John was rejected. Thus, according to Barrett, memra 
became 'a blind alley in the study of the biblical background of John's logos 
doctrine'" 8. For a long time the influence of this term on St. John's Gospel was 
neglected. There were two main interpretations of this term. Some of the scholars 
took memra as meaning 'divine hypostasis'. The hypostatic nature of memra implied 
the existence of an independent or semi-independent entity between God and 
1 1 6 C . H . Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, pp. 265-268. 
1 1 7 G.A. Buttrick, The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible. (Abingdon Press, Nashville, New York, 
1962.), p. 868. 
1 I S C . K . Barrett, The Gospel according to St. John, (SPCK, London, 1962.), p. 128. 
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creation. The second interpretation talked about this term as a way of avoiding the 
pronunciation of the name of God. Of these two opinions the latter ultimately 
prevailed. Thus, scholars have neglected memra as a viable solution to the puzzle of 
the logos in the Johannine writings. 
However, because of the first interpretation, where memra was seen as a hypostatic 
intermediary between God and the world, this term was considered the only source 
or one of the main sources of the Logos in the Prologue of St. John's Gospel.119 
More recently, this opinion was replaced, and memra was seen as merely a pious 
120 
formula to refer to the name of God, thus excluding any connection with Logos . 
Moreover, according to the fundamental monotheism of mainstream Rabbinic 
Judaism, the Jewish scholars concluded that memra is in no way an hypostasis or an 
intermediary between God and creation, and thus the main argument for the parallel 
memrallogos was abolished. 
In analysing Barret's investigation of the relationship between memra and logos, 
Professor Hayward highlights several aspects that have to be borne in mind when 
dealing with such a controversial subject. First, memra or any other concept alone 
does not form the whole source of the doctrine of Logos. However, Judaism does 
represent an important element in the Fourth Gospel. Second, the language of St. 
John's Prologue is similar to those parts of the Old Testament in which the historical 
Christ is described. Professor Hayward therefore advances the hypothesis that St. 
John knew of memra and that he used memra because this proves a knowledge of 
the Targumk tradition not only in the Gospel but also in the Prologue121. Hayward 
compares the Prologue with the Targum and relies on this comparison as evidence 
for the position he adopts. 
St. John uses Targumic language to identify the 'true bread from heaven' with Jesus 
Christ, which in turn has its origins in the Palestinian Neofiti Targum. Memra and 
logos are placed in the same context of creation. Both terms represent God's name. 
Memra, understood as God's Name dwelling among his people Israel (Deut. xii , 5, 
11, xiv, 6, xxvi, 2) is a perfect equivalent to Jesus, who is God's Name come in the 
flesh (Jn, xii , 28). "The Father's glorification of His Name and the glorification of 
1 1 9 Until 1925. New Testament scholars sustained this position, that memra is a sure antecedent of St. 
John's Logos. 
1 : 0 C . T . R . Hayward, The Holy Name of the God of Moses and the Prologue of St. John's Gospel, 
New Testament Studies, 25, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, 1978-79.) 
pp. 16-32. 
1 2 1 C . T . R . Hayward, "The Holy Name of the God of Moses and the Prologue of St. John's Gospel", p. 
26. 
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Jesus are here equivalent"122. Professor Hayward 1 2 3, analysing the meaning of 
memra, has shown that memra was not an hypostasis, but rather is equivalent to 
God's mercy, by which the world was created and sustained. Taken in this context, 
memra has similar characteristics to logos in the Johannine Prologue. Logos taken in 
the sense of God's mercy can be interpreted in terms of the merciful and active 
presence of God. This presence is represented through the self-proclaimed God, 
Jesus, who took flesh. The meaning of memra is God with us. This term best 
describes the presence and activity of God in Jesus Christ and must be taken into 
account as an essential element of the logos doctrine. 
Even though Hayward concludes that Jesus is for St John memra made flesh, he is 
nevertheless aware that memra is not the sole antecedent for St. John's doctrine of 
the Logos. The language of the Prologue, although having many similarities with the 
Tar gum, is also open to other interpretations. The importance of the term dabar 
must not be ruled out and even the influence exercised by Philo's doctrine of Logos 
must be borne in mind. 
Apart from all these influences, John gave his own contribution by his synthesis. 
The Johannine synthesis is reflected in his teaching that the logos would be 
unknown and incomprehensible but for the role of the historical Jesus 
The Prologue uses the term Logos in relation to God as an important agent in 
creation, and it affirms that Logos was incarnate in Christ as the unique Son of God. 
Therefore, broadly speaking, we could say that the prologue presents two aspects, 
depending on from which perspective the Logos is regarded. "In the beginning" the 
Logos was "with God". "In the beginning" does not refer to the beginning of the 
creation, for creation will be mentioned later in the prologue. This expression has no 
temporal character, but is rather a qualitative character. Before time, before creation, 
Logos existed as a hypostasis distinguishable from God, yet not having independent 
existence. It is interesting to observe also that the expression "in the beginning" 
reminds one of the Old Testament and is not the only similarity between the 
Prologue and Genesis. Common points with Genesis run throughout the whole 
Prologue. Coming back to logos, another point needs to be made: not only is logos 
"with God" but St. John states that Logos "is God". Logos is involved in creation. 
The creation was done by the Word TrctvTa oYauTOu EyEVETO (Jn, I , 3). In this 
1 2 2 C . T . R . Hayvvard, "The Holy Name of the God of Moses and the Prologue of St. John's Gospel", p. 
29. 
1 3 5 C . T . R . Hayward, "The Holy Name of the God of Moses and the Prologue of St. John's Gospel", 
p.31 
way St. John excludes any possibility of attributing the origin of the world to 
inferior creators. At this point in the prologue Logos reaches a new stage. He is 
manifested in the world as life and light that cannot be overcome by the darkness. 
But mankind fails to recognise him. However there were a few who did not reject 
the word of the God and they become "the children of God". I f in the first verses of 
the prologue the accent falls on Logos as God, the perspective changes completely 
when St. John affirms that 6 Aoyoc; oapE, eyeveTO (Jn, I , 14). This is something 
new, something that cannot be found in the Old Testament. This second stage 
represents Logos God becoming man. 2ocp£ is the word chosen by the apostle to 
represent human nature as different from God. "Since the word was described as 
6EOS , John's statement is a full and perhaps the most succinct expression of the 
paradox of the person of Christ" 1 2 4. The prologue ends with the image of Christ 
Logos as the unique Son of God, novoyevous Trapa TrccTpos (Jn, I , 14), a 
statement that again distinguishes St. John from all his predecessors, be they 
representatives of the Jewish faith or of the Greek philosophical tradition. 
The original contribution of St John is his introduction on the one hand of the eternal 
Logos, and on the other hand of 'a man sent from God', whose name is Jesus. The 
eternal Logos is at the same time both incarnate and a human person. 
1 2 4 C . K . Barrett. The Gospel according to St. John, p.138 
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I l l Logos as the cosmological principle 
1. The Sower of the seeds; Justin Martyr 
The attempt to synthesise the Hellenistic tradition with the fundamentals of 
Christianity was made in the first three centuries by the Greek apologist Justin 
Martyr and two Alexandrian theologians, Clement and Origen. Thus, as professor 
Chadwick rightly remarks, the answer on Tertullian's question: "What has Athens to 
do with Jerusalem?" will be 'Much in every way' 1 2 5 . 
Philo was the first writer who tried to harmonise the Hellenic ontology with the Old 
Testament. He claims that apart from Greek philosophers having borrowed their 
teachings from Moses, they also discovered certain truths through natural reason. 
Thus, the philosophy is not only a natural predisposition but also a gift from God 
along the same lines as revelation to Israel 1 2 6. Justin stressed that Hellenistic 
philosophy and Judaism occupy the same ground, asserting that both are derived 
from the revelation to Moses. Justin does not deny that philosophers discovered 
some traces of truth through natural reason. Does it mean that Justin considers Greek 
philosophy as a divine gift? The answer to this question can shed more light on 
Justin's thought, revealing the real character of his work. 
" I wil l tell you," said I , "what seems to me; for philosophy is, in fact, the 
greatest possession, and most honourable before God, to whom it leads us 
and alone commends us; and these are truly holy men who have bestowed 
attention on philosophy. What philosophy is, however, and the reason why it 
has been sent down to men, have escaped the observation of most; for there 
would be neither Platonists, nor Stoics, nor Peripatetics, nor Theoretics, nor 
Pythagoreans, this knowledge being one.'" 
The first sentence of this quotation can misdirect us to conclude that every 
philosophy leads us to God. But Justin is clear that only one philosophy can reach 
the truth. 
"When he had spoken these and many other things, which there is no time 
for mentioning at present, he went away, bidding me attend to them; and I 
have not seen him since. But straightway a flame was kindled in my soul; 
and a love of the prophets, and of those men who are friends of Christ, 
possessed me; and whilst revolving his words in my mind, I found this 
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philosophy alone to be safe and profitable. 
1 2 5 Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, (Studies in Justin, Clement 
and Origen, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966.), p. 1. 
1 2 6 Harry Wolfson, Philo, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1948.), p. 141. 
1 2 7 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo 2, 1. (in Ante-Nicene Christian Library, volume II, The 
Writings of Justin Martyr and Athenagoras, translated by M. Dods, G. Reith and B.P. Pratten, 
Edinburgh, London, 1867.). 
1 2 8 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo, 8, 1. 
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Thus, the philosophy which was sent down to men (KaTeJT.£|a.(|)9r| eit; xovq 
dvOpcoTiODc;) can be nothing else than Old Testament revelation1 2 9. Justin does 
allows no room for the truth of philosophies other than Christ's. 
There is no doubt that Justin used terminological material of Greek philosophy as 
well as the same methods of developing an argument, but sometimes his interest in 
philosophical themes is overestimated by scholars. Justin was much more of a 
biblical thinker and a man with a mission than an academic philosopher. His 
intention was not to introduce innovation into biblical beliefs, but to emphasise, as a 
theological traditionalist, that the whole truth can be found only in the Church. Our 
task is to elucidate to what extent Hellenism influenced Justin's theology, thus 
diminishing its evangelical message. 
The way he thinks about God shows that Justin remains Platonist even after his 
conversion to Christianity. For Justin, God is 'that which always maintains the same 
nature, and in the same manner, and is the cause of all other things 
( T O Kara xd aired K O U cbaamcot; del fe%ov m i xov elvai raxai xolc, dXXoic, a t 
T I O V ) ' 1 3 0 . Justin does not differ much from Plato, who speaks in the same way about 
being ( T O 6V), rather than about God (©eov). Plato says that true being is something 
'which is eternal and unchanging (oi xov del K a x d xavxd &>aaxix<x>q £x,ovxoc;)'1 3 1. 
Justin's God is transcendent, passionless132, incorruptible1 3 3, unchangeable134 and 
eternal. Justin's doctrine of the divine reflects two different conceptions, one biblical 
and the other from Middle-Platonism. The concept of God which Justin adopted is 
the same eclectic idea very common among Platonists of the second century, 
especially Albinus. This doctrine of God is a combination of the ineffable God of 
Plato, the Demiurge of Timaeus and the Aristotelian 'unmoved mover'. The way to 
know God is described in the same terms as the act of knowing the truth. This way 
of describing the knowledge of God is very common in Middle Platonism and is 
originally found in Plato1 3 5. 
1 2 9 Ragnar Holte, Logos Spermatikos, Studia Theologica, vol. 12, (Lund, 1958.), pp. 164-5. 
' j 0 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo, 3, 5. 
1 3 1 Plato, The Republic, 484b (The Loeb Classical Library, volume II) also in Plato, Phaedo 78c, 
Sophist, 248a 
U J Justin, Apologia I, 12. 
I j 3 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo, 5. 
m Justin. Apologia I, 13. 
1 3 5 Plato, Epistles, V I I , 34led. 'As a result of continued application to the subject itself and 
communion therewith, it [knowledge] is brought to birth in the soul on a sudden, as light that is 
kindled by a leaping spark, and there after it nourishes itself. 
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Thus Justin states that God 'cannot be seen merely by the eyes, but is discernible to 
the mind alone (vcp KaraA.T|7r.T6v)'135. Justin re-establishes the monistic ontology of 
Greek thought based on the unity of the intelligible world, the mind and being. 
Tlato indeed says, 'replied I , 'that the mind's eye is of such a nature, and has 
been given for this end, that we may see that very Being when the mind is 
pure itself, who is the cause of all discerned by the mind, having no colour, 
no form, no greatness-nothing, indeed, which the bodily eye looks upon; but 
It is something of this sort, he goes on to say, that is beyond all essence, 
unutterable and inexplicable, but alone honourable and good, coming 
suddenly into souls well-dispositioned, on account of their affinity to and 
desire of seeing Him. 1 3 7 
A few lines later Justin states that cvrfyEVEm between God and us, is 'the soul also 
divine and immortal, and a part of that very regal mind' (t) yx>%r\ Beta Kai 
aGdvaxot; EOXI Kcd ccbioxj eKelvov %ox> (3aaiXiKo\) vov |i£po<;). 1 3 8 Justin does 
not intend to establish 'kinship' between soul as a part of divine Nous and God, as 
Plato does. Soul is not divine and immortal, but created and corruptible and as such 
cannot be ontological (avn/ytvevx) between God and man. 
The soul assuredly is or has life. If, then, it is life, it would cause something 
else, and not itself, to live, even as motion would move something else than 
itself. Now, that the soul lives, no one would deny. But i f it lives, it lives not 
as being life, but as the partaker of life; but that which partakes of anything, 
is different from that of which it does partake. Now the soul partakes of life, 
since God wills it to live. Thus, then, it will not even partake [of life] when 
God does not will it to l ive. 1 3 9 
The idea of soul as xox> ^aciXiKov vov [ikpoc, is replaced by idea of soul as 
u.e0fe£,iQ tTte C 0 5 ^- By denying the pre-existence of the soul which possesses 
immediate insight into God's essence, Justin abandons the concept of a natural 
capacity to gain knowledge of God. In his second Apology, Justin introduces 
another avyytvEia. 
For each man spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatic 
word, seeing what was related to it (EKCLOTOC, yap ate; dnb \Lkpovc, xov 
aTtepiioaiKoij Beiov \6yov> xo avyyevkq bpcov KaXoSq e<f)6eY£a.i;o).140 
Traditional interpretations of this passage claim that Justin employs the Stoic and 
Middle-Platonic ideas of ovyykvEia and [itpoq to describe the relationship between 
1 3 6 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo, 3, 7. 
1 3 7 Justin. Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo. 4, I . 
1 3 8 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo, 4, 2. 
1 3 9 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo, 6, 1. 
M 0 Justin. Apologia II, 13,3. 
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Logos as a source of knowledge, and the human mind as inherently rational. Using 
the term 'sowing Logos' (A.6yo<; cntepiiaxiKdc;), Justin describes Logos as a Sower, 
who 'sows the seed' in the human mind. Thus the 'seeds of Logos' 
(crafepiia xov \6yov) are implants in human beings, which directs them to work and 
to think according to Logos. Justin supports this idea, claming that Christ 'was 
partially known even by Socrates for He was and is the Word who is in every 
man' 1 4 1 . But, does this mean that Justin reintroduces the idea of a natural affinity 
between God and man, which he had abandoned in his Dialogue with Tripho the 
Jew? As we have seen above, Justin strictly denies any natural kinship between God 
and soul, and the possibility of an immediate knowledge of God. Does this mean 
that Justin changed his attitude in his Apologies by claiming Greek philosophy as a 
means of reaching a partial knowledge of God? The ideas of 'sowing Logos' and 
'seeds of Logos' should be considered in light of the coherence of Justin's thought. 
We must have on mind that Justin is not a philosophical syncretist, but a traditional 
thinker. I f Greek philosophers borrowed their teachings from Moses, their 
philosophies contain the seeds of truth. 
And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the 
immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of 
things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such 
suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and 
interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all 
men. 1 4 2 
Justin does not think in terms of two opposed world-views - Greek philosophy and 
Old Testament faith. For him it much more a matter of only one faith, transmitted by 
Moses, and then adopted by Greek philosophers. 
Thus, the idea of Logos spermatikos should not be considered in the light of similar 
concepts developed in Stoicism and Middle-Platonism, because Justin does not 
maintain 'seeds of Logos' as a natural property implanted in human minds. Some 
scholars have already shown that searching in the contemporary philosophies for the 
source of Justin's doctrine of logos spermatikos is futi le 1 4 3 . It will be convenient to 
look at Edwards' 1 4 4 explanation of the question of real meaning of Justin's theory of 
'sowing Logos' and 'seeds of the Logos'. The Stoic concept of logoi spermatikoi, 
1 4 1 Justin. Apologia II, 10, 8. 
1 4 2 Justin, Apologia I, 44, 9-10. 
1 4 3 R. Holte, Logos Spermatikos, 145-6; also in Carl Andersen, 'Justin und der mittlere Platonismus', 
Z N T W 4 4 , 1952-3, 157-195 
1 4 4 M.J. Edwards, 'Justin's Logos and the Word of God', Journal of Early Christian Studies 3.3, 1995, 
pp. 261-80, esp. p. 275. 
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apart from their use in the plural, has a completely different context of human moral 
potential. Edwards emphasises that Stoics and Platonists in their theory accented the 
potential of seed to grow. Thus, any explanation of Justin's logos in the light of 
Stoic theory should underline the nature of the implanted sperma as a vehicle of 
enlightenment, which is not the case. A possible solution is that Justin applies the 
term logos spermatikos to Christ, having in mind the parable of the Sower who sows 
the Word of God 1 4 5 . Thus, the accent is much more on the activity of sowing as 
implanting something which does not already exist. The vehicle of enlightenment is 
the words of Scripture, which are sown by Logos Spermatikos, who is Christ. 
Justin showed that people do not have immediate knowledge of the Logos of God, 
denying again the natural affinity between God and man. He preserves the 
transcendence of God. The God of Justin remains confined to Middle-Platonistic 
patterns. Justin distinguishes God the Creator from the God who appeared to 
Abraham, Jacob and Moses. 
Moses, then, the blessed and faithful servant of God, declares that He who 
appeared to Abraham under the oak in Mamre is God, sent with the two 
angels in His company to judge Sodom by Another who remains ever in the 
supercelestial places, invisible to all men, holding personal intercourse with 
none, whom we believe to be Maker and Father of all things. 1 4 6 
The concept of God as ineffable being does not allow Justin to identify God the 
Creator with the God who appeared in the world. Thus, Justin introduces a 'second 
God', or Jesus Christ as Logos of God, who reveals God to the world. Christ is 
distinct from the Creator 'numerically, not in the w i l l ' 1 4 7 . It is obvious that Justin 
undermines the divinity of the Son. This subordinationism has the result of 
endangering the divine economy, because God and man remain remote from each 
other. The gap between them is filled, not with a number of beings subordinated one 
to another as in contemporary philosophies of the time, but with the Logos of God. 
Justin numbers all forms in which Logos of God appeared in the world. 
The Word of God is His Son, as we have before said. And He is called Angel 
and Apostle; for He declares whatever we ought to know, and is sent forth to 
declare whatever is revealed... But so much is written for the sake of proving 
that Jesus the Christ is the Son of God and His Apostle, being of old the 
Word, and appearing sometimes in the form of fire, and sometimes in the 
likeness of angels; but now, by the will of God, having become man for the 
human race... become Man by a virgin, according to the counsel of the 
Father, for the salvation of those who believe on Him, He endured both to be 
''b Mat. 13, 3 also in James I, 21 
1 4 6 Justin, Dia'logus cum Trvphone Judaeo, 56, 4. 
1 1 7 Justin, Dialogus cum Trvphone Judaeo, 56, 11. 
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set at nought and to suffer, that by dying and rising again He might conquer 
death.148 
The last form in the history of revelation, which Logos of God has taken, is human. 
But the history of revelation is not fulfilled with the earthly life of Jesus Christ, his 
crucifixion and his resurrection. Justin mentions Christ's second appearance. 
Some have reference to the first advent of Christ, in which He is preached as 
inglorious, obscure, and of mortal appearance: but others had reference to 
His second advent, when He shall appear in glory and above the clouds.1 4 9 
What does Justin have in mind referring to the 'second advent'? Do his words reflect 
an eschatological perspective, which is common in the early centuries after Christ? 
Unfortunately, this is not the case. Rather, Justin perceives the 'second coming' as 
just another event in the history of revelation. Thus, the Logos of God is inevitably 
linked to the world and is temporally confined. We can speak about the Logos of 
Justin in terms of temporalising God. Thus, for Justin the incarnation of Logos is just 
one episode in the long history of God's presence in the world, a history which is 
not yet completed. 
Professor Behr1'"10 rightly emphasises that the 'first advent' of Christ for Justin has no 
significance on the plane of the redemption and salvation of humankind. For Justin, 
Christ's role as teacher is much more important. 
Brief and concise utterances (PpaxeiQ 8e Kod cvvxo[ioi Xbyoi) fell from 
Him, for He was no sophist, but His word was the power of God 
(&XXd bi)va[iiq Qeov b Xdyoq ocbt.o'o r jv) . 1 5 1 
Underlining Christ's role as teacher Justin identifies the words from the scripture 
and the scriptural Christ. This identification of revealer and revelation inseparably 
mingles the role of the Logos of God, who conveys the message with the message 
itself. 
We can conclude that the history of applying the term logos exclusively to Jesus 
Christ begins with Justin. Thus, Justin's logos is not the rational principle of Stoics 
or world-soul of Plato, but the scriptural Christ. But at the same time his logos 
remains a lesser God, subordinate to the Father and placed in the world and defined 
as within time. 
Representing Justin as a Helleniser is to underestimate both his role as a biblical 
thinker and his achievement in /ogos-theology. But as Professor Chadwick pointed 
1 4 8 Justin, Apologia I, 63, 4-16. 
1 4 9 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo, 14, 8. 
1 5 0 John Beht\ The Way to Nicaea, (SVS, Crestwood, New York, 2001.), p. 105. 
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out: 'For the Platonist to accept Christianity, as Justin himself has done, is no 
revolutionary step involving a radical rejection of his earlier world-view' 1 5 2. 
2. The Pious Intellectual; Clement of Alexandria 
The first two centuries were a period in which the Christian Church had to struggle 
for her existence, resisting attacks by political rulers and, at an intellectual level, 
those of educated pagans, who considered the new religion predominant only among 
slaves and ignorant women (Celsus is perhaps the most famous case). The apologists 
of the Christian faith did not show too much determination in encouraging a closer 
relationship between the two cultures. On the contrary, their attitude towards the 
Greeks was one of suspicion and even hostility, and their tendency was more to 
emphasise the discontinuity which existed between the two worlds, rather than to 
wish their reconciliation . 
Alexandria was the centre of many religious and philosophical schools in the first 
centuries after Christ. The differing cultural and religious influences created a 
variety of syncretistic teachings. Philo's teaching was produced in the process of the 
Hellenisation of Judaism. Clement of Alexandria was among the first Christian 
writers to have the courage to recognise openly the achievements of Greek culture 
and to use it in a deep synthesis of Christian and Hellenic thinking. He started the 
process of Hellenisation not of Judaism but of Christianity. His intention was not 
only to defend and to justify Christian beliefs and to convert educated pagans to 
Christianity by harmonising Greek philosophy with the Christian world-view, but 
also to transform religious faith into a philosophical system. 
In Clement's works, we find a different picture of the pagan world, one which 
values what he considers the good in non-Christian thought. Being both a Greek and 
a Christian, he tried to bring together his cultural and religious ideals'34. Always 
questing for true knowledge, Clement of Alexandria built a clear and powerful idea 
of the development of the spiritual life. Convinced that truth is a unity, he also 
considered that the history of the truth must be one, and in no way exclusive or 
applying only to Christians. According to Clement's point of view, there was not a 
strong opposition between Hellenism and Christianity, especially because both of 
them participate in absolute truth. He wrote: 
1 5 1 Justin, Apologia I, 14, 5. 
1 5 2 Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, p. 12. 
1 5 3 Henry Chadvvick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition, p. 35. 
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There is only one way of truth, but different paths from different places join 
it, just like tributaries flowing into a perennial river. 1 5 5 
Therefore, he rejected nothing achieved for the benefit of human knowledge before 
the coming of Christ. Moreover, he integrated the Greek and the Jewish cultures in 
his conception of the evolution of the spiritual life, considering them both as a 
propaideia136 to the Christianity, the true knowledge. He wanted all his work to 
reflect this majestic conception that he held about true knowledge, which leads man 
to God. Most important, he wanted to show that in our way through life we are never 
alone. Therefore, in the first chapter of Pedagogos, he distinguishes between the 
divine Logos as Protreptikos, Pedagogos and Didaskalos, each of them relevant to a 
certain level of human spiritual development. Proptreptikos invites men to salvation. 
The Pedagogos will refine their moral conduct, cleansing their passions, and finally 
the Didaskalos will teach the true gnosis to those who are worthy to receive i t 1 5 7 . 
This scenario of divine activity is reflected in his most important works considered 
by some scholars to form a trilogy: Proptreptikos, Pedagogos and Stromateis. Some 
argue that the final part of this trilogy is not Stromateis, but another work that 
Clement intended to entitle Didaskalos . Greek culture is discussed a great deal in 
Protreptikos where it is both frequently criticised and also praised for catching a 
glimpse of the truth. A large part of Stromateis deals with the same subject and 
because of this its correspondence with the third description of the activity of Logos, 
the Didaskalos^9, has been doubted. 
As we have seen above, all human life in Clement's view is marked by the seal of 
the Logos, and by discovering traces of divine inspiration in pagan culture, Clement 
is ready to accept what is good in it. 
One of the paths to gain the truth, apart from 'prophets' and 'advent"', is Greek 
philosophy. Clement maintains that the Greek philosophers are able to discover true 
1 5 4 Claude Mondesert, Introduction, in Clement d'Alexandrie, Le Protreptique. Sources Chretiennes, 
Paris, Editions du Cerf, 1949. 
1 5 3 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, I. 5.29, 1; in Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, (books one to 
three, translated by John Ferguson, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1991.) 
And Ante-Nicene Christian Library, volume X I I , translated by William Wilson, edited by A. Roberts 
and J. Donaldson , Edinburgh, London, 1867. 
1 5 6 Werner, Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, (London, Oxford University Press, 1962.) 
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doctrines through a 'common human mind' (KOIV6<; vovc)m, which is a gift from 
God, or by divine inspiration, which comes from Logos. 
Clement gives two other explanations why Greek philosophy is a good way to gain 
the truth about God. The first maintains that Greek philosophy is beneficial because 
Greek philosophers have 'stolen' their doctrines from the Old Testament and 
Moses1 6 1. For Clement there was no doubt that Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato had 
read the Bible: 
Pythagoras, and Socrates, and Plato say that they hear God's voice while 
closely contemplating the fabric of the universe, made and preserved 
unceasingly by God. For they heard Moses say, 'He said, and was done,' 
describing the word of God as an act.1 6 2 
The second theory 1 6 3 of the origins of Greek philosophy claims that philosophy is 
divine property 'stolen' from God by powers or angels who transmitted it to man. 
This Greek philosophy serves to prepare Greeks for reception of the more perfect 
Christian philosophy. 
...that philosophy includes questions concerning truth and the nature of the 
universe (the truth of which the Lord himself says, T am the truth') 
xf\v <J)iAoao())tav ^fixriaiv &%ew nepi &Xr\BEiac, K a i t f j q toov 6vxoov cpvae 
cot; (AATIGEUX 8e amr), mpi f jq b icupiot; ainot; ETTCV "eyoa etaa t| dA/qBe 
la") (John 14, 6.)164 
Identifying truth with divine Logos, Clement maintains the old Greek concept of the 
Divine, which dates from the pre-Socratic period. In this conception, remarks 
Werner Jaeger, it claims 'the bold identification of the Divine ( T O 6E7OV) with 
nature' (f) cpuois)165. In Clement's fragments, which are preserved in the writings of 
Maximus the Confessor, nature is identified with the truth of things 
(cpuois eoTiv t\ T C O V TrpayiidTOuV dAf |9£ia) 1 6 6 . Clement replaces the Greek ideal 
of knowledge of the eternal and unchangeable things with the knowledge of God. 
We find a good example of this in one of the most cited quotations of Clement. 
Could we, then, suppose any one proposing to the Gnostic whether he would 
choose the knowledge of God or everlasting salvation; and i f these, which 
are entirely identical, were separable, he would without the least hesitation 
1 6 0 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, I, 19, 94, 2. 
1 6 1 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, I, 15-28. 
1 6 2 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, V, 14. 
1 6 3 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, s VI I , 6, 4. 
1 6 4 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, I, 5, 32, 4. 
1 6 5 Jaeger Werner, The Theology of Early Greek Philosophers, At the Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1947, 
p. 203 
1 6 0 Maximus Confessoris, Opuscula Theologica et Polemica, 254, PG 91 
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choose the knowledge of God, deeming that property of faith, which from 
love ascends to knowledge, desirable, for its own sake.167. 
The knowledge of God is the highest bliss and this is the exclusive right of the 
Gnostic, who is a perfect Christian and who lives in constant communion with God. 
The only link to the knowledge and contemplation of God is through the intellectual 
faculty or through the mind: 'For he who hopes, as he who believes, sees intellectual 
I /TO 
objects and future things with the mind' . 
Clement distinguishes between knowing Logos and knowing God. His intention is to 
preserve God's transcendence. God is the first principle and by nature remote from 
us. Divine transcendence implies that he is beyond human intellect. Being 
unknowable God is also ineffable. He is unlimited and beyond naming. Clement 
identifies God with Nous. This identification has its origins in the teaching of 
Ammonius Saccas and in that of the main branches of Neoplatonism represented by 
Origen the Neoplatonist and by Hierokles. For them Nous is the highest being and 
this approach distinguishes them from Plotinus who places 'one' above Nous. God 
reveals himself to us through Logos. The Divine Logos is the way to God, because 
Logos is the image of God, and 'the Logos is contemplated by the mind ' 1 6 9 . 
Like Justin, Clement uses Logos as a medium between God and man. Logos is 
applied to the Son of God, who is the image of God. Clement needs the 
identification of God with Mind in order to institute logos as the faculty of reason. 
He actually wants to show that God is the source of all rationality. Logos of God has 
170 
a creative role because 'the Word issuing forth was the cause of creation' . Thus, 
man has been made as an image of Logos and that likeness is reflected in human 
rationality: 
For the image of God is the divine and royal Word, the impassible man; and 
the image of the image is the human mind. 1 7 1 
The divine Logos conveys the particles of logos in human minds. Clement like 
Justin uses the same biblical parable of the Sower for Logos: 
There is only one cultivator of human beings. It is one who from the first, 
from the foundation of universe, has been sowing the seeds with potential 
growth, who has produced rain on every appropriate occasion in the form of 
sovereign Word. 1 7 2 
1 6 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, IV. 22 
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1 6 9 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, V , 3 
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The seeds, which are dropped like a shower from heaven by Logos, inspire Greek 
philosophers. According to this theory human reason is imitation of divine Logosm. 
The description of Logos in Clement we will follow Salvatore L i l l a 1 7 4 . In his 
exceptional book about Clement, Lilla detects three phases or three forms of Logos. 
In the first phase Logos is totality of divine powers or the realm of inteligibilia, in 
the second cosmological principle or arche, and in third the cosmocratic and 
hegemonic wisdom of God in the world. In the first phase or stage Logos is one with 
God and it represents the mind of God. The God of Clement characterises noetical 
activity. God thinks, and the results of his thinking are thoughts or ideas. Logos is 
the mind of God and the realm of ideas. Ideas exist only in mind, which is their 
source. Clement maintains the transcendence of God even in the state of unity. God 
remains beyond Logos. But the transcendence of God does not mean complete 
discontinuity between Logos and God. 
For both are one - that is, God. For He has said, ' In the beginning the Word 
was in God, and the Word was God' 
(&\X' ovbe VKO IOV Xbyov £v yap &u,(|)co, b Qeoq, bn eircev "ev ap%f\ b 
Xbyoq f|v fev tcp Geco, K O U Qeoq r\v b X6YOQ")(John I , l ) . 1 7 5 
In the second stage, Logos comes out from God and becomes a being distinct from 
Him. He creates the world according to ideas, which are in his possession. Clement 
uses the term idea only when referring to Plato and his doctrine of ideas. He speaks 
much more about powers, considering them as fulfilling the function of Plato's 
forms 1 7 6 . 
Logos is a plurality in unity because it contains future beings, which are still 
undivided. This totality of powers or ideas of God, Clement calls monas. 
All the powers of the Spirit, becoming collectively one thing, terminate in 
the same point - that is, in the Son. But He is incapable of being declared, in 
respect of the idea of each one of His powers. And the Son is neither simply 
one thing as one thing, nor many things as parts, but one thing as all things; 
whence also He is all things. For He is the circle of all powers rolled and 
united into one unity. 1 7 7 
Logos as the second hypostasis forms KoapLOQ v6rrtoc; which is a unity, 
comprehending everything in it. Logos is arche or the principle of the sensible 
1 7 3 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, I, 4, 26-27. 
1 7 4 Salvatore Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, (Oxford University Press, 1971.), pp. 199-212 
1 7 5 Clement of Alexandria, Pedagogues, I, 8, 62, 4. 
1 7 6 E . Osborn; The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, p .41 
1 7 7 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, IV, 25, 156, 1-2. 
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world. Logos is the instrument of divine activity and the pattern according to which 
the world will be made. 
And since the un-originated Being is one, the Omnipotent God; one, too, is 
the First-begotten, "by whom all things were made, and without whom not 
one thing ever was made." "For one, in truth, is God, who formed the 
beginning of all things; "pointing out "the first-begotten Son," Peter writes, 
accurately comprehending the statement, "In the beginning God made the 
heaven and the earth." And He is called Wisdom by all the prophets. This is 
He who is the Teacher of all created beings, the Fellow-counsellor of God, 
who foreknew all things; and He from above, from the first foundation of the 
world, "in many ways and many times," trains and perfects; whence it is 
I TO 
rightly said, "Call no man your teacher on earth." 
The third stage Logos of God is the divine wisdom, which is present in the world 
and governs it. This is the last phase of Logos in the process of 'descending' to the 
world. Logos is the cause of order in the world and the supreme law of the universe. 
For the image of God is His Word, the genuine Son of Mind, the Divine 
Word, the archetypal light of light; and the image of the Word is true man, 
the mind which is in man, who is therefore said to have been made 'in the 
image and likeness of God', assimilated to the Divine Word in the affections 
of the soul and therefore rational.1 7 9 
Lilla's theory about three stages in the ' l ife ' of Logos is not generally adopted by 
scholars. Thus Osborn argues that Clement's main works do not give a clear two- or 
180 
three-stage doctrine of the 'emergence' of Logos'1 . One of the reasons why 
Clement does not give a more defined theory of Logos lies in the very nature of 
Logos. The problem which arises for Christians in the first centuries is how to 
reconcile the relation between Logos as the knowable aspect of God, and Logos as 
agent in itself, capable of becoming identified with a specific material individual. In 
spite of the fact that Clement avoids this problem it is discernible that he establishes 
a sort of duality between eternal 'immanent' logos and a personalised subject which 
comes into existence as 'the first born of all creation'. 
Clement rejects the conception of Stoics and the later conception of Valentinus, 
according to which the eternal Word of God begets spoken utterance in every man: 
For the word of the Father of the universe is not the uttered word, but the 
wisdom and most manifest kindness of God, and His power too, which is 
almighty and truly divine, and not incapable of being conceived by those 
who do not confess - the all potent will (b yap xov naxpbq TGOV 6A,oov 
1 7 8 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, VI , 7, 58, 1. 
1 7 9 Clement of Alexandria, Protreptikiis, 10,79 (in Ante-Nicene Christian Library, volume IV, 
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Xbyoq o\>i ovxbq kaxiv b 7tpoc|>opiK6c;, cotyia. 5£ KOCI xpT)crx6xr)Q (jxxvepco 
idxr\ xov Qeov 5vva\xiq xe ax> 7caYKpatf](;...).181 
Clement is against the Valentinian tendency to fragment the divine realm, dividing it 
into distinct substances. They thought that God begets 'The Male', who is the Only 
Begotten, Mind and Truth and second after God. The Male then generates, does not 
create, the angelic seeds. Angelic seeds as children of the Male emanate from the 
'spiritual seeds' which are implanted in us. This flow of reality from God down to 
human beings simply diminishes the fundamental ontological difference between 
God and the world. Clement abandons such a view, emphasising a stronger unity 
between Father and Son, and the difference between the Son and the world. Clement 
denies that the faculty of reason is transferred from the God to the Logos of God, and 
also from the Logos to man, as the Valentinians would have it. The means of 
correspondence between Logos and man is the mind in the man or the faculty of the 
reasoning soul. This does not mean that the distinction between God and Logos is 
the same kind of distinction as between Logos and man. Clement rejects the 
conception of 'seeds' of reason, which are granted as a natural capacity, and any 
kind of natural kinship between God and man through Logos. Thus the knowledge 
of the first principles issues in faith, which is the product of free wil l . The 
affirmation of free will on the part of divine, as well as in humanity, is Clement's 
great achievement. God is not obliged to reveal or save, yet he does so. We are all 
also free to be disobedient to God, as well as to overcome this state by voluntary 
penitence. 
In the final analysis, it is difficult to know the exact meaning of Logos in Clement. Is 
he subsistent eternally distinct from God, or the impersonal function of the Father, 
or something else? As with Justin, we can conclude that Clement perceives Logos as 
a manifestation accidental to the 'real' life of Logos, which is in God. But we need 
to underline that one of positive contributions of Clement's theology, probably the 
most important one, is the concept of the centrality of freedom, divine and human, in 
182 
any proper theological account of God's dealing with the world 
3. The cosmological convenience; Origen 
The Alexandrian school yields another great thinker of early Church, Origen. His 
thought had had a spring from which many orthodox thinkers as well as heretics 
1 8 1 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, V, 1. 
1 8 2 Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, (SCM Press, London, 2001.), pp. 124-131. 
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drunk. The fif th ecumenical council condemned Origen's thought in some points. In 
the same time Origen's Trinitarian theology was used in the disputes with Arius. 
Origen made an attempt to establish a system based on dogmas, without rejection of 
anything that the Church professes. But, his interpretation of Christian tradition was 
merely on the philosophical manner, according to the Middle-Platonic systems. 
We will start with the most controversial part of his teaching, the doctrine of the pre-
existence of souls. Origen teaches that there was the unity of the limited number of 
rational beings with God, which pre-existed from all eternity. The rational beings or 
TCX Aoyixd participated in God's essence before commencement of the world. The 
original monad consisted of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, the Angels, the 
Powers, the Dominions, and the Virtues, including man also. The characteristic of 
rational beings was freedom and mutability. In that monad all rational beings, 
including the Holy Trinity were equal in accordance to their free choice. The 
difference between God and other rational beings was the mutability of the latter. 
According to their free wil l , consisting in the choice between good and evil, the 
rational beings are capable of movement toward God. This movement broke the 
monistic structure of original unity. 
This is the so called second creation or the creation in time. Origen describes this in 
the following way: 
A reason for removal will consist in the movements of souls not being 
conducted according to right and propriety. For the Creator gave, as an 
indulgence to the understandings created by Him, the power of free and 
voluntary action, by which the good that was in them might become their 
own, being preserved by the exertion of their own wi l l ; but slothfulness, and 
a dislike of labour in preserving what is good, and an aversion to and a 
neglect of better things, furnished the beginning of a departure from 
goodness. But to depart from good is nothing else than to be made bad. For it 
is certain that to want goodness is to be wicked. Whence it happens that, in 
proportion as one falls away from goodness, in the same proportion does he 
become involved in wickedness. In which condition, according to its actions, 
each understanding, neglecting goodness either to a greater or more limited 
extent, was dragged into the opposite of good, which undoubtedly is evil. 
From which it appears that the Creator of all things admitted certain seeds 
and causes of variety and diversity, that He might create variety and diversity 
in proportion to the diversity of understandings, i.e., of rational creatures, 
which diversity they must be supposed to have conceived from that cause 
which we have mentioned above. 
1 8 3 Jean Danielou, Origen, (translated by Walter Mitchell, Shed and Ward, London, New York, 
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The second creation of universe is the consequence of the fall of rational being. The 
punishment of God was in dependence of the degree in which the rational beings 
have moved from God. Thus, some beings who sinned less became the Archangels 
and Angels and those who sinned heavily became the demons. The man sinned more 
than Angels and Archangels, but less than demons. For a punishment his soul was 
bounded with physical body and he was settled in the material world. 
There are two theories about the cause of the movement. According to the first the 
fall of the rational beings was caused by the surfeit (Kopos) of the divine vision. 
Another explanation is etymological. Origen states that minds lost their rational 
character in their fall from God. Through the process of cooling ( ^ U X E I V O ^ ) from 
the zeal toward God, minds or intellects became souls (yuxfjs) 1 8 5 . Ten years before 
the Fifth ecumenical council Justinian in his letter to Mennas exposes both ways of 
explanation. 
Souls of man pre-exist, insofar as being first minds, but having a surfeit of 
the divine vision and turned to the worse and therefore being cooled with 
regard to the love of God and hence being named souls and sent down into 
186 
bodies for punishment's sake - let him be anathema. 
This point of Origen's teaching was criticised a lot and the Fifth ecumenical council 
condemned it. The name of Origen is mentioned only as an ancestor of Isochristes, 
to whom is originally addressed the anathema. 
Origen's idea of rational beings that existed before the world can be interpreted in 
different ways. But the real matter of the question is why Origen really needs this 
hypothesis. Is he deeply influenced by Platonism that he could not avoid the theory 
of the world of ideas? He could not find the support for this theory in Scripture. 
Why did then he develop such a system and what are the origins of this idea. 
The foundation of Origen's teaching is a response to Gnostic ideas of predestination. 
According to Gnostic teaching there are different kinds of human beings, each of 
187 
them destined to their own particular fate . Origen distinguishes between the first 
creation or K T I O I S , which refers to a primordial 'heaven and earth' (from Genesis I , 
l 1 8 8 ) , and cosmos which refer to the world in the fallen state, which is created in 
time. The first world of rational spirits was created by the will of God and out of his 
1 8 5 J.W. Trigg, Origen, S C M Press, London, 1983., p. 107, and Louth, A, The Origins of Christian 
Mystical Tradition,(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.), p. 61 
1 8 6 Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicotum (ed. Schwartz) III , 191; III, 213. 
1 8 7 Origen, On the First Principles, 1, 6, 2; I, 8, 2; II, 1,1-2. 
1 8 8 Origen. Com. In loan, 11,96, 169, 18 - 1 7 0 , 17. 
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own goodness . The first principle on which is based existence of rational beings is 
equality. According to J. Danielou, Origen developed this theory to explain diversity 
of the world, which was the result of free will of rational beings. For Origen it was 
illogical that the Creator apart of the reason and merits gave to certain created beings 
superior position than to the others. He found that: 
The cause of the diversity and variety among these beings is shown to be 
derived not from any unfairness on the part of the Disposer but their own 
action, which exhibit varying degrees of earnestness or laxity according to 
the goodness or badness of each.1 0 
The beings created at the beginning as equal, using their voluntary choice and 
freedom gained a certain state in the movement from God. Thus, the diversity of 
nature has its root in the diversity of choice and free wil l . Origen's theory of pre-
existence is just his attempt to solve the problem of diversity in the world and to 
defend the Creator. It was mainly a reply on the attacks of Marcionites, who were 
accusing God for the injustice, in regard to inequality of the created beings. And, it 
was also a reply to Valentinian theory of the different kinds of souls. Thus, two main 
principles of cosmology of Origen, according to Danielou1 9' are that free nature 
necessarily implies the mutability of beings and that the diversity of natures is 
rooted in the diversity of choice. 
Cosmos is then the world of diversity, which is the result of the variable wills of 
creatures. According to Origen the world we know is not 'created' by God, but is 
conditioned by the choices of its creatures. The consequence of this fall is that 
certain souls descended into their bodies. Thus, Origen reconciles the inequality of 
human fate and affirms the justice of God. 
The surfeit was a reason for the fall of rational beings from God. But, one of pre-
existed souls did not fall from God. 
By reason of free-will, variety and diversity had taken hold of the individual 
souls, so one was attached to its author with a warmer and another with a 
feebler and weaker love, that soul of which Jesus said 'No man taketh from 
me my soul', clinging to God from the beginning of creation and after a 
union inseparable and indissoluble, as being the soul of the wisdom and 
word of God and the truth and the true light, and receiving him wholly, and 
itself entering into his light and splendour, was made with him in pre-
eminent degree of spirit, just as apostle promises to them whose duty it is to 
imitate Jesus, that 'he who is joined to the Lord in one spirit'. This soul, 
then, acting as a medium between God and flesh (for it was not possible for 
the nature of God to mingle with the body apart some medium), there is 
Origen, On the First Principles., U, 9, 6. 
0 Origen. Oh the First Principles, 1,8,2. 
1 Jean Danielou, Origen, p. 214. 
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born, as we said, the God-man, the medium being that existence to whose 
nature it was not contrary to assume a body. 
The soul of Jesus is by nature mutable, like all other souls. But the free will of Jesus' 
soul remains directed to the good and its choice becomes natural to it. Thus, the soul 
of Jesus is transformed by God. Origen uses Stoic images of iron and fire, which 
describe the transformation of iron in the f i re 1 9 3 . The human soul of Jesus was 
attached to the Logos with mystical devotion and Jesus 'becomes' for us one who 
exercises the royal power of logos194. It does not mean that Jesus possesses all 
powers of logos by nature, but rather that Jesus remains the recipient of the grace of 
the divine Son in all his fullness. Christ is one of the manifestations of logos, which 
is indistinguishable from logosm in the economy of revelation. Williams points out 
that 'the soul of Jesus is still the paradigm for the relation of the rational beings to 
the Logos, as the Logos himself is the paradigm of relation to the Father'196. 
Following Williams we can conclude that christoi are coming into existence by 
union with Christos in the same way in which we became logikoi in Logos. 
The unity of Logos and Jesus Christ became the unity of all creation or the world of 
TCX AoyiKd. The rational beings or TCX AoyiKcc are AoyiKa by reason of their 
participation in Logos. They are partakers of the Logos of God because they have 
implanted seeds of reason and Logos is the principle of reason. 
The Son of God or 'the very Logos and wisdom and truth i t se l f 1 9 7 is the intelligible 
world of ideas and reasons, which are contained in Him. The influences of Stoic 
theory according to which Logos is everywhere in the cosmos and TCX AoyiKa are 
sharers of his rational properties are evident in this place. Origen writes 
In this Wisdom, therefore, who ever existed with the Father, the Creation 
was always present in the form and outline, and there was never a time when 
the pre-figuration of those things which hereafter were to be did not exist in 
Wisdom. 1 9 8 
The Son of God as a Logos is the instrument of God in Creation and through Him 
the ideas and reasons, which are in Him as Wisdom become concrete beings. 'These 
rational beings, were made in the beginning, were made when before they did not 
1 9 2 Origen. On the First Principles, 11,6,3. 
I 9'' Origen, On the First Principles, II, 6, 5-6. 
1 9 4 Origen, Com. In . loan. I, 28, 35 16-21. 
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1 9 7 Origen, Contra Celsuin, III , 41 (translated by Henry Chadwick, University Press, Cambridge, 
1953.) 
1 9 8 Origen, On the First Principles, I, 4, 4; 
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exist, by this very fact that they did not exist and then began to exist they are of 
necessity subject to change and alternation'199. But did Origen fall in this trap of 
embedding theology deeply in cosmology? 
I f we look just at Origen's theory of Logos in its relationship with the cosmos we 
can conclude that Origen's thought is entirely dependent on the existing tradition. 
From this point of view Origen is nothing more than a philosopher who deals with 
existing philosophical material, as some scholars intend to show. Thus, his logos is 
envisaged in the relation to the cosmos. 
According to another scholar Henry Crouzel2 0 0, who devoted all his life to the study 
of Origen's work, one of the principles of the Origen's cosmology is that at the end 
is like at the beginning. The similarity between beginning and the end is in the unity 
of all in God rather than the equality of all. From this notion we can conclude that 
equality of beings is not a main theme of Origen's concern. Thus, all creation at the 
end will be freely submitted to God. The whole conception of apocatastasis or the 
universal restoration puts in question the free will of created beings to submit 
themselves to God. Therefore Origen gives to Logos the main role in the 
apokatastasis as well as in the creation. The Son of God as Logos needs to persuade 
the created beings without violation of their free wil l . The submission of the created 
being to the God and attaining the union with God is return in the same state as it 
was in pre-existence. At the same time, the submission of the entire creation to the 
Son is the condition of the subjection of Son to the Father201. This theory of Origen 
raises some questions about the nature of the relationship between the Father and the 
Son, or the Logos of God and the Godhead. The relationship between the Father and 
the Son has the essential importance because it is the ground for the relationship 
between God and the creation. 
It was a widely spread attitude that Origen through the idea of the superiority of the 
Father to the Logos falls into subordinationism. The few expressions, according to 
which the Son is a second God 2 0 2 , or that Son is just 'the image of God's 
goodness'203 lead us to conclude that the nature of the Son is less divine than the 
nature of the Father. I f Son as Logos is just a sharer of Divinity and not absolute 
possessor, his nature is different from the nature of the Father and He must be 
subordinated to the Father. There are many places in Origen's work, which give 
1 9 9 Origen, On the First Principles, II, 9, 2; 
2 0 0 Henry Crouzel, Origen, (T.&T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1989.), p. 205 
2 0 1 .Origen, On the First Principles. I l l , 5, 6-7 
2 0 2 Origen, Contra Celsum, V, 39; V I , 61; V I I , 57 
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support for such assertion. But, what is the real nature of the subordinationism in 
Origen? 
We say that the Saviour and the Holy Spirit transcend all generated beings, 
not by comparison, but by absolute transcendence, but that he [the Son] is 
transcended as much and more by the Father, as he and the Holy Spirit 
transcend other beings, not just ordinary ones.204 
The fact that the Father transcends Logos implies his dependence of The Father and 
his lesser hierarchical rank than one of the Father. But, what does it really mean? 
Origen's subordinationism arises from the fact that the Father is the source from 
which the Son is generated and the Holy Spirit proceeded. The higher rank of the 
Father is the conscience of His initiative role in the Holy Trinity. Al l these 
differences in the Holy Trinity do not have the ontological character, but they are the 
consequences of the different roles of the divine Persons. The role of the Father, 
according to Origen, is to give life to all creatures. The role of the Son is to confer 
the natural gift of reason or to make the being AoyiKog. Finally, the role of the Holy 
Spirit is to distribute the grace, ministered through the Son and put in operation by 
the Father. Origen especially draws the conclusion that 'nothing in the Trinity can be 
called greater and less', and that 'the power in the Trinity is one and same'2 0 5. The 
Son and the Holy Spirit are not less Gods that the Father and the differences in 
activities are more questions of the divine economy than ontology. The only 
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justification for such superior position of the Father, according to G.L. Prestige is 
that Origen has in mind the 'monarchy' of the Father. 
In regard to some passages from the work of Origen one can get impression that 
Father and Son are different by nature. 
Therefore we worship the Father of the truth and the Son who is the truth; 
they are two distinct existences, but one in mental unity, in agreement, and in 
identity of will 
(&via 5<)o tfj vnooxdaei TtpdyiJ.a'ca, fev 5e T.fi b(iovola KOCI xf\ rjv|i<|)CDVi 
a K a i Trj Tamoriyti xox> pouA-fpcaoc;). Thus he who has seen the Son, 
who is effulgence of the glory and express image of the Person of God, has 
seen God in him who is God's image.2 7 
According to the previous passage we can get impression that Origen made 
distinction between the nature of the Father and the nature of the Son. Origen 
introduces the term hypostasis to describe characteristics of Persons in the Holy 
2 0 3 Origen, Contra Celsum, V , 11 
2 0 4 Origen, Com. In loan, 13, 25, in Joseph W. Trigg, Origen, Routledge, London, New York, 1998 
2 0 5 Origen, On the First Principles, I, 3, 7. 
2 0 6 G . L . Prestige, God in Patristic Thought. London, (Toronto, 1936.), p. 133. 
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Trinity. The meaning of hypostasis has ontological character and its usage in such a 
delicate way can indicate the ontological difference between the Divine Persons. By 
applying the term hypostasis to the Son, Origen broke with previous tradition, which 
conceived logos in conceptual terms ( K C I T ' eTUivolav). 
The term hypostasis was derived from current philosophical tradition and it was 
used in the ontological sense, similar to ousia in the Platonistic tradition. The 
meaning of hypostasis is real individual subsistence. 
Origen, probably familiar with such usage, first time applies this ontological term to 
individual and concrete being. Thus, Origen gives to this term a new meaning that 
follows his intention to move the centre o f being from the impersonal substance to 
the personal God. His attempt unfortunately stayed undeveloped and gives a lot o f 
possibilities for misinterpretations. In the other place Origen shows that the Father 
and the Son have same nature. Origen writes that: 
The Father and the Son are not two, but that together they are one, not only 
as a nature, but also as a subject, that the names of Father and Son are related 
to different points of view not to their person ( E K xomcov 7taptaxaa0ai pLf] 
5ux(j)£pEiv xcp dpiGpop xbv vliov xox> TtaxpoQ, 6XX &v ot) |i6vov cybata 
dXkd Kod wr,OKeip,evcp xvyxdvovxaq otp^oiEpcnx;, Kaxd xivaq 
ETtivotac, 6ia<|)6po'oc;, ov Kaxd bntoxaaiv XeyeaBai 7taxepa Kod 
m o v ) - 2 0 8 
As elsewhere, Origen speaks of the Son in terms other than homoousios. In 
Dialogue with Heraclides, Origen is clearer about the different subsistence o f the 
Father and the Son. The Son has his 'own' proper ousia, distinct from the ousia of 
the Father. The distinct subsistence o f the Son is derived from God the Father, rather 
then from his activity as Creator. The Son receives his entire being from the Father 
and there is an unbroken continuity between them. Origen establishes the Son's 
kinship with the Father and it becomes the constitutive element o f God's being. The 
Son is never considered without the Father. The different subsistence o f the Son 
does not mean that the Son is divine in a way different from the Father. Origen 
affirms that the Father and the Son cannot be identical and possess the same 
properties. Origen's original intention was to preserve the transcendence o f God as a 
first principle. The Father as a first principle cannot be a member o f the same class 
as the Son and the Holy Spirit, because there will then be more than one first 
principle. This is the main reason why Origen does not apply homoousios. Origen 
2 0 7 Origen, Contra Celsum, V I I I , 12. 
2 0 8 Origen, Com. In loan, 10, 37, 246. 
58 
understood under the term homoousios members of a single class, sharing the same 
properties. 
Origen approaches this problem carefully, attacking the Gnostic teaching according 
to which souls were of one substance with God. The teaching of Heraclitus is that 
God, being of the same substance as souls, is like them subject to variation and 
change209. Origen claims that only the Father is 'the one true God' (Jn 17, 3) and he 
is referred to as 'the God' (6 0e6s). A l l other beings called gods are 'made gods by 
participation in his [Father's] divinity ' 2 1 0 . 
Apart from accusation that the Father and the Son have different natures, Origen is 
also accused that he does not allow enough difference between Logos and the 
rational beings. The Logos is superior to the rational beings because he is the source 
of rationality in the creation. Logos became the principle in which the divine unity is 
intelligibly mediated in a multiple world. 
God is therefore entirely one and simple, but the Saviour, on account of the 
many -since God 'designated' him 'in advance as a propitiation' (Rom. 
3,25) and the first-fruits of all creation - has become many and is doubtless 
all things that every created being, capable of liberation, has need of from 
him. 2 1 1 
First, applying the terms first-fruit of all creation or tcrioua on Logos, Origen does 
not make clear distinction between generation and creation. But there are another 
interpretations212 according to which the term K T I O I S is not strictly used to express 
created beings, but is applied to everything that comes from God. Second, according 
to Origen Logos or Son came into being by the will of the Father, and in the same 
time he is identified with the will of the Father. In the first case, when 'the birth 
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from the Father is as it were an act of his will proceeding from the mind' , must be 
conceived as a free act of the Father. This free act of the Father should not be 
interpreted in the categories of human freedom, because then the existence of the 
Son is completely dependent on the Father's wil l . The fact that God is Father from 
all eternity implies that the freedom and the necessity in God are not opposite 
notions. God as a Father begets his Son from eternity. The second case where the 
Son is identified with the wil l of the Father just projects role of the Son as the 
Father's minister and collaborator. 
2 W Origen, Comm. In loan. 13, 150. 
2 1 0 Origen, Comm. In loan. 2, 17. 
2 1 1 Origen, Comm. In loan. 1, 20. 
2 1 2 Henry Crouzel, Origen, p. 186. 
2 1 3 Origen, On the First Principles, 1, 2, 6. 
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The later case is quit clear, but the former originates some interesting solutions. The 
problem is that generation of the Son is eternal. The fatherhood of God is seen as a 
continuous and permanent generation of the Son. Origen logically develops his 
theory. He starts from the notion that God is always the Father of His only-begotten 
Son. God in the same time always actualises his capacity. The fatherhood of God is 
projected through eternal generation of the Son. In the same time in the Son as 
Wisdom is pre-arranged the world of rational beings, created by the Father from 
eternity. The consequence of these assertions is that creation is co-eternal with God. 
According to this conception, God's essence is immutable and unchangeable and the 
rational beings are eternal as a part of God. The key notion in Origen's system is the 
omnipotence of God. 
Now as one cannot be a father apart from having a son, nor a lord apart from 
holding a possession or a slave, so we cannot even call God almighty i f there 
are none over whom ha can exercise his power. Accordingly, to prove that 
God is almighty we must assume the existence of the universe. For i f anyone 
would have it that certain ages, or periods of time, or whatever he cares to 
call them, elapsed during which the present creation did not exist, he would 
undoubtedly prove that in those ages or periods God was not almighty, but 
that he afterwards became almighty from the time when he began to have 
creatures over whom he could exercise power. Thus God will apparently 
have experienced a kind of progress, for there can be no doubt that it is better 
for him to be almighty than not to be so. 2 1 4 
Origen borrows this concept from Middle Platonism, according to which God must 
always have had a world on which He exercises his power. The problem is in fact 
that Origen could not think God different than Creator. For Origen it is very difficult 
to imagine some change in God. The eternal actualisation of God does not leave a 
room for his potentiality. Therefore Origen deeply roots cosmology in his ontology. 
The ontological gap between the Creator and creation is overcome by bounding the 
world closely with God. We do not want to go any further in explaining the system 
of Origen. Neither do we want to involve in deeper in his theory of the pre-existence 
of the soul. Even i f we adopt the theory, presented by Crouzel that the world created 
by God is not the world of pre-existed minds but the world of the Platonistic 'ideas' 
and the Stoic 'reasons', plans and seeds of being pre-arranged in the Son and created 
by the Father through the eternal generation of his Son, still stays the fact that God 
needs something to exercise his power. Thus the God of Origen is not absolutely 
free and he is not released from the 'closed ontology' Greek thinking is based on. 
The relationship between God and world is based on necessity. Origen' conception 
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of Logos still subsists on the Stoic's theory of logos as immanent rational principle. 
He gives attention largely to the cosmic aspect of the Son as an immanent Thought 
within the paternal Mind and then as 'uttered in the act of the creation. However 
logos is not only the intermediary between God and the world in the sense of being a 
'cosmological convenience', but as bishop Williams states, logos is 'the paradigm of 
our knowing and loving God' 2 1 5 . 
In spite of the accusation that Origen's thought is 'pressed into the mould of Middle 
Platonism', he remains the greatest mind of his time and his thought constitutes a 
clear advance on previous time. Origen was also the common ancestor of the Arian 
heresy and of Cappadocian orthodoxy. Therefore the attempts to impute to Origen, 
something which belong to his descendants from the time of the Origenist crisis, are 
ignorant and stupid. 
Unfortunately, the works of Origen have been read largely in the context of heresies. 
When preconceptions have been laid aside, and Origen studied objectively, it wil l be 
found that Christian thought is most indebted to him. 
IV The Zenith of Late Antiquity; Plotinus 
The development of Christian philosophy did not affect classical thinkers by 
arousing their interest in Christian themes. Apart from Celsus and Numenius, who 
were involved in disputes with Christians, the other second century philosophers like 
Albinus, Atticus, Maximus of Tyre, and Plutarch remain faithful to their great 
teacher - Plato. Their successor and the greatest thinker among pagan philosophers 
in late antiquity was Plotinus. His task was not only to preserve and improve Plato's 
thought, but also to defend his teaching from the attacks of Gnostic and Christian 
philosophers. Plotinus succeeded in his task, not only reviving interest in pagan 
philosophy in the great length but also influencing his opponents. It is simply 
impossible to deny the influence of Plotinus and his successors, usually known as 
Neoplatonists, on Christian thought. 
Plotinus left a written work, called Enneads. Edited by Plotinus' disciple Porphyry, 
it consisted of fifty-four treatises, arranged according to theme into six sets of nine 
treatises - hence its name, the Greek for "nine". Although Plotinus professes to 
follow his teacher Plato, he upgrades Plato's teaching by introducing new elements. 
Plotinus' philosophy is deeply original. Three main principles constitute his system, 
2 1 4 Origen, On the First Principles. I, 2, 10. 
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i f we can apply the term 'system' to his philosophy. The first and supreme principle 
is "the One", which correlates with "the Good" in Plato. Nous or "Intellect" is the 
second; and the last and the lowest in the chain is "Soul". The One is the ultimate 
principle and the source of everything. The One is beyond Being; it is simple and 
infinite. Intellect proceeds from the One, which remains unchanged. This is the first 
stage of coming into existence from the One. Nous is equivalent to the "Forms" of 
Plato's philosophy. The second stage is derivation of Soul from Intellect. Soul is a 
second degree of dispersion and is responsible for the structure of the entire 
universe. Entering into the material world, the Soul is not subject to change as is 
matter. Soul as a hypostasis of True Being organises the world from above. Bodies 
are the emanations of Soul. The process of emanation from the One has a reverse 
phase. This is return from Soul to Intellect and from Intellect to the One. This return 
has as its basis a desire for the Good and for the achievement of union with the One. 
After a brief introduction we will focus our attention on questions which fall into the 
field of our interest. These questions are: What kind of relationship exists between 
the One, Intellect and Soul? Does the One produce by Necessity? And what is the 
role of Logos in Plotinus' teaching? 
Let's see first what the One means to Plotinus. He defines the One in negative terms 
using Plato's terminological arsenal. Like Plato's Good (fercfeKEiva xr\q obaiac;) 2 1 6, 
the One is "beyond being". Being without limitation and finitude the One falls 
outside the Greek definition of being. There is no name for the One 
(ob5e 6vou.a odnou) 2 1 7. The One is absolutely unknowable and cannot be spoken 
about2 1 8. Speaking of the One is possible only in terms of speaking about ourselves 
or other aspects of the world. Speaking of the One merely reflects dependency and a 
desire to be in relation with something prior to and higher than ourselves. Thus, all 
things derive existence from the One, the source of all beings. 
Plotinus identifies the process of emanation with a process in which existences, 
according to their essence and power, produce an outward-facing hypostasis, which 
are continuously attached to them and represent the image of the archetypes219. He 
gives the examples of fire, which radiates heat; and snow, which radiates cold. The 
general pattern of things is that they produce effects. Thus, it is inconceivable that 
2 1 5 RowanWilliams. Arius. p. 139. 
2 1 6 Plato, Republic 509b; also Plotinus, Enneads, I, 7, 1, 19; I, 8, 6, 28; (translated by Stephan 
MacKenna, revised by B.S. Page, London, 1969.) 
2 1 7 Plotinus, Enneads, V, 5, 6, 12 also Plato, Parmenides, 142c. 
2 1 8 Plotinus, Enneads, I, 2, 3, 27. 
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the One, which is the supreme perfection, can remain unproductive and sterile. But 
the One is not like other existences, which produce effects according to their 
essence. The One is not subject to his Essence or to himself. The One is absolutely 
free from his Essence and as such he enters into process of emanation. Everything is 
a product of the One and there is a radical difference between the One and 
everything else, including Intellect. 
Producing it He left it outside of Himself: He had no need of being, who 
brought it to be. Thus his making of being is no 'action in accordance with 
his being' '(xoivw ot>8e KO606 ecru T I O I E I T6 ecrci). 2 2 0 
The One is limited neither in relation to others, nor in relation to himself 2 2 1. Plotinus 
introduces distinction between one and many to describe difference between the One 
and other beings. He claims that the first Principle is different than manifold reality. 
Being opposite to multiplicity the One possesses unity and self-integrity and as such 
it is simple. As simple the One is prior to things, which are composite. Plotinus 
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applies the principle of prior simplicity on the One. 
Standing before all things, different from all its sequels, self-gathered not 
interblended with the forms that rise from it, and yet able in some mode of its 
own to be present to those others: it must be authentically unity, not 
something elaborated into unity and so in the reality no more than unity's 
counterfeit.223 
We see that the other principles, which are derived from the One, must be 
composite. They consist elements, which exist as components of a whole, and they 
are dependent on whole and in the same time those elements exist outside the whole, 
as itself. 
Intellectual-Principle is still being but the First is not being but precedent to 
all being: it can not to be a being, for a being has what we may call the shape 
of its reality but the Unity is whiteout shape, even shape Intellectual. 
Generative of all, The Unity is none of all; neither thing nor quantity nor 
quality nor intellect nor soul; not in motion, not in rest, not in place, not in 
time: it is self-defined, unique in form or, better, formless, existing before 
Forms was, or Movement or Rest, all of which are attachments of Being and 
make Being the manifold it is . 2 2 4 
2 , 9 Plotinus, Enneads. V , 1, 6, 28-32. 
2 2 0 Enneads M\, 8, 19, 18-20. 
2 2 1 Plotinus, Enneads, V , 5, 11,2-3. 
2 2 2 D.J . O'Meara, Plotinus; An Introduction to Enneads, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1933.), pp. 44-9. 
2 2 3 Plotinus. Enneads. V . 4, 1,5-14. 
2 2 4 Plotinus, Enneads, V I , 9, 3, 36-45. 
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This duality is reflected in the existence of Intellect. The constitutive components of 
Intellect are thinking and object of thought. Being dependent on the First Principle, 
Intellect necessarily thinks the One. The natural and desirable movement to what is 
lit 
good is in the basis of thinking the One. But, this is not the only way in which 
Intellects is composite. Intellect is one, as thinking itself, but in the same time 
Intellect thinks the Forms and the Forms are manifold. The way of thinking variety 
and multiplicity 2 2 6 implies the existence of Intellect as multiplicity. The problem of 
one and many, Plotinus solves avoiding spatial categories. 
Intellectual-Principle is the authentic existences and contains them all - not 
as in place but possessing itself and being one thing with this its content 
(Novc; [ikv 5f) feaxco t d 6vca, KOCI ndvia fcv a w p o"bx E v t6n;q) £^cov 
, &AA' cbc; cdrtov & x c o v K a i - & v & v ai/coic;). 2 2 7 
On this level, in the harmonious unity of Intellect and the Forms, the 'true being' 
reveals itself to us. This true being must be understood as finite being, which has its 
cause in the infinite being or the One. 
The process of the emanation of Intellect from the One has no beginning or end, 
because it takes place outside time. Time is a category created by Soul within the 
lower level of existence. The emanation of Soul is from Intellect. Intellect 
constitutes Soul in the same way as the One constitutes Intellect. 
This second outflow is an image or representation of the Divine Intellect as 
the Divine Intellect represented its own prior, The One. This active power 
sprung from essence (from the Intellectual-Principle considered as Being) is 
Soul. Soul arises as the idea and act of the motionless Intellectual-Principle -
which itself sprang from motionless prior - but the Soul's operation is not 
similarly motionless; its image is generated from its movement. It takes 
fullness by looking to its source; but it generates its image by adopting 
another, a downward, movement.228 
Soul is an expression of Intellect and the second hypostasis from the One. As the 
product of the One, the nature of Soul implies an inherited duality. When thinking 
about herself, Soul looks to what precedes her. Soul differs from Intellect because 
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she is involved in arranging and governing those things which come after her . 
Soul arranges and governs the material world. The second form of involvement 
implies immediate contact with individual bodies. Thus the nature of the Soul is to 
2 - 5 Plotinus, Enneads, V , 6, 5, 8. 
2 2 6 Plotinus, Enneads. V, 3, 10, 39-43. 
2 2 7 Plotinus, Enneads, V , 9, 6, 1-2. 
2 2 8 Plotinus, Enneads, V, 2, 1, 14-20. 
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organise bodies and to be present in bodies. The soul stays pure and unaffected by 
the world of sense and change. The World Soul governs the material universe, 
remaining in the same state of contemplation what is above her. Soul, as the 
immediate cause of the world, creates matter. Matter does not come into existence 
out of the process of emanation, but is a necessary implication of it. Plotinus puts in 
question the theory of matter of his Platonic predecessor. Plato teaches that cosmos 
is made of two independently existing levels of reality. One level is the realm of 
Forms and the other the realm of disorganised matter. The link between these two 
worlds is Soul, which shapes matter according to the Forms. This theory supposes 
the eternal existence of matter. The theory of emanation does not suppose the pre-
existence of matter, but considers it to be a product of higher levels of reality. Thus, 
matter is derived from the One, through the intermediary stages of Intellect and 
Soul. Plotinus tries to solve this dilemma. 
If, therefore, Matter has always existed, that existence is enough to ensure its 
participation in the being which, according to each receptivity, 
communicates the supreme receptivity, communicates the supreme Good 
universally: i f on the contrary, Matter has come into being as a necessary 
sequence of the causes preceding it, that origin would similarly prevent it 
standing apart from the scheme as though it were out of reach of the 
principle to whose grace it owes its existence. 
This section from Enneads is matter of dispute among scholars. Does Plotinus really 
solve the problem of matter by denying its pre-existence? The eternal existence of 
matter can be interpreted in such a way that matter is distinct from the realities 
which are derived from the One, namely Intellect and Soul. The alternative to this is 
that matter is the last sequence in the process of emanations from the One in which 
the productive force of the One dies. Thus, matter can be independent of the process 
of emanation or it can be its last stage. This kind of interpretation is given by 
Brehier 2 3 1. Professor Rist rejects Brehier's view, suggesting that Plotinus does not 
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claim that matter is independent of the One. According to Rist , Plotinus sets the 
problem in the context of a distinction between eternal matter and matter created in 
time. Thus, the first alternative according to which matter has always existed, does 
not suppose the existence of matter as a separate reality, but the existence of matter 
as ultimately connected to the process of emanation. In the second case, where 
2 2 9 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, 8, 3. 
2 3 0 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, 8, 6, 18-23. 
2 3 1 E . Brehier, The Philosophy of Plotinus, (translated by J. Thomas, Chicago, 1985.), p. 180. 
2 3 2 J .M. Rist, Plotinus; The Road to Reality, (Cambridge, 1980.), pp. 118-9. 
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matter has come into being as a necessary sequence of causes (7tp6 odrr/fjt; aixloiQ), 
the term Tipo ahxr\q refers to the temporal creation of matter. Plotinus emphasises 
that even in this case matter is not separate (0"b5' &>c, fe5et xwpiq) from the One. 
Thus, in both cases matter is not independent of the One. 
What according to Plotinus causes the creation of matter in time? Plotinus develops 
his argument in the context of a "one-and-many" distinction. The multiplicity of 
Forms, which exist at the level of Intellect is reflected on a lower level, or level of 
Soul. The particular Forms are represented in the world of matter as particular souls. 
Soul by its nature overflows and creates material universe. The creation of the world 
is similar to the creation of Intellect from the One, and Soul from Intellect. The 
correlative of the Intellect in the material universe is World Soul, which relates to 
Intellect in the same way as Intellect relates to the One. This is not the case with 
individual souls. The difference between World Soul and particular souls is in their 
relationship to body or different bodies. World Soul organises and governs the 
world, but always remains pure. The individual souls are capable of a ' fa l l ' in their 
lower aspects, namely in the bodies. 
So it is with the individual souls; the appetite for the divine Intellect urges 
them to return to their source, but they have, too, a power apt to 
administration in this lower sphere; they may be compared to the light 
attached upwards to the sun, but not grudging its presidency to what lies 
beneath it. In the Intellectual, then, they remain with soul-entire, and are 
immune from care and trouble; in the heavenly sphere, absorbed in the soul-
entire, they are administrators with it just as kings, associated with the 
supreme ruler and governing with him, do not descend from their kingly 
stations: the souls indeed are thus far in the one place with their overlord; but 
there comes a stage at which they descend from the universal to become 
partial and self-centred; in a weary desire of standing apart they find their 
way, each to a place of its very own. This state long maintained, the Soul is a 
deserter from the Al l ; its differentiation has severed it; its vision is no longer 
set in the Intellectual; it is a partial thing, isolated, weakened, full of care, 
intent upon the fragment; severed from the whole, it nestles in one form of 
being; for this, it abandons all else, entering into and caring for only the one, 
for a thing buffeted about by a worldful of things: thus it has drifted away 
from the universal and, by an actual presence, it administers the particular; it 
is caught into contact now, and tends to the outer to which it has become 
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present and into whose inner depths it henceforth sinks far. 
This passage aptly describes the consequences of the ' fa l l ' for self-centred souls. 
The souls imprisoned in the bodies represent particular parts of reality. The cause of 
the ' fa l l ' is a desire to be itself. Thus, the centre of soul is no longer in the true 
2 3 3 Plotinus, Enneads, IV, 8,4,1-21. 
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centre of all, the One, but in soul's own nature. However, soul cannot be capable of 
a ' fa l l ' apart from matter. Matter is the weakness of the soul. When the soul's 
governing activity over matter starts to f i l l it with pleasure, soul deliberately moves 
not to World Soul, but to the material world. Professor Armstrong defines this 
movement of the soul as 'a desire not to have all things at once so that it can pass 
from one to another'234. In her movement the soul spreads out from the unified life 
of intellect and creates time. Plotinus defines time as 'the life of the soul in 
movement as it passes from one stage of act or experience to another'235 Soul 
remains timeless, because it is eternal, without beginning or end in time. But the 
movement of soul downward creates the image of soul, which is within time. This 
image of soul is the immanent principle of life, form and growth, which Plotinus 
calls Nature2 3 6. Nature is an integral part of soul on a lower level and it has a 
productive force. The movement of Nature is oriented toward soul, but its 
contemplation of higher levels is so weak that Nature produces forms in matter. 
These embodied forms are shadows of supreme reality and they are lifeless images 
of the soul, incapable of producing further forms. The role of Nature as a lower part 
of Soul is to give life and reality to bodies, thus making them determinate. 
The whole process of emanation from the One is ended in the matter of world of 
sense, which no longer represents the perfection of its ontological predecessors. 
We will now consider the question whether the One produces reality freely or of 
necessity. The notion of necessity was common in Greek philosophy. In Christian 
ontology this notion attracted some negative connotations, because the intention of 
Christian writers was to release God from every kind of constraint and to show that 
God's creation is a free act of love. 
Plotinus likens the process of emanation to the process of deriving light from fire 
and cold from snow. 
Al l existences, as long as they retain their character, produce - about 
themselves, from their essence, in virtue of the power, which must be in 
them - some necessary, outward-facing hypostasis continuously attached to 
them and representing in image the engendering archetypes.237 
2 3 4 A . H . Armstrong, Plotinus in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval 
Philosophy, edited by A.H. Armstrong, Cambridge, 1967, p. 251. 
2 3 5 Plotinus, Enneads, III, 7, 11, 23-7. 
2 3 6 Plotinus, Enneads, V, 2, 1, 18-21. 
2 3 7 Plotinus, Enneads. V, 1, 6, 30-4. 
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Thus, light and cold are derived from their archetypes, fire and snow 
£K xf\c, ocbxcov o-batccc; avayKalav. But does Plotinus apply the same analogy to 
the process of the emanation of Intellect from the One? In the next section of the 
Ennead the compulsion used in the case of fire and snow is replaced with a weaker 
expression. 
The Intellectual-Principle stands as the image of The One, firstly because 
there is a certain necessity {del TCCDQ) that the first should have its offspring, 
carrying onward much of its quality. 
Plotinus suggests that the necessity applied in the case of the emanation of Intellect 
from the One is a completely different kind of necessity. The difference between 
these two cases lies in the different nature of the One. In the case of fire and snow, 
their products, heat and cold, are essentially linked with the nature of the fire and 
snow. Plotinus describes this as the "act of the essence" (Evfepyeux xr\q oixriac;), 
and an act "going out from" the essence which are inseparably bound together. 
Thus, 'the second act is an inevitable outflow from the first, an emanation distinct 
from the things itself (f)v 5et navel &Ttea9ca avcryicr^ etepav crocrav 
aincrn)' 2 3 9 . The act from the essence or the productive act is one of necessity, 
dependant and related to the act of the essence. Does the act from essence of the One 
depend on the essence or nature of the One? Plotinus is strict that an act according 
Nature (f| K a r a xf\v evepyeiav xo e l v a i ) 2 4 0 could not be applied to the One. The 
One is free of every determination by its essence and from any kind of internal or 
external constraint. Plotinus states that the One wills itself, as well as what it 
produces. 
If, then, we are to allow Activities in the Supreme and make them depend 
upon wil l - and certainly Act cannot be will-less - and these Activities are to 
be the very essence, then will and essence in the Supreme must be identical. 
This admitted, as He wills to be He is. 2 4 1 
The nature of the One is at the same time its wil l . The one is 'what He has willed to 
be' not 'what He has happened to be' 2 4 2 . But at the same time the will of the One 
produces necessity in the process of emanation. We can conclude that because the 
One is free from the acts of essence as well as from the acts from the essence. Does 
it mean that the One could 'not have created at all' and that the lower levels of 
Plotinus, Enneads. V, 1, 7, 1-4. 
2 3 9 Plotinus, Enneads. V, 4, 2, 29-30. 
2 4 0 Plotinus, Enneads, VI , 8, 7, 49-50. 
2 4 1 Plotinus, Enneads, V I , 8, 13, 5-8. 
2 4 2 Plotinus, Enneads. V I , 8, 13, 57-8. 
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existence could 'not have existed at all'? I f we ask the question in that way, the 
answer will be negative. But Plotinus, probably aware of the possibility that freedom 
of the One can be questioned, puts this problem in the context of a distinction 
between 'necessary' (xomo 8£ov) and 'chance-made' or 'appropriate' 
(TO\> OOQ £TU%£V) creation. In establishing a distinction between creation by chance 
and creation by necessity, Plotinus wants to show that term 'by chance' is 
diametrically opposite not to the term 'by necessity', but to the term 'free ' 2 4 3 . The 
intention of the One, i f we can speak in such terms, was to create not by chance but 
according to free will . 
On the assumption that God wills what should be and that impossible to 
separate right from realisation and that this Necessary is not to God an 
outside thing but is, itself his first Activity manifesting outwardly in the 
exactly representative form. 2 4 4 
The problem of the One for Plotinus is that the process of emanation cannot be 
pressed into the mould of the Christian theory of creation. The One does not have a 
positive movement toward creation, as does the Christian God. Even in the process 
of emanation the One remains focused on itself and 'anything that comes into being 
after it can be produced only as a consequence of its unfailing self-intention'2 4 5. 
The self-intention of the One is the act of essence, which is ontologically prior to the 
act from essence or the emanation from the One. Thus the necessity in the process of 
emanation is just a consequence of the One's self-concern. Being free from its 
essence, which is prior to products of essence, the One is also free from every 
external constraint. Necessity is the One's own will . Following Trouillard 2 4 6 we can 
conclude that the voluntarism of the One is a key for understanding the question of 
necessity and freedom in Plotinus. 
The next question is about the role Plotinus gives to logos in his teaching. The 
problem of logos is one of the burning questions in Plotinian studies. The main 
reason for the dispute among scholars is the real nature of logos. Is logos the fourth 
hypostasis or is it just an activity of the lower hypostasis. Plotinus also puzzles 
modern scholars by referring in some places to logos as an intermediary between 
Intellect and Soul and in others as an activity of Soul in the material reality. But 
what is consistent in Plotinus' teaching about logos is the fact that it always appears 
2 4 3 J .M. Rist, Plotinus, The Road to Reality, p. 82. 
2 4 4 Plotinus, Enneads, VI , 8, 18, 49-52 
2 4 3 Plotinus, Enneads, V, 1, 6, 30-34 
2'"' J. Trouillard, La Procession plotinienne, (Paris, 1951.), p.77. 
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as a unifying principle, which brings order to chaos. Following this line, we will 
examine the role of logos in connection with the material world. 
Plotinus states that 'Soul governs the Al l by the plan contained in the Reason-
Principle' ( K a r a Xtyov M/'ux'rk 5toiKOioar|<; to roiv)247. He follows on by 
explaining that all process takes place in the cosmos. The cosmos is "ensouled" from 
above, without the soul descending. 
The universe spreads as broad as the presence of soul; the bound of its 
expansion is the point at which, in its downward egression from the 
Supreme, it still has soul to bind it in one: it is shadow as broad as the 
Reason-Principle proceeding from soul; and that Reason-Principle is of 
scope to generate a cosmic bulk as vast as lay in the purposes of the Idea (the 
Divine forming power) which it conveys.248 
Logos appears as a regulative principle which uses the Forms as patterns and creates 
particular entities in the material world. The role of logos is not only to create, but 
also to introduce order into the universe. Does Plotinus multiply roles of nature and 
logos, connecting both with lower level of Soul, which is involved in creation? 
Yet the offspring of intellectual principle must be a Reason-Principle, that is 
to say, a substantial existence (hypostasis) identified with the principle of 
deliberative thought (in the Timaeus): such then is that (higher Soul) which 
circles about Divine Mind, its light, its image inseparably attached to it: on 
the upper level united with it, filled from it, enjoying, participant in its 
nature, intellective with it, but on the lower level in contact with the realm 
beneath itself, or, rather, generating in turn an offspring which must lie 
beneath; of this lower we will treat later; so far we deal still with the Divine. 
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Plotinus makes a distinction between Nature and logos on the basis of relationship 
with Intellect. Logos is regarded as an activity not only connected with the lowest 
level of reality, but also with the level of Intellect. Intellect emanates from logos into 
universe. Logos contains the seed or logoi, which directs the process of producing 
embodied forms. These logoi possess all the qualities of identity, which create the 
world of diverse forms 2 5 0. The emanation of logos from Intellect does not mean that 
logos descends into the material world, independently of Soul. But at the same time, 
logos does not descend only from the pure Soul. Plotinus describes Logos as 
radiation from both hypostasis, Intellect and Soul 2 5 1. Thus, logos passes through the 
2 4 7 Plotinus, Enneads, II , 3, 13, 4; II , 3, 16, 5. 
2 4 8 Plotinus, Enneads. IV, 3, 9, 46-51. 
2 4 9 Plotinus, Enneads. V , 1, 7, 42-9. 
2 5 0 Plotinus, Enneads, III , 2, 2, 19. 
2 5 1 Plotinus, Enneads. I l l , 2, 16, 14. 
70 
pure Soul, transmitting Forms into material world. Apart from this role of linking 
higher levels of reality with lower, logos has creative and regulative functions in the 
material world. The distinct functions of logos, the first of 
Xoyoq crovT)p:uJ6vo£ eKelvco, and the second of A.6yoq 7toiT]xiK6Q are two phases of 
logos according to its presence in the higher and lower realities. In the first phase 
logos is identified with All-Soul and in the second with Nature, becoming the 
Nature-principle252. 
Plotinus identifies logos and Nature as elements, which do not possess the full 
power of contemplation. At the third remove from Intellect, logoi in Nature, because 
of weak contemplation, produce the ghost-world consisting of ever-changing 
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particularities. Thus, professor Rist correctly concludes that the reason why logos 
cannot be the fourth hypostasis is the lack of its contemplation of the real world. 
Thus, logos remains just a function of Soul, like Nature in the multiplicity of the 
material world. 
In spite of similarities with concepts of logos in previous philosophical tradition, the 
logos of Plotinus must be considered in the context of his philosophy, as an activity 
of Soul which conveys the Forms from the level of Intellect into the material 
universe. 
Finally, we can conclude that the philosophy of Plotinus escapes the bonds of 
monistic ontology of Greek philosophers. Plotinus establishes the sovereignty of the 
transcendence of the One, refusing to imprison it in the Platonic concept of finite 
being. His philosophy is a product of the times in which he lived and it carries the 
answers to the current philosophical problems - problems which bothered both 
Christian and pagan philosophers. 
V Ontology of Freedom 
The Church Fathers did not accept that the world was ontologically 'given' because 
they were guided by the biblical doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Thus, the Church 
Fathers had instituted a completely different ontology tracing world back to 
ontology outside world, to God 2 5 4 . This ontology overcame an ancient naturalistic 
standpoint about God as the immanent cosmic power. According to the Fathers, God 
became absolutely free from every kind of necessity and the freedom the highest 
2 5 2 Plotinus, Enneads, III , 8, 3, 9. 
2 5 3 J .M. Rist, Plotinus, The Road to Reality, p. 99. 
2 5 4 J . Zizioulas, Being as Communion, (St. Vladimir Seminary Press, New York, 1985.), p. 39. 
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principle of Godhead. Thus, being became the product of freedom. This teaching 
was not explicitly given in the Bible, but it was a product of struggle against the 
ancient viewpoint over centuries. There were many traps which it was needed to 
avoid. A number of Church doctors had failed in their attempt to repudiate Plato's 
concept of creation from pre-existent matter, which limited the freedom of God. The 
others could not avoid the other great danger of Hellenistic thought, the teaching of 
Gnostic systems about 'gulf between God and the world. The goal was achieved 
after centuries of struggle and after many martyrs who witnessed by death the 
correct confession of the faith, but also after many heretics. Patristic thought 
revealed a new ontology of freedom. Thus, St. Gregory of Nyssa can say: 'To be 
God is to be free' . According to Gregory 'God always wants to be what he is, and 
he is absolutely what he wants to be' 2 3 6 . A similar standpoint about God, who is free 
of every definition, and whose nature is best defined by freedom, we find in St. 
Maximus the Confessor: 'CCUTE^OUOIOS 5E cpuoEi f] SEI'CC <puai$'257. The path to this 
way of thinking was not easy to pass. The trap of the ontological monism of ancient 
thought could not avoid such great mind as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria 
and Origen. 
1. The witness of faith; Ignatius of Antioch 
The apostolic fathers continued the work of apostles on establishing Christian 
communities. The period of late first century and early second century characterises 
appearance of a vast diffusion of local congregations each leading its separate life 
with its own constitutional structure and officers and each called 'church'. The deep 
conciseness of these communities that they are the parts of one universal Church 
needed the doctrinal foundation. The isolated communities were subjected to 
different cultural and religious influences. In the same time they were the fertile soil 
for developing the heresies. 
Known as the champion of monarchical episcopacy, St. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch 
made an attempt to establish a foundation for the doctrine of the Catholic Church 
based not any more on confined districts presided over by the bishops, but on the 
presence of Christ in body and blood. His letters give the clear evidence of the 
Church life in early second century. The whole work of Ignatius consisted of seven 
2 " Gregory of Nyssa, De Mortius, in Jaeger IX, 54. 
2 5 6 Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. I l l , 1, 125 (Jaeger II, 45-46). 
2 > 1 Maximus the Confessoris, Dispute with Pyrrhus, PG 91, 304c. 
72 
epistles addressed to the Churches in Asia Minor. Ignatius as condemned prisoner 
was transported across Asia Minor in the custody of Roman soldiers to Rome. Al l 
his epistles, written on the road to his death in Rome, discuss burning problems of 
the churches in the cities through which Ignatius had passed. They are not academic 
in style as a part of some intellectual movement but firmly rooted in the every day 
life of these small Christian communities. The epistles discover the person deeply 
grounded in the faith not only by concern for practical issues of Church life and 
order but also by his strong desire for martyrdom. In his letters Ignatius does not 
leave room for different interpretation and for arguing. His language is authoritative 
and at the same time prophetic. Being lead by spiritual experience of Church as a 
community Ignatius does not hypothesize in his letters, but he pronounces. 
Ignatius does not give only the answers on practical problems in the cities of western 
Asia Minor but he develops theological perspective, which wil l be of the great 
significance for later doctrinal struggles against heretics. Ignatius' contribution to 
the correct confession of faith is timeless although his teaching is the product of the 
struggle against the particular heresies. We shall discuss his theological achievement 
in the text to follow. The major problem, which confronts Ignatian studies today, is 
the understanding of the background of the Ignatian epistles. The matter of dispute 
among scholars is the number of different heretical teachings against which Ignatius 
had fought. The standpoint of some scholars is that Ignatius was combating two 
distinct heresies rather then one form of Judaeo-Gnosticism. The problem lies much 
deeper than it looks on first sight. According to the opinion of the scholars of 
German religious-historical school (Religionsgeschichtlicheschule), the traces of the 
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widely known Iranian myth are evident in Ignatian epistles. Thus, Schlier thinks 
that Gnostic influence on Ignatian thought is so strong that it fully explains his 
theology. The view of Christ as descending and ascending redeemer and the 
conception of church members as pneumatikoi who are by nature redeemed and 
ontologically related to Christ are the elements which support Schlier's standpoint. 
The other scholar from the same school, Bartsch2 5 9 holds that Gnostic influence is 
predominantly shown in the Ignatian idea of the unity of God and he distinguishes 
three levels in Ignatian thought. The first level is ungnosticised early Christian 
2 5 8 H. Schlier, Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Ignatius-briefen, Beihefte zur 
Zeitschrift fur die Neutistamentliche Wissenschaft, 8, Geisen, Topelmann, 1929. 
2 5 9 H.W Batrsch, Gnostiches Gut und Gemeindetradition bei Ignatius von Antiochien , Gutersloh, 
Werner, 1940. 
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preaching; the second an indirect Gnosticism mediated through the Johannine 
theology and the third a direct Gnostic influence. 
From the Ignatian letters his standpoint toward Docetic heresy is evident. Ignatius 
combats their position according to which Christ was not born in human flesh but on 
the contrary he only appeared to have a fleshly body and was really aocbiaaTOs. 
The Docetists denied the physical birth of Christ, his death and his resurrection. For 
them, according to Ignatius, Christ is 'without body and demon-like' 2 6 0 and 'bearer 
of a corps (vEKpocpopos)' 2 6 1 and 'He suffered only in semblance'262. Ignatius 
refuses to mention their names because they are unbelievers and not worthy to be 
mentioned, but it is evident that he talks about the Docetists. 
But is this the only heresy against which Ignatius fought. He does not give any direct 
indication that he is fighting on two fronts, but indirectly suggests that there are two 
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heresies defining them as the 'strange doctrines' and the 'antiquated fables' . The 
first heresy is docetic and Ignatius describes them in the following way: 
But certain persons ignorantly deny Him, or rather have been denied by Him, 
being advocates of death rather than of the truth; and they have not been 
persuaded by the prophecies nor by the law of Mosses, nay-nor even the very 
hour by the Gospel.2 4 
The second group is 'those who had walked in ancient practices'263 and observe 
Sabbaths. It is obvious that the first group who denies the authority of Old 
Testament can be mingled with those who live according to the Jewish law. 
These elements, according to some scholars strongly define the position of Ignatius. 
Virginia Corwin 2 6 6 , following C.C. Richardson267 and Bartsch distinguishes two 
distinct groups of heretics and locates the position of Ignatius in the middle. On the 
one side was the group of Christians deeply influenced by the Old Testament with 
strongly pro-Jewish orientation. On the other side stood the Docetist. Ignatius was 
the leader of the centrist party, which was maintaining the- balance between two 
extremes. 
~"«v»> 
2 G 0 Ignatius of Antioch, Smyr. 2. 
" 6 1 Ignatius of Antioch, Smyr. 5. 
2 6 2 Ignatius of Antioch, Tral. 10. 
2 ( b Ignatius of Antioch, Magn. 8. 
2 M Ignatius of Antioch, Smyr. 5. 
2 6 5 Ignatius of Antioch. Magn. 9. 
2 6 6 V.Corwin, St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch, (Yale University Press, New York, 1960.); pp. 
52-64 
2 6 7 C . C . Richardson., The Christianity of Ignatius of Antioch, (Columbia University Press, New York, 
1935.), pp. 81-5 
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According to other opinions Ignatius was confronted to only one form of Judeo-
Docetism. L.W. Barnard develops his position on the basis of the recent 
discoveries of the Dead Sea Scrolls, which supplied proof that Judaism was not so 
monolithic in its structure, but open to outside influences. Thus, one of various 
forms of Judaism known as Essene Judaism influenced incipient Gnostic thought. 
The Judaism invading Hellenistic thought creates a new form of Judaeo-Docetism or 
Judaeo-Gnosticism. The partisans of Judaeo-Gnosticism had their own interpretation 
of the Old Testament in which they based their christological position. The Ignatius 
was familiar with this form which is evident in his epistles to Magnesians and 
Philadelphians. The question is in which measure did Gnosticism influence him. He 
is well rooted in the tradition of Syrian Catholicism, which is based on incarnational 
and sacramental issues, but the terminology, which he uses is parallel to Gnostics. 
The Christian background in Ignatian epistles is the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. 
John and St. Paul Epistles. 
The tradition embodied in St. Matthew Gospel is opposed to the Pharisaic Judaism, 
and does not leave any room for any Judaic influence on Ignatius. But maybe as 
Bartsch suggests the influence, which came through Fourth Gospel and Johannine 
teaching, carried by oral tradition, introduced certain Gnostic elements in Ignatian 
epistles. 
However, Ignatian thought stays uninfluenced by Gnostics although the language of 
Ignatian epistles is marked by Gnostic terminology. 
Following St. John, Ignatius develops his own teaching about logos. The 
relationship between Logos and Silence is one his key conceptions. Using the 
language of Gnostics Ignatius avoided one of biggest 'trap' of Gnostic system -
insuperable gulf between God and the world. 
Ignatius does not fully develop the doctrine of Logos. Logos in his epistles is used 
directly to Jesus Christ. Logos in Ignatian language is not just a figure of speech but 
it is a hypostasis. Ignatius is very clear about that in the following passage: 
There is one God who manifest Himself through Jesus Christ His Son, who. 
is His Word that proceeded from silence, who in all things was well-pleasing 
unto Him that sent Him. 
In this place Ignatius introduces the notion silence, in which many scholars have 
seen the Gnostic insight. The Silence-Logos concept belongs to the late 
2 6 8 L .W. Barnard, The Background of St. Ignatius of Antioch, in Vigiliae Christianae, volume 17, 
1963., pp. 193.-206. 
2 6 9 Ignatius of Antioch, Magn. 8. 
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Valentianism. According to the Gnostic system, from the supreme Father, Bythos, 
the unbegotten Monad and Sige (Silence), who is his Ennoia (Thought) proceed by 
successive emanation, three pairs of aeons, Nous (or Monogenes) and Alitheia 
(Truth), Logos and Zoe (Life), and Anthropos (Man) and Ecclesia (Church). The 
association of Sige with the Godhead is not only confined to Valentianism, but 
belongs to the Greek cosmological speculations and in the system of earlier 
Gnostics. However, the Ignatian Silence-logos paradox is completely different in 
form from the imaginative tale of late Valentianism. The Ignatian form is pregnant 
and more suggestive, revealing not the way in which Logos proceeded from the God 
but the fact that the hidden God discloses Himself. The notion Silence is not just a 
figure or a metaphor, but a technical term which reflects the hidden realm. The idea 
that such hidden world exists behind the world of visible and tangible things was 
spread among the Christians in Ignatian times. This hidden world of transcendent 
God is revealed through Jesus Logos: 
It is better to keep silence and to be, and to talk and not to be. It is fine thing 
to teach, i f the speaker practise. Now there is one teacher, who spoke and it 
came to pass and even the things what He has done in worthy of the Father. 
He that truly possesses the word of Jesus, is able also to hear his silence, that 
he may be perfect, that through his speech he may act and to through his 
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silence he may be known. 
The idea of Silence is not applied only to deity but for Ignatius has implications in 
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the ethical life which shows analogy between the silence of the bishops and God 
as Silence. Silence is something active and positive, not just an attribute of the God 
but God Himself. The notion Silence expresses the transcendent nature of the God, 
who is unknown and inaccessible. However, God does not stay unknown and finally 
inaccessible because Logos, which proceeds from Silence, reveals the way to attain 
to God. Ignatius in his epistle to Romans appeals to them not to try to rescue him or 
to obstruct his martyrdom in any way and let him to be the word of God. 
For neither shall I myself ever find an opportunity such as this to attain unto 
God, nor can you, i f you be silent, win the credit of any nobler work. For i f 
you be silent and leave me alone, I am a word of God; but i f you desire my 
flesh, then shell I be again a mere cry. 2 7 2 
Logos is the utterance, not the divine reason. The way in which Ignatius uses logos 
in the relation to Silence shows that logos is also the meaningful declaration of God 
Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 15. 
1 see H. Chadwick, The Silence of Bishops in Ignatius, Harvard Theological Review, vol. 43, 1950. 
2 Ignatius of Antioch, Rom. 2 
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to the world. The concept of the God as silence provides a ground for the work of 
Christ. 
The ontological gap between God and the world is overarched by the logos of God, 
his Son Jesus Christ, who offers something to humankind. 
In this point Ignatius is different from academic theologians interested in 
Christianity as revelation. Ignatius approaches to the being of God through 
experience of ecclesial community. Ignatius was not interested in developing 
theological system but on the contrary he was concerned above all with what was 
the crucial problem of humankind, the experience of destruction and death. 
The biggest Ignatian contribution is his teaching that the being of God could be 
known only through personal relationship and personal love. Being means life, and 
life means unity with God. These two points are key conceptions. 
Ignatius develops the new concept of life. As an existentialist Ignatius gives the 
answer to the central questions of human life in the very form in which they were 
worrying man in the Hellenistic world. He proclaimed the message of the newness 
of eternal life and of the abolition of death. Ignatius stands in Johannine tradition, 
according to which knowledge of God is 'eternal l i f e ' 2 7 3 . By the identification of 
being with life, Ignatius creates a basis for a new ontological approach to the idea of 
life and completely changes the Hellenistic concept of life. First, the term, which he 
uses, for life £cor| has the essentially different meaning from (3105, which is usually 
used for life. He even makes distinction between these two words based in their 
relationship to death. The term £cori is the principle of life taken in its spiritual 
meaning and as such is in opposition to death. The second expression is inseparably 
connected with death2 7 4 because it describes physical sphere of existence. It was not 
the case in Aristotle, who uses (3i'os as higher term of these two. 
Second and most important is that Ignatius gives the new notion of life. In the 
Hellenistic mind, from the time of Aristotle life is something added to being 2 7 3, but 
not being itself. Thus, it is correct to say that stone and bird are, but it is not correct 
to say that they live. The lifeless stone can claim the verb 'to be', but not 'to live'. 
Life is just the quality of being or something possessed by being. 
'3 John. 17:3 
' 4 Ignatius of Antioch, Rom. 7 
' 5 J. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 79 
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For Ignatius life means 'being for ever', it means something which is not subjected 
to destruction and death, but it is everlasting. He teaches Ephesians: 
Be not anointed with the il l odour of the teaching of the prince of this world, 
lest he lead you captive and rob you of the life which is set before you. 2 7 6 
Ignatius' concept of life implies immortality and incorruptibility and the abolition of 
death. What kind of life is this? Ignatius declares that the eternal and everlasting life 
is only life in (ev) 2 7 7 Christ, or through (5 id) 2 7 8 Him or toward ( E I S ) 2 7 9 Him. 
According to the Ignatius, the practical means for the achievement of eternal life are 
discipleship and imitation (n(|_ir|ais). Discipleship implies devotion to the spiritual 
teachers and the following of the pattern. The Christians are the disciples of Jesus 
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Christ who is 'the only teacher' . He was also the teacher of prophets in the Spirit 
as well as teacher of his living disciples. Discipleship includes following the pattern, 
which prepares man for life and death and whatever sufferings may come. For 
Ignatius his discipleship implies readiness for martyrdom. 
Now am beginning to be a disciple. May naught of things visible and 
invisible envy me; that I may attain unto Jesus Christ. Come fire and cross 
and grappling with wild beasts, [cuttings and mangling], wrenching of bones, 
hacking of limbs, crushing of my whole body, come cruel tortures of the 
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devil to assail me. Only be it mine to attain unto Jesus Christ. 
The sacrificing aspect of the discipleship is not only one. The obedience to the 
bishop is also a form of discipleship. But this does not imply just obeying the 
commands of bishop and presbyter, but a much deeper relationship. 
Do you all follow your bishop, as Jesus Christ followed the Father, and the 
presbytery as the Apostles; and the deacons pay respect, as to God's 
commandment. Let no man do aught of things pertaining to the Church apart 
from bishop. Let that be held a valid Eucharist which is under the bishop or 
one to whom he shell have committed it. Whatsoever the bishop shall appear, 
there let the people be; even as where Jesus may be, there is universal 
Church.2 8 2 
The bishop is the head of community and i f one ignores the bishop, he cuts himself 
from community and loses contact with God. Bishop is a 'type' of God' but only as 
a head of eucharistic assembly. Miss Corwin wants to show that discipleship is just a 
matter of ethics. Her interpretation of the Ignatian notions of discipleship is focused 
Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 17. 
7 Ignatius of Antioch, Tral 9. 
8 Ignatius of Antioch, Phi]. 8. 
9 Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 14. 
'" Ignatius of Antioch, Magn. 9. 
'' Ignatius of Antioch, Rom. 5. 
'2 Ignatius of Antioch, Smvr. 8. 
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on the historical and incarnate Christ as a central issue in ethics as in theology. Thus, 
Christ is much more ethical ideal, which needs to be followed. 
Another concept central for Ignatius' teaching is an imitation. There is disagreement 
among scholars, what is the real nature of the Ignatian notion of imitation. Thus, the 
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standpoint of Bartsch is that Ignatius uses the term imitation to describe the 
eucharistic muriois. Miss Corwin thinks that Ignatius suggests the ethical 
imitation of Christ rather than eucharistic. There is no doubt that Ignatius teaches 
about life based on goodness, gentleness and benevolence of Christ. The possible 
reason why Ignatius gives much more attention to this aspect can be the sufferings 
facing him. We must be aware of facts that the teaching of Ignatius is overshadowed 
by his desire to imitate Christ in the passion. 
Being imitators of God, and having your hearts kindled in the blood of God, 
you have perfectly fulfilled your congenial work - for when you heard that I 
was on my way to Syria, in bonds for the sake of the common Name and 
hope, and was hoping through prayers to succeed in fighting with wild beasts 
in Rome.2 8 5 
Ignatius goes beyond the notion of ethical imitation and he declares that imitation of 
Christ can be achieved only within church community. This is the product of his 
pastoral care for communities. 
Do nothing without the bishop; keep your flesh as a temple of God; cherish 
union; shun divisions; be imitators of Jesus Christ, as He Himself also was of 
the Father.286 
Ignatius introduces us to the concept of Eucharistic imitation, which leads to the 
notion of Eucharistic unity or the event of communion. 
Assemble yourself together in common, every one of you severally, man by 
man, in grace, in one faith and one Jesus Christ, ... breaking one bread, 
which is medicine of immortality (9ap|_iai<ov dSavaotas) and the antidote 
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that we should not die but live for ever in Jesus Christ. 
Some biblical scholars interpret the Ignatian concept of 'the medicine of 
immortality' as similar to the pagan notions of Eucharist. In that way Eucharist as 
the medicine of immortality is something which as such possesses the possibility for 
life. I f we take in consideration the whole Ignatian opus, we are inevitably led not to 
the notion of Eucharist as something that in its nature implies a potential for life, but 
2 8 3 H. W. Batrsch, Gnostiches Gut und Gemeindetradition bei Ignatius von Antiochien. p. 124. 
2 8 4 V . Corwin., St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch, pp. 229-32. 
2 8 5 Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 1. 
2 8 6 Ignatius of Antioch, Phjl- 7. 
2 8 7 Ignatius of Antioch, Eph. 20. 
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to the idea of Eucharist as unity of eucharistic assembly or rather the event of 
communion. The identification of life with unity of God and man as unity in 
Eucharist is the second great achievement of Ignatius. The notion of unity or union 
with God takes a very important place in Ignatian epistles. The unity with God is 
possible only as unity of Church in bishop as a president of eucharistic community. 
Not that I have divisions among you, but exceeding purity. For as many as 
are of God and of Jesus Christ, they are with the bishop; and as many as shall 
repent and enter into unity of the Church, these also shall be of God, that 
may be living after Jesus Christ. 
Ignatius' approach to the notion of unity is not from the point of ethical experience 
but from the existential one. Achieving the unity of God is not just a lack of sin but 
overcoming the divisions. God is not archetype of goodness, which needs to be a 
paradigm for moral behaviour, but One from whom man are separated. Virginia 
Corwin correctly emphasises that the core of Ignatian teaching is that the disunity 
can be transcended . 
Ignatius has given the significant contribution to Christian thought. He avoided the 
traps of Hellenistic thought as well as Gnostic systems. He did not confine God in 
the closed ontology of Hellenistic thought and he preserved the transcendent nature 
of God's being. His God was free of all limitation. At the same time he overcame 
the Gnostic teaching of the gulf between God and world, by identification of being 
with life. The concept of life in Christ as the ground for Christian ontology was the 
core of the Ignatian preaching and the core for foundation of unity between God and 
world. God ceased to be a remote abstraction but He fully entered into human life as 
the scene of history. The contribution of Ignatius is not the result of his academic 
speculations but the result of his pastoral care in struggle with heretics. 
2. The liberation of God; Irenaeus of Lyon 
Irenaeus of Lyon belongs to the group of Christian writers in the early Church 
known as the apostolic fathers. Originally, Irenaeus was from Smyrna. The 
memories of his childhood are connected with Polycarp, Bishop of Smyrna. He 
moved from his birthplace toward the West, and he took a part in the world-wide 
mission of the church. First he arrived in Rome, at the same time Polycarp was 
there. According to some sources he became a disciple of Justin Martyr, who at that 
time was teaching in Rome. After a while he proceeded further to the West, and 
2 8 8 Ignatius of Antioch, Phi l 3. 
2 8 9 V . Corwin, St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch. p. 284. 
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became a missionary among the Celts in Gaul. Christianity in Gaul was based in the 
thought and manners characteristic of Asia Minor. At the beginning he was a 
presbyter, but after the martyrdom of Bishop Potheinos, he succeeded him in that 
post. During the period of his episcopate he produced five books against the heresy 
of Gnosticism, especially its late form of Valentianism. In his first book he detects 
all forms of Gnostic teaching going far back to Simon Magus. The second book is 
the refutation of Gnostic heresy, with the rational proofs that its doctrine is false. 
The third, fourth and fifth books are supplements to the refutation, which begins, in 
the second book. The content of the other three books is gradually exposition of the 
true doctrine, where Irenaeus provides the proofs from apostles, Jesus' teachings, the 
parables from Gospels and letters of Paul. 'On the Discovery and Refutation of 
Gnosis falsely so-called' or 'Adversus haereses' in five books is a brief compendium 
of Christian doctrine with additional instruction for catechumens. 
Some scholars consider Irenaeus as systematic theologian. But he did not write as a 
systematic theologian. He was much more concerned with the practical life of 
Christian communities than in academic work. He writes with pastoral care for his 
flock, protecting them from the influence of false teaching. He is primarily a pastor 
and a teacher of the Church and his writings serve as a manual for behaviour toward 
the Gnostic heresy, addressed to other pastors. 
His teaching consists of the influences of the different Christian traditions with 
which Irenaeus was familiar. This is mainly a combination of tradition from Asia 
Minor, Syria, Rome and Gaul, though it lacks elements from the Palestinian, Greek 
and Egyptian traditions. 
Irenaeus like his fellow bishop Ignatius of Antioch does not belong to the 
intellectual movement of the early Church, but to the tradition which formed the 
foundation of the church life on common experience of liturgical and Eucharistic 
practice. Irenaeus cited Ignatius in a few places without naming him. He does not 
use the Ignatian concept of the monarchical episcopate. Nevertheless, Irenaeus as 
well as Ignatius was involved in a struggle against heretics and both through 
liturgical devotion and eucharistic practice created an identical approach to doctrine 
of Church. The theme, which concerned the identification of being with life and 
communion, reappears in more elaborate form in the philosophy of Irenaeus. 
Before we take into consideration the key concepts of Irenaeus' work, we will give a 
brief exposition of Gnostic doctrines. The doctrine of the Gnostics was a mixture of 
Greek philosophy, theosophy, speculative cosmology and mythology mingled with 
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their dualistic conceptions and mysterious and spiritualising teaching about 
Christ 2 9 0. It is very difficult to determine the real origins of Gnostic ideas but it is 
obvious that they were products of cultural interchange between Judaism and 
Christianity. The esoteric doctrines of Wisdom were especially attractive for the 
well-educated middle class of Christians, which at the same time read the works of 
Gnostics and the writings of the Apologist. These teachings291 consist of doctrines, 
which Jesus taught in confidence to the small group of privileged and Gnostics kept 
them in secrecy. This was the reason why Gnostics believed that they knew the real 
meaning of Christianity. 
The method of Irenaeus was not only dealing with the contemporary Gnostic heresy 
of Valentinians, but he went back to their forerunners, showing the origins of false 
doctrine. The common thing for all Gnostics' system was that they found orthodox 
Christianity, based on straightforward creed, too simple. The mystery of the 
universe, according to the Gnostics is much deeper and complex than orthodox 
Christianity confesses. Depending on system, there are different explanations of the 
riddle of universe. The most popular was the Valentinian conception of the Fullness 
or Pleroma of deity, the least and feeblest of whom had, as a result of some fatal 
error, departed from the world above and brought into being this physical universe. 
We wil l give the brief exposition of Valentinian system without taking into 
consideration other parts of its teaching, namely exegesis or moral doctrine. The 
common thing for all Valentinians is that they distinguished themselves from the 
Christians, but they maintained the names of Jesus, the Father and the Spirit as well 
as the other Christian terms. Establishing their identity, different than Christian they 
broke the tradition of Marcion and the other Gnostics. Although a heretic and the so-
called 'first-born of Satan' Marcion and his followers declared themselves as real 
Christians. They stressed the ascetic aspect of Christianity, teaching that real 
Christian and believer have to break with the world and its affairs. 
Valentius and his followers have a very developed conception of emanations from 
prior Aeons. According to Valentinian myth the Prior Aeon or Pre-Father/Pre-
Beginning/Abyss and Thought/Grace/ Silence emit Mind/Father/Beginning and 
Truth, which compose a Pythagorean Tetrad. Mind then emitted Logos and Life, 
which emitted Man and Church. Abyss, Mind, Logos and Man exist in pairs of male 
and female and they compose the firstborn Ogdoad. Logos and Life emitted ten 
2 9 0 Robert M. Grant, Irenaeus of Lyon. (Early Church Fathers, London and New York, 1997.), p. 11. 
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Aeons more composing Decad, and Man and Church emitted twelve Aeons, the last 
of which was Sophia, composing Dodecad. Ogdoad including Silence and Abyss, 
Decad and Dodecad compose the invisible and spiritual Pleroma of thirty Aeons2 9 2. 
This myth is known as Ptolemaeus' system or 'Great notice'. Irenaeus finds the 
origins of Gnostic conception of Aeons in Plato's theory of ideas293. Of course, he 
does not go too far in his speculation looking for every stage of emanations 
counterpart in Plato' theory, but he stays on the position that Plato's theory of ideas 
was the source of inspiration for Gnostic system of Aeons. Thus, Gnostics Aeons 
constitute an ideal world, which serves as 'figure' or 'pattern' or 'image' for the 
sensible world 2 9 4 . Irenaeus proceeds with the question about the origin of the ideal 
world: Did God make it out of himself or did He receive it from some power above 
him. This is for Irenaeus the core of the problem. I f the patterns or images are 
accepted from above then God is forced by some higher principles to act and his 
freedom is limited. This is not acceptable for Irenaeus, because it denies the creative 
freedom of God and at the same time it gives the eternal existence to the world apart 
from Him. He accuses those who 'are ignorant of God, poets and historians' 
maintaining that 'God is the slave of necessity'295. Irenaeus confesses that: 'God, the 
Creator, who made the world, is the only God, and that there is no other God besides 
Him, He himself receiving from himself the pattern (exemplum) and figure 
(figurationem) of those things which have been made' 2 9 6. 
In the Valentinian teachings large parts of reality stay out of God's influence. Being 
independent of God, these parts possess a certain degree of sovereignty. This implies 
that God is not sovereign and that he does not contain everything. It creates a gulf 
between God and beings not contained by Him. The starting point of Irenaeus' 
refutation of such concept is that God 'freely made everything, not moved by 
another but on his own initiative' and that He is 'the only Creator and the only 
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Father, the only one who contains all and provides being to all' . Irenaeus opposes 
to the Gnostic multiplicity of mutually limiting principles or little creators. The 
Gnostic conception of Aeons or little creators is unacceptable for Irenaeus because 
2 9 1 Hans Lietzmann, A History of the Early Church, (Volume II, Lutterworth Press, London, 1963.), 
p. 207. 
2 9 2 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. I, 1, 1-3; in Robert M. Grant, Irenaeus of Lyon 
2 9 3 Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1956.), pp. 261-262. 
2 9 4 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. II , 16, 1-2. 
2 9 5 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. II, 14. 4. 
2 9 6 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. II, 16, 3. 
2 9 7 Irenaeus of Lyon. Adv. Haer. II, 1,1. 
83 
such a principle could not be called God and it could not be omnipotent. According 
to Irenaeus' conception fullness and omnipotence are two main principles, which he 
applies to the divine nature. These two principles serve as a foundation stone for 
God's freedom. First, the fullness or pleroma of God based on the fact that he 
'contains everything' implies that there is nothing outside him. The Irenaean 
standpoint is that God is enclosing (TTEPIEXEIV) all being in the sphere of his being 
and in the stays unenclosed298. Valentinians apply the notion 'unenclosed'299 to God, 
but at the same time they maintain that there is more than one fullness of God. 
Irenaeus rejects this because i f there is a something outside him He is not fullness 
anymore. This being according to Irenaeus 'wi l l have beginning, middle and end in 
the relation to those outside of h im ' 3 0 0 . The relationship between fullness and what 
is out of fullness can be twofold. In the first case the fullness wil l be enclosed in 
some other fullness, which is outside of it. In the second case it will separated from 
it by same distance. This includes that there is a third kind of thing, which is 
between the first fullness and the second one and this 'tertium quid ' 3 0 1 wil l limit and 
contain the other two. 
God's divine nature does penetrate all things. But the portions of divine benefits do 
not depend on the distance from him. I f we apply this concept the Christian God 
would not be different from the Aristotelian God 3 0 2 , and law, which rules in the 
cosmic hierarchy, wil l limit his power. God must be all encompassing and his power 
must be extended to all beings. The term 'enclosing' serves to express not only 
transcendence but also immanence. The notion that God is all encompassing means 
that there is nothing out of him, which can limit him externally. At the same time 
God stays unlimited internally. This means that God, who 'containing all things' is 
'unified, not composite, without diversity of members, completely similar and equal 
to himself 3 0 3 . 
The idea of God's inclusiveness leads Irenaeus to introduce the second element of 
God's nature his omnipotence or his unlimited power. At this point Irenaeus makes a 
clear distinction between his conception of God and the conception which yields 
Greek monistic ontology. His God is not subject to necessity and his freedom is 
2 9 8 William R. Schoedel, Enclosing, not Enclosed: The Early Christian Doctrine of God, in Early 
Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, edited by, W.R. Schoedel and R . L . 
Wilken, Paris, 1979., pp. 75-86. 
2 9 9 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. 1, 1, 1. 
3 0 0 Irenaeus of Lyon. Adv. Haer. 11, 1,2. 
' 0 I Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. II, 1, 2. 
3 0 2 Aristotle, De Mundo, 397b 30-35. 
3 0 3 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. II , 13, 3 
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reflected in his unlimited power. The power of God is extended equally to all beings 
and everything depends on the will of the all-inclusive God. Thus the freedom of 
God becomes an aspect of his power. The aim of the doctrine of God's freedom is 
the refutation of Gnostic theory, which makes God the slave of necessity. Although 
God is the highest factor in an order, he remains subjected to this order, which 
includes and surpasses him. For Irenaeus God is not God i f he is not almighty and 
free (auTe^ouoios). Richard Norris 3 0 4 insists on the position that Irenaeus failed to 
express or conceptualise in a clear fashion the Gnostic concept of God. Instead of 
this he developed his own doctrine of God without awareness of doing so, which he 
directed against the Gnostic concept of God. However, this theory of Irenaeus is the 
great achievement in liberation of God from the necessity of Greek thought. 
Irenaeus rejects the Gnostic concept of redemption as reassertion of the unchanging 
natural structures of the cosmos. He introduces a new doctrine based not on the 
given world in which rules static and inviolable order, but the doctrine of the world 
as a creature of the all-encompassing God. This idea of God's freedom is the key 
notion for Irenaeus' meaning of redemption and it forms the frame for human 
history with God. 
All-encompassing God through his Logos created everything, which includes 
mankind and the world 3 0 5 . Irenaeus introduces the notion Logos. However, his 
Logos concept does not have anything in common with logos theology of the 
Apologist. He rejects the analogy between the generation of the Logos and the 
uttered Logos of Stoics, made by Philo and Justin Martyr. 
'In Greek, Logos as the directive faculty which elaborates thought is one thing, and 
another is the organ by means of which 'word' is emitted 3 0 6. For Irenaeus this 
analogy is the source of Gnostic erroneous conception of the generation of the Logos 
as a physical process. Thus, he criticises the Gnostic conception of the generation of 
Logos as a physical emanation: 
Those who transferred the generation of the expressed word of man to the 
eternal Logos of God and give the expressions a beginning and a genesis as 
they would give it to their own word. But how wil l the Logos of God, or 
rather God himself since he is Logos, differ from the word of man, i f it has 
the same order and manner of generation.307 
4 Richard Norris, The Transcendence and Freedom of God, in Early Christian Literature and the 
Classical Intellectual Tradition, edited by, W.R. Schoedel and R . L . Wilken, Paris, 1979., p. 98 
Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. IV , 20, 1-3 
3 0 0 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer., II, 28, 4 
, 0 7 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. II , 14, 1. 
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The Monarchianism of Irenaeus' native land determines his Logos concept and he 
would have nothing to do with any essential separation of logos, or nous from the 
Father. 
But since God the Mind, all World, all operative Spirit, all Light, always 
identical and like himself (as it is right to think God and learn from the 
scriptures), processes and distinctions of this kind do not exist in h im. 3 0 8 
Thus, the relationship between Father and Logos is described in favourite paradoxes 
about the Invisible becoming visible and the Impassible undergoing suffering 3 0 9, 
underlying the same nature of Logos with the Father. 
He thinks of Logos in biblical terms, following the Proverbs 8: 23 of the Septuagint 
and St. John the Theologian. Irenaeus maintains that Logos or as he calls it Son is 
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always coexisting with the Father at the first, before the beginning . He conceives 
that the generation of the Logos was from eternity and explicitly denies a beginning 
of generation of Logos. Irenaeus knew of the Philonic twofold stage theory3 1 1, 
according to which the generation of the Logos precedes by an eternal existence in 
the mind of God. The teaching of the Gnostics is different in the point of external 
existence of Logos in the mind of God. They thought that Logos had a beginning of 
generation which was not preceded an eternal existence in the mind of God. By 
refutation of the Gnostic theory, Irenaeus develops his theory according to which the 
generation of Logos had no beginning at all. Moreover, the beginning was not 
preceded by an eternal existence in the mind of God. For Irenaeus any conception 
of generation, which had a beginning and cannot be described as eternal, is 
unacceptable. His position is not as it is in the twofold stage theory to emphasise the 
eternity of Logos, but rather to show that generation is eternal or without beginning. 
At this point Irenaeus stops and he does not go further in explanation of the 
generation of Logos. For him it remains the unique miracle: ' I f any one, therefore, 
says to us, 'How then was the Son produced by the Father?' we reply to him, that no 
man understands that emission, or generation, or utterance, or manifestation, or by 
whatever name one may describe His generation, which is in fact indescribable'312. 
Irenaeus makes a clarification between Logos and Sophia, which are identified in 
some of his predecessors. Before Irenaeus, Theophilus identified the Spirit with 
3 0 8 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. II, 28, 4. 
3 0 9 Irenaeus of Lyon. Adv. Haer. I l l , 16, 6. 
3 1 0 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. 11, 30, 9. 
3 1 1 Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, p. 200. 
3 1 2 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. II , 28, 6. 
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313 Wisdom and he was the first to apply the term 'triad' to the Godhead. He replaced 
the baptismal formula of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, with a triadic formula of 
God, Logos and Sophia. Following Psalm 33.6, Theophilus states that the three days 
which preceded the creation of the sun and moon 'were types of the Triad, that is, of 
God, and of His Word and of His Wisdom' 
(Tmoi etotv xf\c, xpi&boc,, xov Qeov iced iox> Xoyov (xbiov KOU xf)c; oofyiaq ocbx 
ou) 3 1 4 . Irenaeus writes in the same spirit: 
We have provided many proofs to show that the Word, that is, the Son, was 
always with the Father. ...the Wisdom, which is the Spirit, was with him 
before all creation.313 
A few passages after, Irenaeus defines the Godhead: 'Therefore there is one God 
who by Word and Wisdom made and harmonised everything. He is the Creator, who 
assigned this world to the human race' . The role of the Spirit is to prepare man in 
the Son of God, who brings man to the Father, and finally the Father confers on man 
the incorruptibility (d<p6apo(a) of eternal l i f e 3 1 7 . The incorruptibility of eternal life 
is the core of Irenaeus' thought. The idea of incorruptibility initially appeared in the 
epistles of Ignatius of Antioch. The same pastoral zeal leads Irenaeus to develop 
such an idea, which is not a product of intellectual speculation but the real 
experience of liturgical life. 
'But, being ignorant of Him who from the Virgin is Emmanuel, they are deprived of 
His gift, which is eternal life; and not receiving the incorruptible Word, they remain 
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in mortal flesh, and are debtors to death, not obtaining the antidote of life' . 
The idea of immortality locates the life force directly in human life and it is in 
connection with the Eucharist. His conception of incorruptibility was derived from 
the relationship, which Irenaeus establishes between creation and Eucharist. 
Irenaeus as well as Ignatius gives the central place in his teaching to the Eucharist. 
He argues that fleshly bodies must inherit eternal life, because they partake of the 
Eucharistic bread. 
For as the bread, which is produced from the earth, when it receives the 
invocation of God, is no longer common bread, but the Eucharist, consisting 
of two realities, earthly and heavenly; so also our bodies, when they receive 
J'"' Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, 1, 7; 2, 18. 
3 1 4 Theophilus of Antioch Ad Autolycum, 2, 15. 
Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. IV , 20, 3 . 
3 1 0 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. IV , 20, 4 . 
3 1 7 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. V , 2, 3. 
3 1 8 Irenaeus of.Lyon, Adv. Haer. I l l , 19, 1, the similar idea in Ignatius, Ephesians 20, 2: 'the drug of 
immortality, the antidote not to die but live forever in Jesus Christ.' 
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the Eucharist, are no longer corruptible, having the hope of the resurrection 
to eternity.3 1 9 
According to the opinion of some modern scholars mainly from Anglican circles the 
Eucharist is an extension of the Incarnation. Montgomery Hitchcock 3 2 0 maintains 
that the Eucharist is extension of Christ's creative energies. He makes a link 
between the Incarnation and the Eucharist. Gnostic disbelief in Incarnation implies 
that their celebration of mysteries cannot extend the divine power into human life. 
Gnostics treat gifts of creation as something created by the Demiurge and not God 
the Father. For them the bread and wine of Eucharist remain the food and the 
nourishment, without any relation to Christ. This is the reason why the spear of 
Irenaeus' critic was against occult and esoteric Gnostic practices. For him by the 
Eucharist, the Church handed to mortal man the 'medicine of life ' which united 
them with Godhead. The life or the new life is the key conception of Irenaeus 
teaching. 
'It is not possible to live apart from life, and the means of life (uTrccp^is) is found in 
fellowship (usToxn) with God' . 
The Eucharistic experience leads Irenaeus to an identification of existence with life. 
This identification of being with the life is the same as in Ignatius. The origins of 
this identification lie on the one hand, in the biblical roots of the relationship 
between Eucharist and life, and on the other hand in combating heresies. The life of 
the Eucharist is the life of God. Only by participation in God, through the Eucharist 
man can gain life. Irenaeus' concept of life is not life in the sense of Aristotelian 
movement which flows out mechanically from the interior of existence. Moreover, 
this is not the concept of life which modern individualism proclaims. The 
conception of life as a certain length of time between birth and death, is established 
on the idea that man is a creature who exists by himself. Irenaeus thinks initially of 
life as a separated existence, which has not its being in itself, but in communion with 
God. This kind of life exists within the Trinity and it is actualised within the 
members of the Eucharistic community. With the identification of life with 
communion Irenaeus locates the source of being in God. He does not proceed further 
and his interest mainly remains on created being. 
3 1 9 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. IV , 18,5. 
3 2 0 F .R .M. Hitchcock, Irenaeus of Lungdunum. Cambridge, 1914., p. 87. 
' , 2 ' Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Haer. IV, 20, 5. 
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Irenaeus' teaching about God and his world opens the way to the further 
philosophical development of Christian thought. The formulation of the tradition 
was carried on by the bright boy who was already reading the books in Alexandria 
when the old bishop finished his task in Lyon. Origen was the logical successor of 
Irenaeus, but his philosophy did not surpass the contribution of the theology of 
Irenaeus. 
3. The triumph of Orthodoxy; Athanasius of Alexandria 
'The innocent speculations of the Apologists came to provide support for the Arian 
school of thought' 3 2 2. This remark of Prestige pointed out the source of the teaching 
which had shaken the Church in the fourth century. To put it more precisely, the 
teaching of Arius and his supporters was the fruit of the garden of Origen's 
theological legacy. Origen's thought carries significant tensions and inner 
contradictions, which gave rise to varying interpretations. His teaching about God 
implies the principle of necessity, which always exists in the relationship between 
God and the world. This was unacceptable for some of Origen's successors because 
it correlates God and the world too closely. Methodius of Olympus 3 2 3 repudiated 
Origen's doctrine of an eternal creation, accusing him of trying to establish a self-
subsistent reality alongside God. The blade of Methodius' criticism was directed 
against Origen's 'dualism' having the aim of preserving God as a being wholly 
sufficient to himself as well as his freedom of action in creation. The essence of the 
problem lies in the fact that Origen linking God's Being too closely with creation of 
the world diminishes the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. The strong tendency to 
emphasise the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo demanded belief in an absolute 
unlikeness between God and creation. This was the common starting point for two 
different theological world-views, that of Arius and the other of Athanasius. 
First I will elucidate the standpoint of Arius. He was a priest in Alexandria. In the 
time of bishop Alexander of Alexandria, shortly before 320, he began to preach a 
doctrine which attracted many supporters. Alexander, finding those teachings 
dangerous in some points, deposed him from his post in the council of the Egyptian 
Church in 323. A few years later, in 325, his teaching was condemned by the 
Council of Nicaea. Finding supporters among the very influential bishops as well as 
in the court of Emperor Constantine, Arius' party began to recover, and was soon 
3 2 2 G . L . Prestige, God in the Patristic Thought, p. 123 
3 2 3 Rowan Williams, Arius; Heresy and Tradition, ( D L T , London, 1987.), pp. 167-71 
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ready to strike back at the Nicene party. Arius' death was surrounded by 
uncertainties, but the episcopal and imperial uproar which Arianism provoked kept 
both Church and Empire in a state of constant theological and political uncertainty 
for the next 60 years. 
The main written source of Arius' doctrine is his poem Thalia (GaAia), meaning 
"banquet" or "dinner party" 3 2 4. The reconstruction of a profile of Arius' doctrine is 
difficult because written evidence of his teaching is available only through the 
reports of his enemies. The first source upon which we can build an opinion is the 
credal letter presented to Alexander of Alexandria, signed by Arius and eleven 
supporters. The second source is Arius' letter to the Eusebius of Nicomedia and the 
third is the Confession of Athanasius and Euzoius addressed to the Emperor in 
3 2 7 3 2 \ Athanasius gives brief extracts of Arius' Thalia in his Contra Arianos 1.5-6 
and De Synodis 15. As we noticed before Arius is deeply rooted in the Alexandrian 
theological tradition. The theological ideas of Arius were developed in the light of 
Methodius' and Alexander's repudiation of Origen's theory of the eternity of God 
and creation. Also maintained the idea of eternity of God as well co-eternity of the 
Father and the Son . The need to clearly delineate the difference between God and 
creation was the origin of the problem of the nature of Logos. The problem was on 
which side of the ontological gulf between God and creation Logos is situated - on 
the side of God or on the side of creation. Arius chose the second solution. By 
rejecting the eternity of the world Arius rejected the eternity of Logos. He decided to 
place Logos among other created beings. Following Philo, Arius gave Logos a 
twofold role. Logos is an attribute of the divine essence and the being created by the 
wil l and act of God. In Arius teaching is inherited the dual concern so typical of 
Alexandrian tradition. The first concern is to preserve God's freedom and the second 
is how to avoid the concept of Logos as divine rationality, which implies the 
presence of pre-existent ideal forms. According to Athanasius, Arius wrote: 
...the Word of God Himself was 'made out of nothing,' and 'once He was 
not,' and "He was not before His origination,' but He as others 'had an origin 
of creation.' 'For God,' he says, 'was alone, and the Word as yet was not, nor 
3 2 4 Athanasius, De Synodis 15, Orat. I. 2-5; de Sent. D. 6; Athanasius states that Arius wrote 'as if in 
a the Song for dinner party' and Socrates in his Ecclesiastical history, I. 9 'Arius had written a 
treatise on his own opinion which he entitled Thalia; but the character of the book is loose and 
dissolute, similar in its style and metres to the Songs of Sotades'. The Arian Philostorgius tells us that 
'Arius wrote the Songs for the sea and for the mill and for the road, and then set them to suitable 
music'. See also R. Williams, Anus, pp. 62-81. 
3 2 5 R. Williams, Arius, p. 95. 
3 2 6 Peter Widd.icombe, The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1994.), pp. 129-30. 
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the Wisdom. Then, wishing to form us, thereupon He made a certain one, 
and named Him Word and Wisdom and The Son, that He might form us by 
means of Him.' Accordingly, he says that there are two wisdoms, first, the 
attribute co-existent with God, and next, that in this wisdom the Son was 
originated, and was only named Wisdom and Word as partaking of i t . 3 2 7 
Thus, Arius defines Logos of God as rational structure of the world but without 
existence independent of the world. He underlined two principles. The first one is 
that 'there was [a time] when the Son of God was not' 
(rjv TTOTE OTE OUK x\v 6 uios TOO 8EOU) and the second that God created all things, 
including the Son 'out of nothing' (E!; OUK OVTCOV). Arius gave a solution for the 
unsolved tension of previous Alexandrian theology. Establishing the Logos as an 
individual being distinct from God, he preserves God's liberty from every 
contingent and mutable reality. At the same time, Arius solved the problem of 
immanent rationality breaking the necessary connection between Logos of God and 
the existence of an ordered world. According to the principle that Logos does not 
exist before the divine decision to make the world (in other words, that Logos has a 
temporal beginning). Arius states that Logos or the Son owes his being to an act of 
wil l by the Father. As Bishop Williams pointedly concludes, Arius by combining 
and reorganising traditional ideas 'presses them to their logical conclusions - God is 
free, the world need not exist, the Word is other than God, the Word is part of the 
328 
world, so the Word is freely formed ex nihilo' . 
By rejecting the eternity of Logos and making him a part of created reality, Arius 
establishes God as a monad, and God's being as uniquely self-subsistent. In his 
credal letter to Alexander, Arius expresses the nature of God's being by attributing 
to Him ingenerateness, eternity and without beginning. 
'We acknowledge one God, the only unbegotten (aysvvriTOs), the only eternal 
(cuSios), the only one without cause or beginning (avapxos)'329. 
Being unbegotten (ayevvrjTov) God is by definition simple and single, indivisible 
330 
and what is necessary and eternal . 
God, being the cause of all things, is without beginning and supremely 
unique, while the Son, timelessly begotten by the Father, created and 
established before all ages, did not exist prior his begetting, but was 
timelessly begotten before all things; he alone was given existence directly 
3 2 7 Athanasius, Contra Arianos, 1, 5 
3 2 8 R. Williams, Arius, p. 177 
3 2 9 The statement of faith and his Alexandrian supporters (from Opitz, U. 6 ) in R. Williams, Arius, 
pp. 247-8, also in Athanasius, De Synodis 16 
3 3 0 Rowan Williams, The Logic of Arianism, The Journal of Theological Studies, volume 34, Oxford, 
1983., p. 70 
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by the Father. For he is not eternal and co-eternal or equally self-sufficient 
with the Father, nor does he have his being alongside the Father, [in virtue] 
as some way, [of] his relation with him, thus postulating two self-sufficient 
first principles. But it is God [only], as monad and first principle of all 
things, who exists in this way before all things.3 3 1 
The Arian logic is that there is no room for two ingenerate realities 
(5uo ccyevvriTa) and the Son must be classified as yEwriiia or KTiana. The 
concept of God the Father as absolute unity and God the Son as multiplicity imposes 
the conclusion that the Son is not the same in essence (OU5E ouoouoiog) with the 
Father. I f the Son is of the same essence as the Father, he must then have the same 
attributes as the Father - he must be ingenerate, eternal, and without beginning. The 
Son 'is not equal, no, nor one in essence with [the Father]' 
(OU5E y d p EOTIV loos, aAA' OU8E ouoouoiog auTcp) . 3 3 2 
Arius does not want to accept a concept of God understood generically. God 
according to him cannot be the essence in which the Father and the Son participate 
equally. They have distinct essential properties, and as such are completely different 
in nature. 
The essences of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, are separate in 
nature, and estranged, and disconnected, and alien, and without participation 
of each other;' and, in his own words, 'utterly unlike from each other in 
i l l 
essence and glory, unto infinity'. 
The names Father, Son and Holy Ghost are more metaphor than essential 
characteristics. Arius does not think God as the Father and Fatherhood is essential to 
God's being. The same can be said for the Son. The Son cannot be eternal. Rather, 
he is a creature who came into being out of nothing. He was used by God to create 
humanity. The Son participates in God's Logos and Wisdom, but he is neither Logos 
nor Wisdom, but just named like that after God's attributes334. Like all y£vr |Ta he is 
ontologically different from God and dependant on his wil l . Thus, he is called the 
Son only by grace (KOTO: xapiv), n o t by nature. Arius applied the same concept of 
participation to Logos, calling him God 'by participation in grace'. Logos is 'God in 
name only' (AsyETai ovoncm uovov 0E6S) 3 3\ 
Arius' intention was to clearly distinguish the uncreated and the self-subsistent, 
between God and the world. He achieved this by abolishing any intermediate zone 
3 3 1 Opitz, U. 6 in Williams. Arius. pp. 248, also in Athanasius, De Synodis 16 
3 3 2 Athanasius, De Synodis 15 
3 3 3 Contra Arianos, 1, 6 
3 3 4 Athanasius. Contra Arianos, I, 5. 
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between God and the world, which would otherwise necessarily link them. By 
abolishing the intermediate zone between God and the world, Logos ceased to be an 
intermediary. Arius classified Logos in the created realm, identifying him with other 
created beings. Thus, Arius avoided the trap of Greek monistic ontology, but in 
doing so he courted another danger - jeopardising the whole concept of salvation 
through Jesus Christ, the true Son of God. His name would thereafter remain closely 
related to the first dogmatic crisis of early Christianity, which was not rooted in 
Greek philosophical thought. 
This completely different approach to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo had a worthy 
opponent in Athanasius of Alexandria. He is well known as a champion of Nicene 
Orthodoxy. In spite of the fact that Athanasius was just a deacon when he attended 
Council of Nicaea as a follower of Bishop Alexander, whom he was to succeed as 
Bishop of Alexandria, his role was significant in the condemnation of Arius' 
teaching. The condemnation of Arius at Nicaea could not contain the influence of 
Arius and his supporters among the churches. As a result, the Alexandrian bishop 
was to spend his entire life struggling against the Arian heresy. In witnessing to the 
faith in a true God, Athanasius became involved in imperial and ecclesial intrigues 
and spent many years in exile. Emperor Valens in 366 invited Athanasius to resume 
his place as Bishop of Alexandria. Athanasius spent the last years of his life in 
tranquillity, remaining faithful to his beliefs in the divine Logos who became flesh. 
From his early apologetic writings Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione is evident 
that the central place in his interest is occupied by the doctrine of relationship 
between God and the world. In Contra Gentes Athanasius is still under the big 
influence of Origen and previous Alexandrian tradition. In another treatise of this 
time, De Incarnatione he develops his own style and the influence of Origen 
decreases336. It has become a commonplace view 3 3 7 that Irenaeus of Lyon 
influenced Athanasius by distancing him from Origen and Alexandrian catechetical 
tradition. This is evident in the language, which Athanasius adopted from Irenaeus 
to describe the relationship between God and the world. Athanasius approaches this 
problem in the same way as the Bishop of Lyon. Making a clear distinction between 
the Creator and created beings, Athanasius speaks of God the Father as a Creator . 
J"° Athanasius. Contra Arianos, I, 6. 
3 3 6 Andrew Louth, The origins of Christian Mystical Tradition. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981.), pp. 
77-80 
3 3 7 Khaled Anatolios, The Influence of Irenaeus on Athanasius, Studia Patristica, volume 36, Peeters, 
Leuven, 2001., pp. 463-76 
3 3 8 See also in Irenaeus, Epideixis 6 
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He abandoned Origen's theory according to which God and world, distinct in their 
intrinsic nature, are connected by mediatory role of Logos. Athanasius emphasises 
the significance of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, which from Athanasius onwards 
was adopted as a principle of patristic theology. The relationship between created 
and uncreated nature governs the paradigm of Athanasius' ontology 3 3 9. His early 
works indicate that Athanasius' starting point is the relationship between God and 
humanity. His cosmology is always in function of his anthropology. 
For God, the creator of the universe and king of all, who is beyond all being 
and human thought, since he is good and bountiful, he made mankind in his 
own image through his own Word, our Saviour Jesus Christ; and he also 
made man perceptive and understanding of reality through his similarity to 
him, so that as long as he kept his likeness he might ever abandon his 
concept of God or live the company of the saints, but retaining the grace of 
him who bestowed it in him, and also special power given him by the 
Father's Word, he might rejoice and converse with God, living an idyllic and 
truly blessed and immortal l i f e . 3 4 0 
In Athanasius1 ontology the convergence between immanence and transcendence of 
God's being is underlined. The concept of God who transcends all beings and 
thinking belongs to Platonic341 and Middle-Platonic world-views. Athanasius 
probably follows Irenaeus342, who provides the same concept of divine 
transcendence. Athanasius' God is 'incorporeal and incorruptible and immortal, 
lacking nothing whatever'343. The divine being according to Athanasius is real, true 
being (TOV OVTGOS OVTCC O E O V ) 3 4 4 . TO the existence of God as a true being 
Athanasius adds the existence of something that is completely opposite to God, or 
non-being as such. He situates the world between two fundamental and diametrically 
opposite ontological categories. Thus the world has two possible directions - toward 
God or toward non-being, from which it came to being 3 4 5. Establishing the divine 
transcendence, Athanasius does not diminish God's accessibility. On the contrary, 
he affirms the divine accessibility through creation. Athanasius states that God 'who 
is invisible by nature, (...) might nevertheless be known to people through his 
3 3 9 Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius, The coherence of his thought, (Routledge, London, N Y , 1998.) 31-
5. 
3 4 0 Athanasius, Contra Gentes 2, (in Athanasius, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione, edited and 
translated by Robert W. Thompthe Son, Oxford, 1971.) 
3 4 1 Plato, Republica, VI , 509b, see also in E.P. Meijering, Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius, 
Synthesis or Antithesis, Leiden, 1968., 6-9. 
3 4 2 Irenaeus, Epideixis 3. 
3 4 ' Athanasius, Contra Gentes 22. 
3 4 4 Athanasius, Contra Gentes 30. 
3 4 3 Athanasius, De Incarnatione 2. 
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work' . We find in Irenaeus the same way of establishing divine accessibility347. 
He moves from God's self-contained transcendence to a conception of God's 
goodness. Thus he provides ontological presuppositions for accessibility in the very 
being of God. Apart from the apophatic descriptions of God as a being defined by 
many negative attributes, Athanasius gives some positive statement about God. God 
is 'good' (ccya06s) and 'lover of mankind' (cpiXdv8pcoTro5)348. It means that God 
by his goodness and loving-kindness, which is in his nature, has bridged the 
ontological gulf between created and uncreated nature. God creates in order to 
manifest his love and his creative agency is integral to his being. The relationship 
between God and creation is articulated on the basis of a distinction in se and ad 
extra. God is ' in all creation, he is in essence outside the universe but in everything 
by his power, ordering everything and extending his providence'3 4 9. Employing the 
distinction essence-power, Athanasius shows the presence of God in the world by 
his power. The crucial point in the relationship between God and creation is the total 
dependency of the creation on God, because God brought creation from nothing into 
existence. The divine sovereignty characterises the relationship between God and 
the world and preserves his transcendence. On the other side is divine 'goodness', 
which keeps the relationship between divine immanence and transcendence in 
balance, maintaining the nearness of God. Being outside creation by his essence God 
allows creation to share in his power. Athanasius, like Irenaeus, uses Platonic 
categories of participation: 
Being good, he [God] governs and establishes the whole world through his 
Word who is himself God, in order that creation, illuminated by the 
leadership, providence and ordering of the Word, may be able to remain 
firm, since it shares in the Word who is truly from the Father and is aided by 
him to exist.3 5 0 
Being ontologically impoverished, creation is constantly in the state of a potential 
dissolution back into nothingness. Athanasius shows that the activity of God in the 
world is to maintain creation in existence by his Logos. He makes no distinction in 
Godhead by prioritising the Father over the Son, or God over his Logos. The Logos 
is fully divine for Athanasius. 
3 4 6 Athanasius. Contra Gentes 35. 
3 4 7 Irenaeus of Lyon, Adv. Hear. 11, 9, 1 'For even creation reveals Him who formed it, and the very 
work made suggests Him who made it, and the world manifests Him who ordered it'. 
3 4 8 Athanasius, Contra Gentes 35. 
3 4 9 Athanasius, De Incarnatione 17. 
^° Athanasius, Contra Gentes 41. 
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His holy disciples teach that everything was created through him and for 
him, and that being good offspring of a good The Father and true The Son, 
he is the power of the Father and his wisdom and Word; not so by 
participation, nor to these properties accrue to him from outside in the way of 
those who participate in him and are given wisdom by him; but he is absolute 
wisdom, very Word, and himself the Father's own power.3 5 1 
Athanasius defines Logos in a completely different way from Arius. For him Logos 
is not on the side of creation, as it was in Arius, but on the side of the strictly divine. 
Logos is other than creation, but he is powerfully present in it. He keeps the role of 
mediator between God and creation, but there is no subordinationism. Athanasius 
clearly distinguishes the Logos of God from Aoyog OTTEPUOCTIKOS of Stoics. 
By word I do not mean the word involved and innate in every creature, 
which some are accustomed to call seminal; it has no life of its own neither 
can it reason or think, but it acts merely by an extrinsic art according to the 
skill of him who set it in the creature. Nor do I mean the word of human kind 
which is composed of syllables and expressed in the air. But I mean the 
living and acting God, the very Word of the good God of the universe, who 
is other than created things and all creation; he is rather the sole and 
individual Word of good The Father, who was ordered all this universe and 
illuminates it by his providence. He is the good Word of the good The 
Father, and it is he who has established the order off all things, reconciling 
the opposites and from them forming a single harmony. 
Athanasius does not only distinguish Logos from the seminal logos, but his Logos, 
as in Irenaeus353, differs from the human word or Aoyos irpocpopiKos because 
Logos is not composed and therefore not dissolvable. Despite the fact that 
Athanasius openly attacked the Stoic doctrine of Aoyos OTrepuccTiKos in previous 
citation, for some scholars it remains an open question how Athanasius saw the 
relation between human reason and divine Reason in his early treatises354. It is 
obvious that in Contra Gentes we can trace the frequent influence of Stoicism, but 
this is not the case with the Stoic doctrine of Aoyos OTTEpucmKOs. Using the same 
vocabulary and conceptual tools of Stoics, Athanasius replaced the doctrine of 
Aoyos O T T E P U C C T I K O S with faith in the Creator Logos355. Athanasius interpreted the 
Stoic doctrine about rationality as a way to know God in the Christian sense in terms 
3 3 1 Athanasius, Contra Gentes 46. 
j 5 2 Athanasius, Contra Gentes 40 
3 5 3 Irenaeus, Adv. Hear. II, 17, 4 'If, again, the Aeons were derived from Logos, Logos from Nous, 
and Nous from Bythus, just as lights are kindled from a light-as, for example, torches are from a 
torch-then they may no doubt differ in generation and size from one another; but since they are of the 
same substance with the Author of their production, they must either all remain for ever impossible, 
or their The Father Himself must participate in passion'. 
3 3 4 E .P . Meijer.ing, Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius. p. 34 
3 5 5 Andrew Louth, Reason and Revelation, Scottish Journal of Theology, volume 23, 1970, p. 386. 
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of his strong belief that Logos in creation is the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ. 
The knowledge of Logos is at the same time the knowledge of God. 
As looking up to heaven and seeing its order and the light of the stars one 
can form an idea of the Word who sets their order, so when thinking of the 
Word of God one must also think of his The Father, God, from whom he 
proceeds and therefore rightly called the interpreter and messenger of his 
The Father.356 
The universe is constructed reasonably by the Logos of God. But this Logos is not 
the impersonal and immanent Reason of the Stoics, but Logos is the Son of God, the 
incarnate Jesus Christ. Athanasius does not deny that the order, meaning and 
intelligibility in the world is arranged and governed3^7 by the Logos of God. 
Athanasius develops this argument through the analogy between reason and order in 
the world and Logos, who is the Son of the Father358. In his second treatise De 
Incarnatione, Athanasius develops his theological argument in Contra Gentes. Thus 
the knowledge of God is presented in the context of grace. Athanasius asks the 
question: 
What advantage would there be for those who had been made, i f they did not 
know their own Maker? Or in what way would they be rational, being 
unaware of the Word of the Father by whom they had also been created? 
( H ncbq dv elev ^.OYIKOI (if) ywcbcKOvxec, xov xov Ylaxpoq A6YOV, ev co 
Koci YEYO^cccnv)3 5 9-
Answering the question how ^OYIKO'I are rational i f they do not know the Logos of 
God, Athanasius combines the Stoic argumentation with typically Christian themes. 
The Stoic argumentation is that A,OYtKO\ are rational i f they participate in Logos, 
which is Reason. In Athanasius interpretation Logos is the Son of God, who was the 
incarnate Jesus Christ. Thus, real XOYIKOI are those who recognise the fu l l 
revelation of Logos in Jesus Christ. 
Therefore, lest this should happen, since he is good he bestowed on them on 
his own image, our Lord Jesus Christ and made them according to his own 
image and likeness, in order that, understanding through such grace the 
image, I mean the Word of the Father, they might be able through him to 
gain some notion about the Father, and recognising the Maker, might live a 
happy and truly blessed l i f e . 3 6 0 
Athanasius, Contra Gentes 45 
j : > 7 Athanasius, Contra Gentes 40 
3 5 8 Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius, p. 49 
3 : > 9 Athanasius, De incarnatione 1 1. 
3 6 0 Athanasius, De incarnatione 11. 
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As we see the Stoic idea of Aoyog ouepuaTiKos is completely changed with the 
Christian orientation. Athanasius employs the Platonic category of participation to 
show in which ways man can be truly AoyiKOS. Through participation in the image 
and the likeness of incarnate Logos of God, we can be truly rational and have 
knowledge of God. 
It is very interesting to mention that Athanasius in his Contra Gentes proposes 
another way to know God. Apart from the way of knowing God which is based on 
faith in the Creator, there is one based on the rational and immortal soul. The soul 
has the faculty of independent contemplation God 3 6 1 . Athanasius describes soul as 
rrjv fyvaiv e-UKivrixot;3 6 2, using the same term as Origen 3 6 3. Following Origen, who 
teaches that the soul falling from the level of nous to the level of psyche is 
imprisoned in the body, Athanasius links nous and the soul in reverse process. Thus 
nous as the superior pole and principal director of the soul 3 6 4 always turns the soul 
back into communion with God 3 6 5. Conceiving the soul as self-motivating by nature, 
Athanasius nearly establishes the existence of an eternal reality alongside God, 
which is not dependent on God's grace. But in De Incarnatione366, Athanasius 
neglected the idea of self-moving soul, teaching that man, including his soul, is 
mortal by nature because he is created by nature. The purity of the soul still remains 
the way to gain the eternal life and knowledge of God 3 6 7 . The original contribution 
•j f o 
of Athanasius is the doctrine of the soul as mirror of God the Father . 
'When the soul has put of every stain of sin with which it is tinged, and 
keeps pure only what is in the image, than when this shines forth, it can truly 
contemplate as in mirror the Word, the image of the Father 
(fev Kat67ii;pcp Becopei xr\v eiKova xov Flaxpot; xov A6yov), and in him 
meditate on the Father, of whom the Saviour is the image' 3 6 9. 
Being a mirror-image of the Father means to reflect the image of God. But purity of 
soul is a condition for being formed in such an image. It is important to underline 
that there is no ontological connection or the natural kinship between God and the 
soul. The soul can reflect the image of God only when it is pure. Although dealing 
with a Platonistic theme, Athanasius nevertheless retains a Christian position. 
3 S I Athanasius, Contra Gentes 2. 33. 
3 6 2 Athanasius, Contra Gentes 4. 9. 
3 6 3 0rigen, On the First Principles, I, 8, 4. 
3 < M Charles Kannengiesser, Athanasius of Alexandria and the foundation of traditional christology, 
Theological studies, 34, Baltimore, 1973., p. 109. 
3 6 5 Athanasius, Contra Gentes 26.24; 39.19; 34.14 . 
3 6 6 Athanasius, De Incarnatione 4. 
j 6 7 Athanasius, De Incarnatione 57. 
3 6 8 Andrew Louth, The origins of Christian Mystical Tradition, pp. 79-80. 
3 6 9 Athanasius, Contra Gentes 34. 
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He achieved some progress in his early treatises in comparison with the previous 
tradition not just by deplatonising it, but also by giving answers to some current 
theological problems. Athanasius emphasised the transcendence of God the Creator 
over creation, which came from nothing as well as God's action to protect creation 
from the corruption inherited in its ontological poverty. The absence of anti-Arian 
polemics is evident in his early works. The necessity for the Son to be fully divine 
and fully human is not a central theme of Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione 
though it is of more concern in his anti-Arian writings. 
Now we focus our interest on the theological implication of Arian teaching and 
Athanasius' refutation of it. 
As we saw before, Athanasius and Arius agreed that the relationship between God 
and the world must be conceived in the light of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. The 
need to stress the ontological difference between God and the world common to 
both authors was the logical response to Origen's teaching. Thus God became 
absolutely free and sovereign in relation to the world and the world became 
dependent on God. The abolition of an intermediate zone between God and creation 
was achieved in different ways in Arius and in Athanasius. With the intention of 
preserving an ontological gulf between God and the world, Arius applied a radical 
disjunction between God and the world to the relation between God and Logos. Thus 
Logos or the Son of God was downgraded to the level of creaturehood. Athanasius 
on the other hand distinguished the relationship between God and the world from the 
relationship between God and Logos. He placed Logos in the divine realm. 
Athanasius, like Arius, divided reality on two distinct realms, the uncreated and the 
created. By positioning Logos in the divine realm, Athanasius points out 
dissimilarity between the Son and the creation. 
The Son is Offspring of the Father's essence 
(yEvvrina T f js T O U TraTpos ouaias), and He is Framer, and other things 
are framed by Him, and He is the Radiance and Word and Image and 
Wisdom of the Father, and things originate stand and serve in their place 
below the Triad, therefore the Son is different in kind and different in 
essence from things originate, and on the contrary is proper 0 '5 l o s) t o t n e 
* > 370 
Father's essence and one in nature (ouocpuons) with it. 
Athanasius uses terms as 'offspring of the Father's essence', 'proper to the Father's 
essence', and 'one in nature' to underline the divine nature of the Son. Those terms 
are correlatives to bu.oo'uaios. 
3 7 0 Athanasius, Contra Arianos I, 58 
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The word 'Coessential' has not this meaning when used of things immaterial, 
and especially of God, and acknowledging that the Word was not a creature, 
but an offspring from the essence, and that the Father's essence was the 
origin and root and fountain of the Son, and that he was of very truth His The 
Father's likeness.371 
Anatolios''72 in his book pointed out that fa^oowtos is not a positive statement 
telling us something about God's being; rather it is a negative one telling us that 
Logos is not a creature. Athanasius' qualification is based on the difference between 
God and the created order. Athanasius introduces "apart" bu.oo\)<iios, another 
technical term to describe how the Son relates to the 16105, the Father. 18105 is a 
biblical 3 7 3 term, which was used by Alexander, his predecessor as Bishop of 
Alexandria. It describes the Son's relation to the Father as a relation of intimacy and 
inseparability. To 'be proper' with the Father means to be "from his essence" 
( E K Tf |5 ouoi'as). The Son is 'proper to' the Father, while the relationship between 
creation and God is defined in the terms of 'externality'. Thus, creation is 'external 
to' or 'from outside' ( E K T O S , E^COSEV) the Father. 
When then was God without that which is proper (iBiou) to Him? Or how 
can a man consider that which is proper (iSt'ou), as foreign ( £EVOU ) and alien 
in essence (aAAoTpioouoiog)? For other things, according to the nature of 
things originate, are without likeness in essence with the Maker; but are 
external (E^COSEV) to Him, made by the Word at His grace and wil l , and thus 
admit of ceasing to be, i f it so pleases Him who made them; for such is the 
nature of things originate.374 
By using the terms 'proper to' and 'external' or 'alien', Athanasius emphasises the 
ontological difference between God and creation as well as the identity in essence 
between the Son and the Father. Arguing against Arius' belief that the Son is 'called 
the Son and God and Wisdom only by participation'3 7 3, Athanasius makes another 
pair of oppositions to describe the relationship between God and creation. Being 
'proper to' means to be from same essence, and being 'external to' means to 'be by 
3 7 1 Athanasius, De Synodis 45 
3 7 2 Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius, p. 96 
3 7 3 John 5:18 'This way why the Jews sought all the more to kill him, because he not only broke the 
Sabbath but called God his own The Father (-rraTEpa ISIOV), making himself equal God', and 
Romans 8:32 'He who did not spare his own The Son ( T O U i5iou ulou), but gave him up for us all, 
will he also not give us all things with him'. 
j 7 , 1 Athanasius, Contra Arianos, I, 20. 
' 7 5 Athanasius, Contra Arianos, I, 15. 
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participation'. Thus, 'the Son Himself is not the Son by participation, but is the 
Father's own offspring' 3 7 6 . 
Athanasius makes a fundamental distinction between God and creation, articulating 
the distinction in terms of what partakes and what is partaken as well as in the terms 
of what is external and what is proper to divine essence. The Son is related 
essentially to God, and not by participation, for there is nothing of the Father in 
which the Son does not participate. Being proper to the Father's essence means that 
God as God is wholly participated in (oAcog UETexEa8at) 3 7 7 by the Son. The full 
participation of the Son in the Father indicates that there is no gap between that 
which partakes, and which is partaken, because there is no gap between the being of 
the Father and the being of the Son. This is not the case with the creation. 
Athanasius applies the category of participation to the relationship between God and 
the world in such a way that creation is related to God by participation in the Son. 
Athanasius' usage of participation differs from that of Arius. Arius teaches that the 
Son is a creature among other creatures, but not the same as them. 
We consider that the Son has this prerogative over others, and therefore is 
called Only-begotten, because He alone was brought to be by God alone, and 
all other things were created by God through the Son. 
Arius offers a hierarchical model of participation, giving a mediatory role to the 
Son. Al l things participate in the Son, who alone participates in the Father. God is 
involved in the world through the Son, who protects the world from direct contact 
with God. Athanasius criticises this position with a series of arguments. The first 
argument against the Arian position is that God is not so weak that he needs help 
from the Son in the act of creation379. The second argument is against the 
standpoint that God created only the Son and left the rest of the creative act to the 
Son. According to Athanasius, the God of Arius is too proud to be involved directly 
in the creative act 3 8 0 for the direct force of God cannot create the creatures so weak 
by nature381. The third argument is against mediatory role of the Son. I f the Son is a 
creature like any other, how can he endure 'God's hand', and how can the Father 
create him directly? I f the Son is a creature, existence of yet another mediator for the 
creation of the Son is implied. Every created mediator requires another mediator, 
j 7 6 Athanasius. Contra Arianos. HI, 1. 
j 7 7 Athanasius, Contra Arianos 1, 16. 
3 7 8 Athanasius, De Decretis 7. 
3 7 9 Athanasius, Contra Arianos II, 24. 
3 8 0 Athanasius, Contra Arianos II, 25. 
3 8 1 Athanasius, Contra Arianos II, 31. 
and so on ad infinitum . We can find the same argument in Irenaeus' refutation of 
Gnostic doctrine . Irenaeus argues that God needs no assistance or helper in 
creation3 8 4. Irenaeus uses the same argument against those who says that God is 
'careless, or inferior, or paid no regard to those things which took place among his 
own possessions'383. The logic of infinite regress386 is also criticised by Irenaeus. 
The conclusion of both Irenaeus and Athanasius is that all things were created by the 
Father, through Logos, who is his 'hand', and without whom nothing can be made: 
'b riaxfip, dor; Sid XElP°?> ^ v Aoyco eipYdaaxo xd ndvxa, KOCI x^PtQ ocbxou 
oi)5ev 7i:oi£i.'387. 
Through this metaphor Irenaeus and Athanasius emphasise that the world was 
created from nothing by an immediate act of God, without a mediator. The role of 
Logos or the Son is not the role of a mediator, but because he is no less fully divine 
than the Father he is also no less truly the Creator. The role of the Son is to bridge 
the gap between creation and God, not through functional mediation, but rather 
through the immediate presence of the Father in creation. Being consubstantial with 
the Father, the Son reveals his presence in creation. Thus, the incapacity of creation 
to know God is bridged by partaking in the Son's knowledge of the Father. Not only 
the Son, but also Holy Spirit plays the role of mediator between God and the world. 
This mediation is based on the divine status of the whole Holy Trinity and their 
immediacy in the world. 
Athanasius introduces another model of participation, completely different from that 
of Arius'. This model of immediate participation implies that through participation 
in the Spirit, creation participates in the Son and by participating in the Son, also 
participates in the Father. This model of participation is called 'immediate 
participation'3 8 8 different from hierarchical participation of Arius according to 
which the Son 'alone partakes the Father, and all other things partake the Son' . 
Athanasius states: 
3 8 2 Athanasius, Contra Arianos II , 26. 
3 8 3 E .P . Meijering, Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius, pp. 89-90. . 
3 8 4 Irenaeus, Adv. Hear. IV, 7, 4 ' . . .The Father being in no want of angels, in order that He might call 
the creation into being, and form man, for whom also the creation was made; nor, again, standing in 
need of any instrumentality for the framing of created things'. 
j 8 : > Irenaeus, Adv. Hear. II, 2, 1. 
3 8 6 Irenaeus, Adv. Hear. II, 2, 3. 
3 8 7 Athanasius, Contra Arianos II , 31; De Decretis 1 also in Irenaeus, Adv. Hear. IV , 20, 1. 
3 8 8 Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius, p. 115 
'8'' Athanasius, De Decretis 9 
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The Son is not such by participation, but, while all things originated have by 
participation the grace of God, He is the Father's Wisdom and Word of 
which all things partake, it follows that He, being the deifying and 
enlightening power of the Father, in which all things are deified and 
quickened, is not alien in essence from the Father, but coessential. For by 
partaking of Him, we partake of the Father; because the Word is the Father's 
390 
own. 
Athanasius is against Arius' model of hierarchical participation because such a 
model puts in question the divinity of the Son as well as the omnipotence of God. 
The categories of participation can be explained in the terms of grace. Arius' 
gradualist model of transmitting grace to creation implies two steps. In the first step, 
the Son receives grace from the Father, and then distributes it to the rest of creation. 
It is unacceptable to Athanasius that one who receives by participation can grant 
participation to others. Athanasius does not deny the possibility that one creature can 
give to another creature, but he wants to underline the role of creatures as receivers 
and the role of God as the ultimate Giver. 
In that way the world is fully dependent on God and the gap between God and the 
creation is bridged by God's initiative and not by that of the creation. This positive 
step by God toward creation does not abolish the ontological difference between 
God and the world. The immediate participation of creation in the life of the Holy 
Trinity implies a certain correspondence between God and the world. The 'likeness' 
between God and creation cannot be described in terms of analogical similarity. 
Their difference in nature causes an asymmetrical relationship between God and the 
world, because creation partakes and God is partaken of. The asymmetrical structure 
of this relationship, based as it is on absolute dependence of the world on God, 
emphasises their 'likeness' much more than their otherness. The 'likeness' and the 
otherness between God and the creation lead us to the question of continuity and 
discontinuity between God and the world. It puts in question the relation between 
God's essence and his wil l . 
The denial by Arius that the Son is fully divine separates God's creative activity 
from his being. 
God being Maker, to say, that His Framing Word and His Wisdom once was 
not? It is the same as saying, that God is not Maker, i f He had not His proper 
Framing Word which is from Him, but that that by which He frames, accrues 
to Him from without, and is alien from Him, and unlike in essence.391 
•' 0 Athanasius, De Synodis 51 
, y ' Athanasius. Contra Arianos 17. 
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By making Logos dependent of creation, Arius identifies the function of the Father 
with the function of the Creator392. I f the Son is not Son by nature, but belongs to the 
realm of created beings, then God cannot be called the 'Father' but only 'Maker' or 
'Creator'. The generative nature of God correlates with his creative activity. 
But i f there be not a Son, how then say you that God is a Creator? Since all 
things that come to be are through the Word and in Wisdom, and without 
This nothing can be, whereas you say He hath not That in and through which 
He makes all things. For i f the Divine Essence be not fruitful itself, but 
barren, as they hold, as a light that lightens not, and a dry fountain, are they 
not ashamed to speak of His possessing framing energy? and whereas they 
deny what is by nature, do they not blush to place before it what is by 
wi l l ? 3 9 3 
Athanasius distinguishes between the relationship of God with creation and the 
relationship of the Son with the Father. Crucially, Athanasius cuts the connection 
between theologia and oikonomia, giving absolute priority to God's being over his 
wil l . 
For the Word of God was not made for us, but rather we for Him, and "in 
Him all things were created.' Nor for that we were weak, was He strong and 
made by the Father alone, that He might frame us by means of Him as an 
instrument; perish the thought! it is not so. For though it had seemed good to 
God not to make things originate, still had the Word been no less with God, 
and the Father in Him. 3 9 4 
Two different names can be applied to God. He is simultaneously the Father and the 
Creator. Being the Father entails much more than being the Creator395. Athanasius 
establishes a distinction between generation and creation on the basis of a distinction 
between divine essence and wil l . God's essence precedes his wil l , because God is 
'The Father of an offspring from his proper essence' first and then he 'frames things 
that are external to him and before were not, by willing them' 3 9 6. 
Arius establishes a relationship between God and the word on the basis of divine 
will , which relates to the world. Athanasius, on the other hand, starts from the 
position that God is always Maker, but this does not lead him to conclude that his 
works necessarily must be eternal, as is the case with Origen. Being Maker implies 
the power to make and it does not constitute a relationship between God and the 
world, as in the case of God's Fatherhood, which is constitutive of his relationship 
"' " Athanasius, Contra Arianos I, 29. 
3 9 3 Contra Arianos II, 2 
3 9 1 Athanasius, Contra Arianos 11,31. 
^ Athanasius, Contra Arianos I, 33. 
m Athanasius, Contra Arianos II, 2. 
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with the Son. 'And a man may be and may be called Maker, though the works are 
not as yet; but he cannot be called the Father, nor can he be, unless a Son exists' 3 9 7. 
The Fatherhood of God tells much more about God's being than his creaturehood. 
God's Fatherhood does not imply temporal sequence in its being, as is the case with 
his creaturehood. God's Fatherhood implies logical order in his being. The Father 
and the Son are the ontological characteristics of God's being 3 9 8 and it necessarily 
connotes an actual relation by which God's very being is constituted. 
Athanasius refutes Origen's concept of God as TravTOKpdTcop by defining God's 
power to make intrinsic to divine being and defining the creation as necessarily 
temporal because it has come from nothing. 
God always had the power to make, yet the things originated had not the 
power of being eternal. For they are out of nothing, and therefore were not 
before their origination; but things which were not before their origination, 
how could these coexist with the ever-existing God? 3 9 9 
Only God's power to make is eternal. The creation has its beginning in time and it 
does not co-exist with God. It depends on the power of God the Creator, because of 
inherent limitations of its- nature. The relationship between the Father and the Son 
has priority over the relationship between God and the world. Athanasius concludes 
this on the basis of the priority of nature over will . 
Now it is a something that surpasses wil l , that He should be by nature, and 
should be the Father of His proper Word. I f then that which comes first, 
which is according to nature, did not exist, as they would have it in their 
folly, how could that which is second come to be, which is according to will? 
For the Word is first, and then the creation.400 
The Son is proper to the Father's essence and not foreign to God as is the case with 
the creation. The Son feels the same delight as the Father seeing the world made 
after his own image4 0 1 because he is one in being with the Maker. The relationship 
between God and the world is contained in the relationship between the Father and 
the Son. God mediates the ontological distance between God and the world in a 
twofold way. First, God is essentially the Father of his only-begotten Son and only 
subsequently the Maker of the world. Second, through the incarnation of his Son, 
3 9 7 Athanasius, Contra Arianos I, 29. 
3 9 8 G . Florovsky 'The Concept of creation in St. Athanasius', Studia Patristica 6, Berlin, Academie 
Verlag, 1962, pp. 45-6, reprinted in G. Florovsky, Collected works, (volume 4, Northland Publishing 
company, Belmont, Massachusetts, 1975.), pp. 52-3. 
3 , 9 Athanasius, Contra Arianos I, 29. 
4 0 0 Athanasius, Contra Arianos II, 2. 
4 0 1 Athanasius, Contra Arianos 11, 82. 
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God becomes the Father of humanity by grace and the Maker of the Incarnate 
Logos. 
Athanasius links God with creation in one positive relation based on divine creative 
agency. The creation has its being only in God. But it does not mean the abolition of 
the ontological poverty of creation and the establishment of the world as 
independent being. The being of the world remains 'foreign' and 'external' to God's 
being, because it participates in God 'from nothing'. The creation receives being 
from participation in God through his Logos. Participating in the Logos, the creation 
participates in the Father, because 'Logos is the Father's own ' 4 0 2 . Thus, the 
relationship between God and the world becomes dialectical, through an incarnate 
Logos who effects transformation of created reality. 
Athanasius in defending the Nicene formula made an exceptional contribution to 
Christian belief in the divinity of Logos. By establishing Logos as a fully divine, 
Athanasius developed the Christian conception of the relation between God and the 
world. Under the influence of certain philosophical schools, earlier doctrines posited 
God either too close to the world, resulting in the divine being linked with the world 
by necessity, or by emphasising the divine transcendence created a totally 
independent world. Thus God either absorbs the world into his own being or is 
unable to influence the world. A realm of subordinate mediators filled the gap 
between God and the World, and protected the world from the hand of God, or 
helped God to deal with the world. With the Gnostics the schema of intermediaries 
became more complex, because God the Creator employed demigods. Origen and 
the Alexandrian catechetical school could not avoid the cosmological patterns of 
Middle-Platonism establishing one eternal hierarchical chain of beings, which put at 
risk God's transcendence. Athanasius clearly distinguished God from creation, 
putting on the one side the world, which could 'not exist at all' and on the other God 
the Creator, who could 'not have created at all'. 
Athanasius' argument is sometimes traced back to Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyon. 
Athanasius followed Irenaeus in establishing the relationship between God and the 
world based on the divine love and the divine presence in creation. 
Another great achievement of Athanasius is the complete identification of Logos 
with Jesus Christ. In that way he brought to a complete stop the long history of 
philosophical doctrines of Logos and their influence on Christian thought. Logos 
ceased to be the cosmological principle, the Divine Reason, the reason inherited in 
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creatures, God's instrument in creation, God's power etc. Logos in Athanasius is 
Logos who became flesh. Thus Jesus Christ as incarnate Logos preserves the role of 
Mediator, but not as a functional one. He brings the world near the Father. Logos 
accomplishes his divine status through the communion of God and the world in him. 
Otherwise, i f he is merely a creature, he would not be able to bridge the ontological 
gulf between God and the world. 
With Athanasius of Alexandria started a new era in the history of Christian thought, 
an era of dogmatic theology. In his thought Athanasius successfully united two 
different Christian traditions, one Alexandrian with Clement and Origen, and 
another of Ignatius of Antioch and Irenaeus of Lyon, giving the advantage to the 
latter. 
1 2 Athanasius, De Synodis 51. 
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Conclusion 
The common outlook for many centuries has been that the Hellenistic teaching about 
logos found an heir in the Christian logos. Greek philosophers, according to this 
widely accepted opinion, were the ancestors of Christian thought. That implied that 
all the achievements of Greek philosophy were simply adopted wholesale by 
Christian writers and then arranged in accordance to the demands of its canons, 
without any original contribution. On the other hand, some Christian philosophers 
have seen the Old Testament prophets as Hellenistic thinkers, who had a glimpse of 
the truth before the incarnation of the logos as the divine-human person of Christ. 
Therefore, the matter of a possible affinity between Greek and Christian logos 
always hangs unresolved in the air. Modern rationalism is preoccupied not with 
similarities of the two perspectives about logos, but with the primacy of the Greek 
over the Christian logos. The modern rationalist thought tends to come out against 
the dependence of Greek philosophy on Christian revelation. The result of this 
tendency has been the theory that the Christian logos is a plain falsification, a feeble 
philosophical imitation. The old identification of two /ogos-concepts is put in 
question. Martin Heidegger in his The Introduction in Metaphysics, was one of the 
first to abandon a thousand-year-old tradition and to neglect the idea that two logos-
concepts are fundamentally one. Thus, a clash of duplicates is introduced at the 
centre of European thought. There were various attempts to make a clear distinction 
between the two /ogos-concepts. 
It has been the aim of our thesis to investigate both /ogo^-concepts. In the first 
chapter of our thesis, which dealt with Greek philosophers, we investigated the 
/egos-concepts in a wider perspective. Our investigation covered not only the usage 
of logos at an ontological level, but also at both a logical level and at the level of 
language. There are various complex meanings of logos in Greek thought and it is 
very difficult to give a single definition of the term. But every level of our 
investigation, whether logical, linguistic or onto-logical it has been shown that the 
Greek logos always has as its function to 'bring together', to 'unite opposites', to be 
an element of unity in multiplicity. In every case, what is characteristic of the Greek 
108 
understanding of this concept is that logos acts by necessity, having in itself an 
element of force by which it unites. 
It is more difficult to define the Christian logos because every effort to define it ends 
up with a philosophical-mythological logos. Thus, the Christian logos is often 
identified with the Son of God, whose role is to be messenger and instrument of a 
self-willed tyrant. 
In the second, third and fifth chapter of our thesis we investigated the role of logos, 
mainly in Christian thinkers. The fourth chapter returned to Greek philosophy and it 
demonstrates how Plotinus stands outside the central paradigm of our thesis. In the 
first chapter our interest spread to the different uses of logos. The other chapters are 
primarily interested in making a clear distinction between Greek monistic ontology, 
and a Christian ontology in which God became an ontological ground. The questions 
of God's freedom in the creation of the world are particularly emphasised. The focus 
from the second chapter to the end of the thesis is on the questions of necessity and 
freedom in the context of the doctrine of logos, with an intention to show in the final 
analysis that the Christian God is absolutely free with regard to the world. 
In the first part of the second chapter we showed that Philo, despite the difficulty of 
defining his use of logos, remains bound by a supreme ontological necessity. Philo 
sees the Logos as being brought forth by God, because He decided to create the 
world. But on the other hand, Philo shows an interest in divine freedom and grace, 
insisting on a beginning for creation, and the mind's need to be raised up by God. 
Second, Logos is not a messenger of God's commands but mediator of divine gifts, 
reflecting also God's simplicity. Third, Logos reveals both God's gifts and God 
himself. Both the continuity and the gulf between God and his gifts is reconciled in 
Philo's thought. In the Gospel of St. John the term Logos appears to be a synthesis 
of two traditions - the Jewish, from which it probably translates memra or dabar, 
and the Greek philosophical tradition. St. John's Logos acquires at the same time a 
completely new meaning, for he affirms that Logos is God, that He became flesh and 
lived among us. Thus, he reconciles Logos as the eternal power of God with logos as 
a complete human being, whose name is Jesus. 
In the third chapter, which deals with Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria and 
Origen, Logos is described in terms of 'temporalising' God. The incarnation of 
Logos is just one episode in the long history of God's presence in the world, a 
history that is not yet complete. With Justin starts a long history of applying the term 
logos exclusively to Jesus Christ. In Clement, Logos is identical with God and 
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distinct from God-as-such, and the forms in which he appears, like the incarnate 
Jesus Christ, are just accidental to him. Origen completed the identification of Jesus 
Christ with the divine Logos. But, Logos remains for him a 'second God', lesser in 
divinity than the Father because Origen could not allow two first principles. Apart 
from the fact that logos in Justin and in the two Alexandrians was imprisoned by the 
'systems' of Greek philosophy, the movement toward a new ontology is visible in 
their teachings. Thus, was set up the centrality of freedom, and both the divine and 
the human and logos ceased to be just a cosmological convenience and became a 
real pattern for affection to the Father. 
We dedicated the fourth chapter to Plotinus because he deals with the same themes, 
as do Christians. Although he uses the same concepts as freedom or necessity, he 
remains a monistic thinker. His logos retains the role of a unifying principle. Logos 
introduces order in the multiplicity of the material world and serves as mediator 
between higher and lower realities. Plotinus' logos is subject to necessity because it 
acts in the lower levels of realities, but Plotinus' necessity must be conceived as the 
wil l of the One, like everything which emanates from it. 
The final chapter shows the full affirmation of God's freedom as well as the full 
divinity of Jesus Christ as Logos of God. Ignatius of Antioch, responding to Gnostic 
heresies, initiated the process of the 'liberation' of God from the 'chains' of monistic 
ontology. At the same time he bridged the gap between God and the world by 
identifying being with life in Christ, which became the basis of Christian ontology. 
Irenaeus of Lyon continued in the same direction as Ignatius. He identified the 
Logos of God with Jesus Christ. But he did not understand this identity in terms of 
the continuity of a personal subject, as Justin did. Irenaeus conceives identification 
of Logos with Jesus Christ without placing the eternal Logos of God within time. He 
understood the same Logos, who was invisible and incomprehensible, as becoming 
visible and comprehensible. Athanasius of Alexandria considers Logos as being 
fully divine. The incarnate Logos is Jesus Christ, who accomplishes his divine status 
through the communion of God and the world in him. Athanasius affirmed the 
transcendence of God and his freedom in creation, claiming that the world could 
'not exist at all' and that God the Creator could 'not have created at all'. 
Attempts to distinguish between the Greek and Christian logos ended in religious 
and philosophical forms, concealing the fundamental distinction between them. By 
revealing the fundamental distinction between the two logos, the nature of the 
Christian logos is revealed. The Christian logos as the logos of love and freedom is 
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passive and he reveals himself as entirely different from the Greek logos of 
necessity. The Greek logos lies within the Christian logos; but is merely parasitic 
upon it. The Christian Logos, our Lord Jesus Christ, is logos of love and logos of 
gathering, but not gathering by necessity. This gathering is a gathering based on free 
wil l , gathering in the free love of God. He is not a force which brings together 
something which is opposite by nature. He does not use force even i f this is the only 
way to participate in some supreme idea of justice and goodness. Christian logos is a 
call for participation in the love of God. 
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